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Chapter 1: Summary and contribution  
 
This chapter provides a summary of the background and key findings of five peer-reviewed 
publications that constitute the submission for PhD by publication. Two papers (Ding and Jia, 
2012; Al-Najjar and Ding, 2014) contribute to research on product market efficiency and the 
remaining three (Ding and Cheng, 2011; Ding and Hou, 2015; Chen, Ding, Hou and Johan, 
2015) contribute to financial market efficiency. Taken together, the underlying theme of these 
papers has important implications for resources allocation and the aggregate welfare of an 
economy.  
According to a definition in economics, the product market is the marketplace where goods 
or services are provided for purchase by consumers, businesses, and the public sector. The 
elements to be considered when defining product market equilibrium include the 
characteristics of the product or service, the existence of entry barrier, consumer pre-
preference, and competition among market participants (i.e., suppliers and consumers). 
Competition in the product market, which is described by Adam Smith in “the Wealth of 
Nations (1776)” as allocating productive resources to their most highly valued users and 
encouraging efficiency, enables the movement of resources to where they are most needed, 
and where they can be most efficiently utilized. It is generally accepted that competition 
results in lower price as well as greater welfare for consumers, leading to higher efficiency 
for the economy. However, perfect competition requires no barriers to entry. This implies that 
in the presence of new firms entering an industry, incumbent firms will lose their existing 
customers to new entrants and are forced to reduce their price to match the lower price set by 
new entrants. In real life certain kinds of entry barriers do exist, which makes perfect 
competition (and perfect product market efficiency) an idealization.  
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Different from the product market, the influence of the financial market usually goes beyond 
its geographic boundary, because the development of IT technology enables the integration of 
various types of financial market (e.g., stock market, bond market and foreign exchange 
market) and financial market in different locations. Considered as one of the underlying 
principles of modern financial markets, the (semi-strong form of) efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) posits that market price fully reflects all publicly available information, because 
market participants attempt to profit from their information advantage, and doing so enables 
the incorporation of their private information into the market price (Fama, 1970). However, 
this would probably take place in an idealized world of “no market friction”, “zero tax” and 
“zero transaction cost”. According to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), financial market 
efficiency relies on market participants who actively monitor financial markets and arbitrage 
away price discrepancies. Nevertheless, a perfectly efficient financial market is almost 
impossible because if this is the reality, there is no benefit from gathering information. In other 
words, the degree of financial market efficiency determines the effort investors are willing to 
expend to collect and trade on information. Therefore, from the viewpoint of Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), EMH is an idealization that is economically unrealizable, but could serve as a 
useful benchmark for measuring relative market efficiency. 
It is an interesting question whether market efficiency theories developed in mature 
economies such as the US and UK can be applied to other countries with less developed 
market infrastructures. In an attempt to increase the productivity of state-owned enterprises, 
the Chinese government began transforming their economy from being centrally planned into 
market oriented in the late 1970s. As a result, many former state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) 
were turned into publicly listed firms that successfully raised funds from external investors in 
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the stock market.
1
 However, the government and government agencies continue to be the 
controlling shareholder of these firms, suggesting that there are two types of agency problem 
in Chinese SOEs: The agency problem between shareholders and the management (type I 
agency problem); and the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (type II agency problem). As the majority of publicly listed firms in China are 
still controlled by the central and local government and effective internal and external 
governance mechanisms have not been well established yet, the functioning of the Chinese 
stock market might deviate from what is predicted by the efficient market hypothesis. 
Another reason that renders the Chinese stock market deviating from an efficient market is 
that the government still plays a dominant role in managing the economy. For example, SOEs 
are able to receive preferential treatment from the government in terms of easy access to 
credit, government subsidiary and favourable regulatory conditions. This indicates that both 
the financial and product markets play a secondary role in resource allocation, resulting in 
both markets being less efficient. However, with the development of market infrastructure 
and financial intermediaries such as financial analysts, the efficiency of the Chinese stock 
market is likely to improve. For example, Hung (2009) reports that before the announcement 
by the Chinese government to release the investment restrictions on the B-share market on 
                                                          
1 There are two stock exchanges in mainland China. Shanghai Stock Exchange was established on 26th 
November, 1990 and started trading on 19
th
 December, 1990. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was founded on 1
st
 
December, 1990 and started trading on 3
rd
 July, 1991. Two classes of shares are traded on these exchanges. A 
shares are denominated by Chinese Yuan and traded by domestic investors; B shares are denominated in foreign 
currencies and traded by foreign investors before February 2001. Additionally, H shares are denominated in 
Hong Kong Dollar and traded in the Hong Kong stock exchange. By the end of June 2015, there are more than 
1,000 and 1,700 firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively. The aggregate market capitalization of two 
stock exchanges is USD 5.8 trillion by 2015. 
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19
th
 February 2001 (so domestic investors could trade B-shares), the weak form of efficient 
market hypothesis was not supported in the B-share market. After the regulatory change in 
February 2001, the weak form of efficient market hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating 
the efficiency of the B-share market has improved.  
Recent advancement in psychology and experimental economics has documented a number of 
departures from the EMH, due to specific behavioural bias that could affect decision-making 
under uncertainty. These examples include: over-reaction (Debondt and Thaler, 1985), loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Odean, 1998), overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 
2001; Gervais and Odean, 2001) and home bias. In particular, overconfidence is a widely 
observed psychological bias that generates heterogeneous beliefs (Daniel et al., 2002; 
Barberis and Thaler, 2003). The difference in investors’ beliefs will fluctuate more if there is 
more difference in investors’ level of overconfidence because overconfidence can lead 
investors to differ in information processing (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). 
Miller (1977) argues that, if agents have heterogeneous beliefs about an asset’s fundamentals 
and short sales are prohibited, equilibrium prices would, given opinions diverge sufficiently, 
reflect the opinion of the more optimistic investor. Harrison and Kreps (1978) exploit the 
dynamic consequences of heterogeneous beliefs. Since an investor knows that, in the future, 
there may be other investors that value the asset more than he does, the investor is willing to 
pay more for an asset than if he has to hold the asset forever. This is the theoretical 
framework used in the first study: Ding and Cheng (2011). 
In the Chinese stock market, firms which have issued A shares to domestic investors could 
also issue B shares in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and H shares in the Hong 
Kong stock exchange to foreign investors, and such firms are labelled as “cross-listed” firms. 
Mainland domestic investors are prohibited from investing in H shares in the Hong Kong 
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market, while Hong Kong investors are only allowed to invest in mainland B shares but not A 
shares.  
In the literature the “foreign share discount” refers to the price difference of cross-listed firms 
in China. Compared with A shares, the cross-listed B and H shares are always traded at a 
discount, although shareholders of both shares have equal rights (Fernald and Rogers, 2002). 
In the first study, we provide fresh evidence to support the view that the speculative trading 
can potentially explain the share discount of cross-listed stocks by exploiting the “share 
investment through-train scheme to Hong Kong” announced on 20th August 2007 (but re-
assessed in November 2007 and actually suspended thereafter).
2
 Because under the “through-
train” scheme mainland individual investors were allowed to directly invest in Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong investors could buy the cross-listed stocks (which are traded at a discount in 
Hong Kong) with the purpose to sell to incoming mainland investors at a much higher price. 
We expect such speculative trading to generate market optimism and a price bubble in Hong 
Kong, as the Hong Kong Hang Seng index rose by 48% after the release of the “through-train 
scheme” in August 2007. Similarly, after the release of re-assessment announcement in 
November 2007, the speculative trading motive suddenly dissipated, leading to a dramatic 
plummet in Hong Kong’s stock market. The empirical findings generally support our 
conjecture. This study contributes to research on market efficiency by identifying speculation 
as one potential explanation of the “foreign share discount” of cross-listed firms in China. 
The second contribution comes from Ding and Hou (2015). In developing the “investor 
recognition hypothesis”, Merton (1987) assumes that investors know only about a subset of 
                                                          
2
 Since 17th November 2014, Mainland and Hong Kong investors can directly invest in the Shanghai and Hong 
Kong markets through the “Pilot Program of an Interconnection Mechanism for Transactions in the Shanghai 
and Hong Kong Stock Markets”. 
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the available securities on the market and that these subsets do not overlap among different 
investors. In equilibrium, investors require a return premium from firms that are not well 
recognized because investors are less likely to purchase stocks that they are not familiar with, 
so such stocks tend to have lower liquidity. Merton (1987) proposes that the shareholder base 
be a reasonable proxy of the extent to which a particular firm is recognized among investors, 
so a bigger shareholder base indicates that the firm has been better recognized. In other 
words, potential investors have to be aware of a firm before they can gradually become 
familiar with it and then eventually decide to invest, suggesting that investor attention is a 
necessary condition for a firm to be well recognized. Following Da, Engelberg and Gao 
(2011), in the second study of the submission we use a new measure for investors’ active 
attention, which is the aggregate search volume of a particular stock ticker provided by 
Google Trends (available from: www.google.com/trends). Then we test the effect of 
investors’ attention paid to listed firms on two aspects: Breadth of ownership; and stock 
liquidity. We find empirical evidence that investor attention, reflected by Google search 
volume, is associated with enlarged shareholder base and better stock liquidity. This study 
contributes to market efficiency research by highlighting that investor information demand is 
associated with better visibility of the firm among investors as well as reduced information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and external investors. 
Financial market is where individuals or institutions trade financial securities, commodities, 
and other tradable assets at a price that reflects the law of supply and demand. The operation 
of a financial market involves multiple stakeholders including investors, financial 
intermediaries and regulators. Financial analysts are generally considered as one of the most 
important financial intermediaries, as they have the expertise to analyse relevant information 
from financial statements as well as other public sources and, subsequently, disseminate the 
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information to current and prospective investors (Chung and Jo, 1996). As pointed out by 
Healy and Palepu (2001), the benefits of analyst coverage result from the analyst’s role in 
information production and dissemination which, subsequently, enhances corporate 
transparency and informational efficiency. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), “to the 
extent that security analysis activities reduce the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control, they are indeed socially productive”. Empirical evidence supports 
the significant role analysts play in the capital market, particularly in developed countries 
such as the US. For example, Roulstone (2003) shows that more analysts following leads to 
increased liquidity, suggesting that analysts are able to reduce information asymmetry 
between investors and managers of the firm. Ayers and Freeman (2003) find that prices of 
firms with high analyst coverage incorporate future earnings more rapidly than firms with 
low analyst coverage. Consistent with the view that analysts are important information 
intermediaries between the firm and the market, Sun (2011) shows that income smoothing 
enhances earnings informativeness more significantly for firms with high analyst coverage. 
Overall, analyst coverage is believed to contribute to better corporate transparency and 
informational efficiency. In Chen, Ding, Hou and Johan (2015), we investigate the 
monitoring role of financial analysts in the Chinese capital market. As one of the largest 
emerging economies in the world, the Chinese capital market has experienced remarkable 
growth since the early 1990s. By the end of 2010, more than 2,000 firms are listed in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, and the total market capitalization exceeds USD 
4.76 trillion. As a result of the partial privatization of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
since the 1990s, the majority of Chinese listed firms are ultimately controlled by the state 
(e.g., central government, local government or a government agent). Due to political reason 
SOEs can receive favourable treatment from the government and, thus, have relatively easy 
access to equity and credit markets, which implies that SOEs are under less pressure to 
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reduce information asymmetry. In contrast, non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) are more 
dependent on the equity market as the major source of external financing, which implies that 
they have more incentive to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, we are able to analyze 
the effectiveness of analyst coverage and determine whether their monitoring role is 
potentially reduced (enhanced) depending on ownership structure. 
China is also characterized as an earnings-based regulatory regime. For example, in 1998 the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) required that a listed firm reporting loss for 
two consecutive years be labelled a special treatment (ST) firm, and its daily stock quotation 
fluctuation be reduced from 10% to 5%. At the same time, ST firms were subject to intense 
scrutiny from financial intermediaries such as analysts. Therefore, in this study we explicitly 
investigate whether the effect of analyst coverage on financial reporting quality is moderated 
by 1) ownership structure 2) operational performance captured by ST and whether the firm is 
under-performing its industry peers. Based on the analysis of a large sample of Chinese 
publicly listed firms between 2003 and 2009, we find that analyst coverage contributes to a 
higher financial reporting quality in terms of lower incidence of modified audit opinion 
(MAO), and such effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). 
Furthermore, we show that analyst coverage plays a more significant role in reducing the 
propensity that firms experiencing financial distress (ST firms) and under-performing firms 
would receive MAO. The findings of this study contribute to research on market efficiency 
by highlighting the importance of financial analysts in promoting financial reporting 
transparency of public firms in China, one of the largest emerging economies in the world. 
The fourth study is Ding and Jia (2012). In this study we analyze the economic consequence 
of the merger of two auditing firms, namely Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand 
(PwC) in 1998 in the UK audit market. Consumers often benefit from increased competition 
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in the product market (Hausman, 1999; Hausman and Leonard, 2002). The UK audit market 
has been characterized as an oligopoly market. For example, the “Big Four” auditor firms, 
namely, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC dominate the UK auditing 
market by auditing 99 of the FTSE 100 companies, 242 of FTSE 250 companies and 
collecting 99% of auditing fees in the FTSE 350 in 2005. The high degree of concentration 
becomes more remarkable after the Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger in 
1998 and the dissolution of Arthur Anderson in 2002. According to a study commissioned in 
September 2005 by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Financial Reporting 
Council (Oxera, 2006), the higher market concentration led to higher audit fees. Between 
1995 and 2004, audit fees on average increased by 11.7% in real terms. Although information 
on operation margins of auditing firms is limited, anecdotal evidence suggests that the fee 
increase is partially attributed to the collective market power enjoyed by “Big Four” auditors. 
This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that less competition drives the industry price 
to a level well above the marginal cost. In the fourth study we investigate the economic 
consequence of the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in the UK, and 
focus on the impact of the merger on the change in audit quality and audit fee with a sample 
of UK publicly listed firms. We find that in the post-merger period (1999-2001) earnings 
quality improved for clients of top-tier auditors relative to that in the pre-merger period 
(1995-1997). Consistent with the prediction of economic theory that less competition results 
in higher fees, we show that there is an increase in audit fee for the top-tier auditor clients 
after the PwC merger, suggesting the merger leads to a net increase in the price paid by 
clients to purchase audit services. This study contributes to the market efficiency research 
because the findings are of interest to regulators who are responsible for assessing the 
implication of future consolidation of the auditing industry in the UK. 
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The fifth contribution to this dissertation by publication comes from Al-Najjar and Ding 
(2014). There are both theoretical and empirical investigations on voluntary disclosure of 
private information. The theoretical literature identifies conditions under which firms 
voluntarily disclose their private information (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). A manager aiming at maximizing firm value will disclose 
information only if it is sufficiently favourable (so such disclosure contributes to higher firm 
value). The empirical literature on voluntary disclosure points to improved liquidity as one of 
the major benefits. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) survey managers from US public 
firms and report that 44% strongly agreed that “voluntarily communicating information 
increases the overall stock liquidity (compared with 17% who strongly disagree with the 
statement)”. Higher liquidity attracts both individual and institutional investors, as evidenced 
by Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) who document that firms with sustained improvements 
in analyst rating of disclosure quality show an increase in stock liquidity, analyst following, 
institutional ownership and stock performance. On the other hand, firms also incur cost when 
disclosing private information. Disclosure cost includes the actual cost of making the 
disclosure and the cost arising from the proprietary nature of the disclosed information. It is 
relatively difficult to quantify the direct costs associated with disclosure activities. Instead, 
there is more evidence on the indirect cost of voluntary disclosure. Harris (1998) analyses the 
association between product market competition and detailed industry segment disclosure, 
and finds that profitable operations in less competitive industries are less likely to be 
reported. 
In the fifth and last paper included in the submission, we investigate the association between 
product market competition and disclosure of corporate governance information with a 
sample of UK public firms. In this study, we suggest that product market competition can 
potentially have two opposing effects on corporate governance disclosure. On one hand, 
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firms might have more disclosure due to intense product market competition, since 
competition serves as disciplinary and monitoring mechanism to pressure managers to 
commit to better disclosure practice. On the other hand, corporate governance disclosure can 
be seen as a substitute for product market competition: Managers use more disclosure in less 
competitive markets to maintain investor confidence in their firms. Following recent 
literature (i.e. Li, 2010), we employ different measures to describe product market 
competition at the industry level and examine their influence on corporate governance 
disclosure. We find evidence that firms in less competitive industries have significantly more 
disclosure compared with firms in more competitive industries. This study contributes to the 
research on market efficiency in that empirical findings suggest that different dimensions of 
competition affect a firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose more information. Therefore, 
regulators might consider harmonizing industry policies with accounting regulations to 
increase public welfare. 
This dissertation is subject to the following limitations. First, both Ding and Cheng (2011) 
and Ding and Jia (2012) analyze the consequence of individual events in specific countries 
(the announcement of launching the Hong Kong Through-Train scheme in China and the 
merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in the UK, respectively), and it is 
not clear whether these findings can be generalized to other countries with different 
institutional backgrounds. Second, Ding and Hou (2015) is exclusively built on the analysis 
of S&P 500 stocks, which are large and well-established firms with high visibility. It is 
expected that smaller and less recognized firms would benefit more from increased investor 
attention, so adding small and less visible firms to future analysis might strengthen our 
results. Furthermore, as Google becomes an increasingly important source of information for 
investors around the world, it might be intriguing to explore the capital market consequences 
of investors’ active demand for information in other markets (e.g., the UK and other 
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European countries). Third, Chen, Ding, Hou and Johan (2015) is based on the analysis of 
archival data. We suggest that a combination between an archival study and a field study 
(e.g., interview with financial analyst and corporate managers) could provide more insights 
into the role of financial analyst in shaping the financial reporting incentive and practice; and 
it might be interesting to examine the issue from the perspective of the auditor by exploring 
how they factor analyst coverage into the risk-assessment framework of auditing. Finally, the 
product market competition measure used in Al-Najjar and Ding (2014) is an industry-level 
measure. Recent studies (i.e., Li et al., 2013) develop a firm-level competition measure, based 
on how managers perceive the firm's competitive environment in the management discussion 
and analysis section (MD&A) of 10-K filing for US public firms. Future research may use 
firm-level competition measures to provide in-depth insights into the association between 
competition and corporate governance disclosure in the UK and other countries. 
This rest of the submission is organized as follows: Chapter 2 summarizes the contribution of 
each paper included in the submission. Chapter 3 outlines the current and future research of 
the author. Chapter 4 concludes. 
Appendix 1 summarizes the contribution split between collaborating authors and provides the 
written statement by collaborating authors on joint publications. Appendix 2 presents a full 
bibliography of all publications by the author. 
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Chapter 2: Description of the five publications  
 
While Chapter 1 outlines the contribution of the submission, Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
description of the contribution of papers introduced in Chapter 1. In the first study we provide 
evidence to support the speculative trading-based explanation to the share discount of cross-
listed stocks by exploiting the “share investment through-train scheme to Hong Kong” 
initially announced on 20
th
 August 2007 (but re-assessed in November 2007 and actually 
suspended thereafter). Dominated by unsophisticated individual investors, the stock market in 
mainland China is a relative fledgling. China’s two stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen have grown quickly since the early 1990s. In addition, mainland investors are not 
allowed to invest in the Hong Kong market; while Hong Kong investors are only allowed to 
invest in the mainland B-class shares market but not A-class shares. Although Hong Kong 
became part of China in July 1997, it maintains its western-style political ideology and 
market-oriented economy with a large presence of global institutional investors. Importantly, 
Hong Kong is one of the primary overseas markets for mainland firms to raise foreign capital, 
which are also referred to as “H-share” firms. H-share stocks are also regulated by mainland 
laws, but they are denominated in Hong Kong dollars and traded in the same way as other 
equities listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. By the end of July 2008, 152 mainland 
companies were offering H-share stocks, part of which was cross-listed in both Hong Kong 
and mainland stock exchanges (CSRC, 2008).  
Compared with cross-listed A shares, the cross-listed B and H shares are always traded at a 
discount. Chan et al. (2008) suggest that information asymmetry is the major reason for this 
discount. Lee et al. (2001) find that the premium between A and B shares is negatively 
related to the trading volume, and conclude that the price premiums between cross-listed A 
and B shares actually are due to the illiquidity of B shares. Furthermore, Fernald and Rogers 
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(2002) argue that the reason for this discount is that Chinese domestic investors have limited 
alternative investment opportunities; therefore, they could only invest in A share stocks. In 
addition, by using the research framework proposed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Mei 
et al. (2009) find that the price premium exists because there are too many speculators 
prevailing in the A share market.
3
 Therefore, they conclude that the premium between cross-
listed shares could be induced by irrational trading behaviour.  
Cross-listed stocks are traded at a premium on the mainland stock exchanges (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen). Because under the “through-train scheme” mainland individual investors were 
allowed to directly invest in Hong Kong, Hong Kong investors could buy the cross-listed 
stocks (which are traded at a discount) with the purpose of selling to incoming mainland 
investors at a much higher price. Such speculative trading behaviour generated market 
optimism and a price bubble in Hong Kong, as the Hong Kong Hang Seng index rose by 48% 
after the release of the “through-train scheme” in August 2007. Similarly, after the 
announcement of re-assessment in November 2007, speculative trading dissipated, leading to 
a plunge in the Hong Kong market.  
We construct a mediation model to clarify the relation between speculative trading, cross-
listing price difference and post-announcement return. The underlining rationale is as 
follows: On one hand, after the August announcement, Hong Kong stockholders are willing 
to hold their shares and expect to sell their shares to incoming mainland investors at a higher 
price. Hong Kong speculators are also willing to pay more, as they expect to resell to 
optimistic mainland investors for a profit. On the other hand, the “through-train scheme” 
                                                          
3
 Mei et al. (2009) use a unique dataset of Chinese firms with dual-class shares of identical rights (A-class and 
B-class shares, traditionally denoted as shares available to domestic investors and foreign investors until 2001) 
and find that A shares turnover had a significant and positive correlation with A-B price premium before 2001 
and explained 20% of the monthly cross-sectional variation of this premium. 
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could further generate excess speculative demand for cross-listed stocks in Hong Kong, 
which pushes stock price higher. Therefore, we hypothesize that the cross-listing price 
difference causes excess speculative trading which, in turn, generates positive abnormal 
return. The mediator variable, excess speculative trading volume, serves to clarify the nature 
of the relationship between cross-listing price difference and post-announcement returns. 
Similarly we design a mediation model for the November announcement. The empirical 
results confirm our conjecture. 
This research contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, this study provides new 
evidence to understand the difference between domestic and overseas market prices of the 
same underlying assets. Firms cross-listed on mainland markets are traded at a premium 
relative to those traded in Hong Kong. Previous studies (Chan et al., 2008) suggest that, in a 
segmented market setting, price difference of assets with identical rights are often associated 
with limited liquidity and/or information asymmetry. Market liquidity is less likely to explain 
the cross-listing price difference between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, primarily 
because the Hong Kong market is a more liquid market relative to the mainland market. 
Information asymmetry between mainland investors and less informed Hong Kong investors 
may result in this price difference, as investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) shows 
that stocks known by less investors should have a lower price. However, empirical findings 
suggest that this price difference is not necessarily correlated with the Hong Kong 
shareholder base (a proxy for investor recognition). Consistent with Mei et al. (2009), we 
argue that the mainland-Hong Kong price difference is more likely to be explained by the 
speculative price premium in the mainland market.  
Second, this study provides supporting evidence for the theoretical prediction that agents pay 
prices that exceed their own valuation because they believe that in the future they will find a 
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buyer who is willing to pay even more (e.g., Harrison and Kreps, 1978). Empirically, it is 
difficult to separate investors with heterogeneous beliefs in asset valuation from each other. 
The Hong Kong through-train scheme provides a unique opportunity: Hong Kong investors 
and mainland investors differ in valuing the same stocks, because the price of cross-listed 
stocks is much higher in the mainland than that in the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong 
speculators are willing to pay more, expecting to realize capital gains by reselling stock to 
incoming mainland investors that are more optimistic. In other words, the announcement of 
through-train scheme generated speculative trading and a price bubble in Hong Kong. In 
addition, the results are consistent with price pressure hypothesis, as there is a significant 
association between post-announcement abnormal return and excessive trading, but the 
association is short-lived (Shleifer, 1986). Furthermore, a mediation model is constructed to 
analyze the effects of cross-listing price difference (between mainland and Hong Kong 
markets) on Hong Kong stock returns and decipher an indirect effect of cross-listing price 
difference on Hong Kong prices, which is mediated by excessive turnover. The findings of 
this research thus have important implications for both policymakers and regulators.  
There is long-standing literature reporting that investors have “home bias” because they tend 
to favour investment in firms they are familiar with (French and Poterba, 1991; Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Cao, et al., 2011). In order to become familiar with such firms, investors 
have to spend time and effort collecting relevant information which suggests that attention 
from investors might predict the subsequent trading activity. On the theoretical side, studies 
on asset pricing posit that investor attention is a necessary condition for a stock price to fully 
reflect public information, as investors need to be aware of the information before they can 
analyze and react to it (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2011). 
However, because of the limits on the information-processing capacity of human beings, 
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attention is largely concentrated on the stocks that investors are interested in or familiar with 
which implies that attention paid to stocks by investors could result in subsequent trading of 
these stocks. The second study aims to provide new insights into the capital market 
consequences of investors’ attention. 
Previous empirical studies build on the assumption that the investors passively attend to 
publicly available information and use measures such as advertising expenditure (Grullon, 
Kanatas and Weston, 2004) and media coverage (Fang and Peress, 2009) to capture 
investors’ attention. Different from these studies, in the second study we employ a measure 
recently developed by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011), namely the aggregate search volume 
index (SVI) of a stock, and test the impact of investors’ active attention on breadth of 
ownership and liquidity of the firm. After controlling for the passive attention measures 
documented in the literature, we find that increased investor attention measured by the SVI 
contributes to a broader shareholder base. This can be interpreted with the “investor 
recognition hypothesis” (Merton, 1987), which states that the shareholder base measures the 
recognition of the firm among investors, so that an enlarged shareholder base indicates that 
the firm has been well recognized. In other words, potential investors have to be aware of a 
firm before they can gradually become familiar with it and then eventually decide to invest, 
suggesting that investor attention is a necessary condition for a firm to be recognized. The 
impact of passive attention measures, however, is not always significant in the results, 
showing that retail investors do not necessarily invest in firms with more advertising 
expenditure or media coverage. Furthermore, we find that increased investor attention, as 
measured by the SVI, results in reduced bid-ask spread, and our results remain consistent 
after controlling for the passive attention measures, firm characteristics, and year and industry 
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fixed effects. Our findings remain robust to alternative liquidity measures including effective 
spread, relative effective spread, and turnover rate. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study expands the broad 
literature on the “investor recognition hypothesis” (i.e., Merton, 1987, Grullon et al., 2004; 
Tetlock, 2010; Fang and Peress, 2009). Merton (1987) posits that “ceteris paribus, an increase 
in the relative size of the firm’s investor base will reduce the firm’s cost of capital and 
increase the market value of the firm.” A stock’s visibility is associated with its price, 
publicity and popularity of the core products and social image. However, we suggest that 
these measures are passive, in that it is implicitly assumed that firms with high visibility will 
attract more attention from investors, which is difficult to empirically verify. Our study is 
built on an active measure of ex post attention, the Google search volume of a stock. When 
individual investors actively search for a stock using Google, they acquire useful information 
relevant to the stock, which mitigates the information asymmetry problem for these stocks. 
As a result, liquidity improves for stocks with better investor recognition. 
Second, our paper adds to the emerging literature on investor attention and asset pricing 
dynamics, including Barber and Odean (2008) on investor attention and individual investors’ 
trading behaviour, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) on the casual impact of local media 
coverage on local trading, Da et al. (2011) on the impact of active attention on IPO returns 
and price changes in subsequent periods, and Aouadi et al. (2013) on the effect of investor 
attention on stock market liquidity and volatility using Google French data. 
Finally, our study extends the literature on the stock market consequence of investors’ 
information demand. For example, Vlastakis and Markellos (2011) use the Google search 
volume of constituents of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index as a proxy of investors’ 
information demand, and find that such information demand has a significant influence on 
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stock trading volume and the conditional variance of excess return. Siganos (2013) uses 
Google search volume of target firms involved in a merger between 2004 and 2010 in the UK 
as a proxy for investor information demand for the target firms, and finds that such a measure 
can explain a large percentage of the price increase in target firms prior to the merger. We 
extend this stream of literature by providing evidence that investors’ attention leads to larger 
shareholder base and improved stock liquidity. 
In a seminar paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the authors conclude that monitoring 
activities designed to constrain managerial opportunism should become specialized to those 
institutions and individuals who possess competitive advantage, and financial analysts are 
individuals who have the capability and expertise to perform such tasks. Financial analysts 
are professionals with substantial industry background and knowledge. In addition, they track 
corporate information on a regular basis and have opportunities to interact directly with 
managers. Previous studies show that analysts play an important role in disciplining 
managerial behaviour. For example, Moyer et al. (1989) provide evidence for the monitoring 
role of analysts as a mechanism to mitigate the agency problem. Analysts also act as whistle-
blowers of corporate fraud (Dyck et al. 2010). According to Yu (2008), financial analysts are 
well trained to go through numerous financial statements and track firms on a regular basis, 
which enables the improvement of corporate transparency and the identification of financial 
reporting irregularities. As a result, managers from firms followed by more analysts tend to 
act more cautiously under the continuous and intense scrutiny, which suggests a positive 
association between analyst coverage and financial report quality. In the third study we 
examine the influence of analyst following on the financial reporting quality of Chinese listed 
firms reflected by modified audit opinions (MAO). 
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Auditing is essentially a third party certification that can effectively reduce the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Kinney and Martin, 1994). Auditors 
communicate with financial statement users through their opinion expressed in the auditor’s 
report, as a clean opinion indicates that the financial reports are prepared in accordance with 
GAAP and do not contain fundamental uncertainties that need future clarification. In this 
way, auditors help to “certify” the financial statement by increasing its credibility. Assuming a 
given level of auditor competence and independence, if analysts play an effective role in 
monitoring managers’ self-serving behaviour (i.e., earnings management), the financial 
statement will faithfully reflect the underlying economic transaction of the firm to a greater 
extent, leading to higher financial reporting quality and lower incidence of MAO. Therefore, 
we use whether a firm has received modified audit opinion (MAO) from its auditor as an ex 
post manifestation of (low) financial reporting quality.  
We use the Chinese setting to investigate the effect of analyst coverage on financial reporting 
quality. Since the early 1990s China’s capital market and financial intermediation industry 
have experienced significant growth. Different from the US market that is dominated by 
institutional investors, the main market force in the Chinese market remains individual 
investors who are largely reliant on analyst reports when making investment decisions. The 
analysts’ financial and industrial expertise, along with their ability to monitor the firms more 
regularly and more rigorously, enables them to play a crucial role in mitigating the higher 
information asymmetries which Chinese investors face.  
As a direct result of the partial privatization of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since 
1990s, a majority of Chinese listed firms are ultimately controlled by the state (e.g., central 
government, local government or a government agent). Due to political considerations, SOEs 
receive preferential treatment from the central government and thus have relatively easy 
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access to equity and credit markets, which implies that SOEs are under less pressure to 
reduce information asymmetry than non-state owned enterprises (NSOEs). In contrast, 
NSOEs are more dependent on the capital market to finance their investments, which 
suggests that they are incentivized to reduce information asymmetry (i.e., responding to the 
enquiry of analysts or providing high quality/frequent voluntary disclosures) to ensure a 
lower cost of raising external capital. We are able to analyze the effectiveness of analyst 
coverage and determine whether their monitoring role is potentially reduced (enhanced) 
depending on ownership structure. China is also characterized as an earnings-based 
regulatory regime. For example, in 1998 the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) required a listed firm reporting loss for two consecutive years to be labelled a special 
treatment (ST) firm, and its daily stock quotation fluctuation be reduced from 10% to 5%. As 
soon as the ST firm incurs a third-year loss, its stock trading would be immediately 
suspended.
4
 At the same time, ST firms, as well as firms under-performing their industry 
peers, are subject to stringent scrutiny from financial intermediaries such as analysts. 
Therefore, in this study we explicitly investigate whether analyst coverage has an impact on 
the quality of financial reporting of both SOEs and NSOEs, and also firms under normal 
versus intense scrutiny from analysts. 
Based on our analysis of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2009, we find that analyst 
coverage is negatively associated with the propensity of a MAO being issued, and the 
relationship is more pronounced for NSOEs. Due to less financial support from the 
government, Chinese NSOEs rely more on the capital market for external financing. The 
issuance of a MAO, which undermines the credibility of a firm’s financial reporting, indicates 
                                                          
4
 In 2001 CSRC formally introduced a delisting procedure by mandating a firm be compulsorily delisted when it 
reports four-year consecutive losses. 
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poor corporate governance and high information asymmetries, thus potentially increasing the 
firm’s cost of raising external capital. This suggests that NSOEs are more likely to respond to 
issues raised by analysts, leading to improved financial reporting quality. Furthermore, we 
show that analyst coverage plays a significant role in reducing the propensity for ST firms 
and under-performing firms to receive MAOs. The findings are robust to alternative 
specifications of analyst coverage and to the control of endogeneity. 
The contribution of this study is three-fold. First, we extend the literature on the effectiveness 
of external governance mechanism by providing compelling evidence on the monitoring role 
of financial analysts in an emerging economy, and our findings are complementary to those 
based on data from developed economies such as the US. Second, our study is related to the 
growing stream of literature on how economic and institutional development shape the 
reporting incentive and practice in general and specific determinants of financial reporting 
quality of Chinese listed firms in particular. Finally, our study is of interest to regulators and 
policymakers who have continued interest in further promoting corporate transparency in 
China, and shows that the development of the financial analyst industry has welfare 
implications for investors and the general public. 
The fourth study in the submission analyses the direct consequence of the merger of Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in the UK, and investigates the change in the audit 
quality and audit fee with a large sample of publicly listed UK firms. The 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) merger in 1998 created the largest accounting firm in the 
world, with more than 40,000 employees in 1,100 offices worldwide. Its revenue in 1998 was 
over USD 13 billion. After the merger, both PwC and other top-tier auditing firms 
collectively gained more market power. For example, according to McMeeking et al. (2007), 
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after the merger the audit concentration ratio
5
 (CR4) measured by number of clients in the 
UK rose from 0.69 in 1998 to 0.79 in 1999, and the Herfindahl index from 0.15 in 1998 to 
0.21 in 1999. Measured by audit fee, the concentration ratio (CR4) increased from 0.82 in 
1998 to 0.88 in 1999, and the Herfindahl Index from 0.21 in 1998 to 0.28 in 1999. On one 
hand, the merger reduced the level of competition between top-tier auditors. On the other, the 
merged auditor, PwC, could cut its costs and improve its operating efficiency, which might 
have an influence on the operation of other top-tier auditors because they need to be more 
efficient to compete with PwC. The consequence of the merger in terms of audit quality and 
audit fee is an interesting question that deserves exploration.  
In this study we use the earnings quality of clients to reflect audit quality, and construct a six-
year sample centred on the event year 1998 (1995-2001, excluding 1998) to address the 
research question. We use two main tests to compare earnings quality, namely, absolute 
discretionary accruals and value relevance of earnings. We also examine the change of audit 
fee from the pre-merger to the post-merger period. In order to show that the change of audit 
quality and audit fee is not the result of regulatory change, we use the second-tier auditors as 
a reference group. 
We find that in the post-merger period (1999-2001) absolute discretionary accruals of top-tier 
auditor clients decreased compared with that of non-top-tier auditor clients, indicating less 
earnings management; in the post-merger period earnings of top-tier auditor clients were 
more related to stock market returns, indicating that earnings quality improved in this period. 
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The results may reflect the enhanced auditor independence and auditors’ increasing ability to 
constrain earnings management of their clients in the post-merger period. Furthermore, we 
report an increase in audit fee for the top-tier auditor clients after PwC merger, suggesting the 
merger results in a net increase in the price paid by clients to purchase audit services. This 
implies that the costs savings from merger (which tends to lower cost of audit service) is 
dominated by the enhanced market power of auditors (which tends to increase fee). In 
contrast, the earnings quality of clients of second-tier auditors does not change from the pre-
merger to the post-merger period, and there is no evidence of increased audit fee charged by 
this group of auditors in the post-merger period. 
The findings of this study might be of interest to regulators as well as policy-makers. 
Regulators may cautiously assess the implication of future consolidation of the auditing 
industry in the UK. The potential consequence is that on one hand, the audit fee is likely to 
increase if the number of major auditors decreases from “N” to “N-1”; on the other hand, 
audit quality might improve as a result of enhanced auditor independence. The results of this 
study may also be of interest to the “big-four” auditors, because if any of them is thinking 
about a merger, in addition to convincing regulators that the merged firm could provide 
auditing services of a higher quality, it can alleviate the regulator’s concern by promising no 
fee increase or even sharing some of the merger-induced cost savings with clients in the form 
of lower audit fees. 
The fifth study investigates the association between product market competition and 
corporate governance disclosure in the UK. Previous theoretical studies provide different 
predictions. For example, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) predict that firms in more 
competitive industries will follow a better disclosure practice, because withholding 
information can be interpreted by potential entrants as good news, which encourages 
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competitors to enter the market. In contrast, Gertner et al. (1988) suggest that firms in more 
competitive industries will have less disclosure because information disclosed by one firm 
can be opportunistically used by industry rivals and it is optimal for firms to have less 
disclosure. Empirical studies also present mixed results. For example, Harris (1988) finds that 
a firm’s decision to provide separate segment disclosure is positively related to the level of 
competition. Based on a survey of UK private firms, Dedman and Lennox (2009) suggest that 
when managers perceive more competition, they are more likely to withhold information on 
sales and costs. In this study, we argue that product market competition can potentially have 
two opposing effects on corporate governance disclosure. On one hand, firms might have 
more disclosure due to intense product market competition, since competition serves as a 
disciplinary and monitoring mechanism to pressure managers to commit to better disclosure 
practice. On the other hand, corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a substitute for 
product market competition: Managers use more disclosure in less competitive markets to 
maintain investor confidence in their firms. Following a recent study (i.e., Li, 2010), we 
employ different measures to reflect product market competition at the industry level and 
examine their impact on the corporate governance disclosure. We report that firms in less 
competitive industries (where entry cost is high and market size is large) have significantly 
more disclosure compared to their counterparts in more competitive industries. Furthermore, 
we find a positive association between corporate governance disclosure and both board 
independence and audit committee independence. This suggests that firms with better 
corporate governance disclose more information to external investors. Overall, the findings 
support the view that managers use more corporate governance disclosure as a substitute for 
the external disciplinary force of competition. The results of this study have important policy 
implications, as empirical evidence suggests that different dimensions of competition affect a 
firm’s decision to disclose more information. In addition, firms with strong internal 
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governance (reflected by more independent directors among the board) are likely to disclose 
more information. Hence, the results suggest that regulators might harmonize industry 
policies with accounting regulations to increase the social welfare of the general public. 
Furthermore, the multiple dimensions of competition imply that policy makers need to 
consider different aspects of competition before they assess the influence of important merger 
and acquisition deals that could reshape the level of competition within an industry. 
Collectively these five studies contribute to our knowledge in product and financial market 
efficiency. 
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Chapter 3: Current and future research 
3.1 Current research 
As a follow up to the study of Ding and Cheng (2011), Ding et al. (2015) explore the well-
known A-B share discount puzzle in China by examining how news perception influences the 
discount of A-share to B-share of the same firm. Since the late 1970s the Chinese government 
has relaxed its control over domestic and international information flow to facilitate its 
economic reform. However, in the absence of laws that protect the freedom of press in China, 
the government has an overwhelming influence on the media. For example, commercialized 
newspapers remain state-owned and each newspaper must be sponsored by a government unit 
to obtain its license. Furthermore, the government continues to control the newspaper through 
the appointment and dismissal of senior editorial staff. This mechanism ensures that the 
editorial policies and reporting practice of the newspaper remain aligned with the 
government’s preference. Therefore, the Chinese newspaper, which is under tight control by 
the government, serves the political agenda imposed by the government. One consequence is 
that negative news is less likely to be reported, because the government has a strong incentive 
to suppress the release of bad news to maintain social and economic stability. As a result, 
Chinese media is expected to portray a rosy picture of the firm compared with its English 
counterpart. However, due to language barriers foreign investors are likely to rely on English 
media for information. The great divergence between the tone of media reported in Chinese 
and English media implies more information uncertainty for the cross-listed firms, so foreign 
investors will demand a return premium for their investment. We, therefore, suggest a greater 
divergence in the tone of media as reflected by a high ratio of good to bad news reported in 
Chinese and English media is associated with larger A-B share discount for cross-listed firms, 
all others being equal. The empirical analysis confirms our prediction. We find the ratio of 
good-to-negative news to be substantially higher for Chinese newspapers relative to that in 
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English newspapers. Such optimism inflates the price of domestic shares and increases 
foreign share discounts. We contribute to the literature by constructing a perception-based 
measure of media optimism and present evidence that the difference in tone of media 
between Chinese and English media could be an alternative explanation to the “A-B share 
discount”. Our focus on the divergence of the tones between Chinese media and English 
media distinguishes our study from existing studies, which mainly focus on the divergence of 
the levels of coverage between Chinese media and English media. Furthermore, our findings 
suggest that a lack of press freedom in China has implications for the capital market. Because 
of the tight control imposed by the government, Chinese media are inhibited from reporting 
bad news related to listed firms, which has an unfavourable influence on the capital allocation 
decision among foreign investors for cross-listed firms. As far as we are aware, we are the 
first to document the undesired economic consequences of depressed freedom of press in the 
context of A-B share discount in China. This paper has been submitted to the Financial 
Management Association 2016 European Conference. After we present the paper on the 
conference and receive feedback, we will submit to a reputable journal. 
 
3.2 Future research 
The economic consequence of analyst coverage in the Chinese capital market remains an 
under-explored topic. In an on-going project my collaborator and I explore whether analyst 
coverage affects the tax-avoidance behaviour of Chinese listed firms. Based on a review of 
the literature we develop two competing hypotheses: on one hand, the analyst is considered 
as an important external governance mechanism to discipline managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour including tax avoidance (the monitoring effect). On the other hand, the analyst 
may set performance targets by issuing an optimistic earnings forecast. To the extent that 
analysts make forecasted earnings an important performance benchmark, managers are more 
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likely to use tax avoidance strategies to meet or exceed the consensus of analyst forecast (the 
pressure effect). Therefore, the effect of analyst coverage on firms’ tax avoidance activity is 
an empirical question that warrants careful investigation. We have collected data on publicly 
listed firms between 2003 and 2013 in preparation for testing our hypotheses. 
As a capital market anomaly that puzzles scholars and practitioners, post-earnings 
announcement drift (hereafter PEAD) is the tendency of a stock’s cumulative abnormal 
returns to drift in the direction of a recent earnings surprise after an earnings announcement 
(Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990). Although stock prices generally 
increase (decrease) upon the announcement of positive (negative) earnings surprise, they do 
not seem to increase (decrease) enough to fully reflect the positive (negative) news, which is 
reflected by abnormal stock return after the announcement. Bernard and Thomas (1990) show 
that after a positive (negative) earnings surprise, subsequent earnings surprises tend to be 
predictably positive (negative) up to three quarters after the initial earnings announcement.  
Previous literature has provided two main explanations for PEAD: A failure to adjust 
abnormal return for risk and investors’ delayed response to earnings related information (Ball 
et al., 1993; Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Bartov, et al, 2000). For example, Ball et al. (1993) 
argue that investment risk increases for firms with high unexpected earnings and decrease for 
firms with low unexpected earnings. Recent research suggests that delayed response to 
earnings news due to either under-reaction or high transaction cost is a more plausible 
explanation for PEAD (Narayanamoorthy, 2006; Ng et al., 2007). The market under-reaction 
explanation argues that market participants (i.e., investors) fail to fully recognize the 
implication of current quarterly earnings for future earnings. Alternatively, Soffer and Lys 
(1999) contend that it is information disseminated between earnings announcements that 
revise investors’ earnings expectation. However, an implicit assumption of the under-reaction 
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explanation is that investors are instantaneously aware of the earnings related information 
after it becomes public information. If investors fail to attend to the earnings announcement, 
they are unlikely to update their future earnings expectation, leading to under-reaction to 
earnings news. Therefore, the market under-reaction could result from either: 1) Investors do 
not pay sufficient attention to earnings announcement; or, 2) investors fail to recognize the 
implication of current earnings for future earnings. 
In a new project my collaborator and I are interested in investigating whether PEAD could 
result from inadequate investor attention to the earnings-related information. A recent study 
by Chen et al. (2014) analyses articles published on one of the most popular social media 
platforms for investment community in the US (Seeking Alpha). They find that views 
expressed in articles and commentaries predict future stock returns.
6
 In this study we measure 
investor attention to earnings announcement with the number of financial analyses of listed 
firms posted on Seeking Alpha (SA) relative to the number of articles posted in the pre-
earnings announcement period, and expect that information from earnings announcement for 
firms with large increments of SA articles is well impounded into stock prices, which results 
in a weak PEAD. We aim to contribute to the literature by providing new evidence to explain 
PEAD. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
                                                          
6
 Seeking Alpha (SA), which was found in 2004 by David Jackson, is a social media website that provides 
financial commentary and analysis contributed by registered users. By the end of February 2014, SA had 3 
million registered users, and attracted 8 million unique viewers a month. 
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This dissertation submission presents a series of related publications developed by the author 
and his collaborators over a five-year period between 2011 and 2015. Taken together, these 
efforts have enabled the growth of a body a knowledge contributing primarily to financial 
market efficiency in terms of the following: (1) How apparent departures from the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) can be reconciled by investor speculation motives and information 
acquisition behaviour; (2) how the financial analyst helps to enhance the corporate 
transparency and informational efficiency of Chinese listed firms; (3) how competition in the 
UK audit market impacts the audit quality and audit fee; and (4) how production market 
competition affects the UK firm’s incentive to voluntarily disclose information on corporate 
governance. 
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Fig. 1. Hang Seng Index and HS China Enterprise Index Cumulative abnormal returns (06/20/2007–03/20/2008).
investors. Investors have the option to resell their shares to other more optimistic investors in the
future for a proﬁt, and equilibrium prices reﬂect this option. This results in a positive association
between speculative trading and stock overvaluation. Although there are a number of theoretical
studies present in prior literature, direct empirical evidence is limited, possibly due to the difﬁculty
in testing speculative trading and verifying different beliefs in valuation (Mei et al., 2009).
In this research, we study the price bubble in Hong Kong associated with the mainland China’s
decision of “Share Investment Through-Train Scheme to Hong Kong” (Forbes, 2007a), which was
announced on August 20th, 2007 (hereafter August 20th announcement) but is yet to kick off. Under
the Scheme, mainland authority initially allowed individual mainland investors to directly purchase
HongKong stocks.2 However, the implementation of this schemehas beenplaguedby repeateddelays.
Then, in a speech by Chinese PremierWen Jiabao on November 3rd, 2007 (Forbes, 2007b), the scheme
would have to be re-assessed, as he reiterated the concern that excess fund ﬂows could affect market
stability in both China and Hong Kong and he urged the scheme to be rolled out ‘cautiously and prag-
matically’ (Forbes, 2007c). The speech did not explicitly indicate a suspension of the scheme, but in
fact the scheme made no progress since then.
Although mainland investors do not ofﬁcially purchase any Hong Kong shares under the scheme,
the scheme is viewed as a catalyst for the dramatic rising share prices in Hong Kong between August
and November 2007 (MarketWatch, 2008).3 Hong Kong stocks have rallied to record highs by driving
up the Hang Seng Index by 48%, but the Index slid gradually subsequent to the November speech
(see Fig. 1). We argue that the scheme generates market optimism and speculative motive in Hong
Kong, because Hong Kong investors could take speculative positions against mainland investors as
a response to the scheme. Hong Kong speculators purchase Hong Kong shares and they are willing
to pay more for the purpose of reselling their shares to more optimistic mainland investors in the
future for a proﬁt. The main hypothesis of our empirical analysis is that the announcement to launch
this scheme generates price bubble in Hong Kong market, which alleviates after the announcement
to reassess the scheme. We ﬁnd supporting evidence for our conjecture.
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, our study provides direct
empirical evidence to support the heterogeneous beliefs and speculative overvaluation hypothesis
(e.g., HarrisonandKreps, 1978). Empirically, it is difﬁcult to verify investorswithheterogeneousbeliefs
in asset valuation, andHongKong through-train schemeprovides anexcellent opportunity:HongKong
2 This outward investment scheme is intended to provide a release valve for some of the money that is piling up in China
due to its global trade surplus and robust inward foreign investment, which is stoking inﬂation and putting upward pressure
on the Chinese currency.
3 Beijing to delay “through-train” scheme by two years (Market Watch Hong Kong, January 15, 2008), may be available
online: http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/beijing-delay-through-train-scheme-two/story.aspx?guid=%7BF5F210B3-
38A0-4357-AC76-730AD656C974%7D.
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investors and mainland investors differ in valuing the same stocks, because the price of cross-listed
stocks with same rights is much higher in mainland than that in Hong Kong market (Appendix A).
Hong Kong speculators are willing to pay more, expecting to reap capital gains by reselling the stock
to more optimistic mainland investors in the future. In addition, our results are consistent with price
pressurehypothesis, as there is a signiﬁcant associationbetweenpost-announcement abnormal return
and excess trading (buying or selling) but the association is short-lived. Importantly, we identify the
mediating effect of excess trading on the association between cross-listing price difference between
mainland andHongKong andpost-announcement abnormal return: on theonehand,HongKong stock
holders directly adjust their price expectation upwards as s response to the announcement; on the
other hand, large cross-listing price difference generates excess demand among Hong Kong investors,
which translates into abnormal stock return.
Second, our study contributes to the international ﬁnance literature for understanding the dif-
ference between domestic market prices and overseas market prices of the same underlying assets.
Previous studies suggest that cross-listing price difference is often associated with limited liquidity,
information asymmetry and/or investor recognition (Merton, 1987). However, our ﬁndings show that
mainland-Hong Kong price difference is not correlated with Hong Kong shareholder base (proxy for
investor recognition), and market liquidity is not responsible because Hong Kong market is liquid
relative to mainland market. In line with Mei et al. (2009),4 we argue that the mainland-Hong Kong
price difference is more likely to be explained by the speculative price premium in mainland market.
Third, our ﬁndings could be of interest to policymakers: (1) the introduction of the “through-train”
scheme generates speculation in the Hong Kong market. (2) Short sales alleviate price bubbles in the
market upturn. However, we do not ﬁnd robust effects of short sales on bubbleswhen themarket falls,
possibly due to the tick rule in Hong Kong.
The remainderof thepaper isorganizedas follows. Section2presents a literature reviewandsection
3 discusses China’s and Hong Kong’s institutional background. Section 4 and 5 introduce the hypothe-
ses and research design. Section 6 analyzes the data and reports the ﬁndings. Section 7 discusses and
section 8 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Heterogeneous beliefs and speculative trading
Investors often differ in their beliefs about fundamentals of assets. For example, overconﬁdence is a
widely observed behavioral bias in psychological studies that generate heterogeneous beliefs (Daniel
et al., 2002; Barberis and Thaler, 2003).5 Miller (1977) argued that, if agents have heterogeneous
beliefs about fundamentals of an asset and short sales are not allowed, equilibrium prices would, if
opinions diverge enough, reﬂect the opinion of the more optimistic investor. Miller (1977) model is
static and cannot be used to analyze the dynamics of trading. Harrison and Kreps (1978) exploit the
dynamic consequences of heterogeneous beliefs. Since an investor knows that, in the future, there
may be other investors that value the asset more than he does, the investor is willing to pay more
for an asset than he would pay. The difference between the investor’s willingness to pay and his own
discounts of expected dividends reﬂects a speculative motive, which is the willingness to pay more
than the intrinsic value of an asset because the owner of the asset has the right to sell it in the future.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) present a continuous time equilibrium model to study speculative
bubbles and trading volumewhere overconﬁdence generates disagreements among agents regarding
asset fundamentals. They further characterize properties of the magnitude of the bubble, trading
frequency, andassetpricevolatility, so that theycontend thismodel is potentially capableof explaining
4 Mei et al. (2009) use a unique dataset of Chinese ﬁrms with dual-class shares of identical rights (A-class and B-class shares,
traditionally denoted as shares available to domestic investors and foreign investors until 2001) and ﬁnd that A shares turnover
had a signiﬁcant and positive correlationwithA–Bprice premiumbefore 2001 and explained 20% of themonthly cross-sectional
variation of this premium.
5 Heterogeneous beliefs may also result from private information, and the presence of private information suggests that
investors could take advantage of their information to realize a proﬁt.
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the observed cross sectional correlation between market/book ratio and turnover for US stocks in the
period of 1996–2000 as documented by Cochrane (2003).6
2.2. The effect of excess trading on stock prices
Prior empirical studies suggest that demand curve for sharesmay be downward sloping. For exam-
ple, although the inclusion inan indexdoesnot change the fundamentals of the company, passive index
strategists (e.g., index fund) will still purchase the stock and push share price high (Harris and Gurel,
1986; Shleifer, 1986; Lynch andMendenhall, 1997;Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Chakrabarti et al.,
2005). Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) estimate abnormal returns for ﬁrms added to the
S&P 500 index to be around 3% on the inclusion day. As Shleifer (1986) reports little evidence of price
reversal and the abnormal return does not disappear for at least ten days, he supports the hypothesis
that demand curves for stocks slope down. However, Harris and Gurel (1986) ﬁnd nearly completely
price reversal after two weeks. The evidence of price reversal following the announcement is consis-
tent with the price pressure hypothesis. Moreover, many other studies examine S&P 500 inclusions
and deletions, and generally have found a partial price reversal, but an essentially permanent com-
ponent as well (Mitchell et al., 2004). Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) examine the post-1989 data, and
their evidence indicates a signiﬁcant temporary stock-price effect prior to the change (i.e., a short-
term price reversal). Blouin et al. (2000) ﬁnd the evidence consistent with price pressure hypothesis
that share prices of appreciated ﬁrms being temporarily bid up to compensate individual shareholders
for any unanticipated capital gains taxes when they sell to index funds.7 In addition, price pressure
hypothesis and downward sloping demand curve for stocks have been tested in different economic
settings. For example, returns around the expirations of IPO lock-up provisions provide evidence to
support downward sloping hypothesis (Cochrane, 2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003); Mitchell et al.
(2004) support price pressure hypothesis with the evidence around mergers.
3. China’s and Hong Kong’s institutional background
Classiﬁed by the International Finance Corporation as a developedmarket, HongKong stockmarket
is the 7th largest in the world since the 1990s. The market is regulated by its own ﬁnancial services
watchdog, which operates independently from the mainland Chinese authority. Traditionally, main-
land investors are not ofﬁcially allowed to invest in Hong Kong market; while Hong Kong investors
are not allowed to invest in mainland A-class shares. Importantly, Hong Kong is one of the primary
overseasmarkets formainland ﬁrms to raise foreign capitals, which are referred to as “H-share” ﬁrms.
H-share stocks are regulated by mainland laws and Hong Kong listing standards, and they are auto-
matically included in the Hang Seng China Enterprise Index. By the end of July 2008, there are 152
mainlandﬁrms offeringH-share stocks, part ofwhich are cross-listed in bothHongKong andmainland
stock exchanges (CSRC, 2008).8
Mainland stockmarket is relatively ﬂedgling, and it displayed remarkable booms and crashes since
the1990s. Like theUS technologystocks in the1990s,mainlandmarkethadaveryhighannual turnover
rate of 500% (Mei et al., 2009). Moreover, mainland stocks are often over-valued as compared to their
international counterparts, For example, the largest price premium of mainland stocks over cross-
listed Hong Kong counterparts is 75.2% and the smallest price premium is 22.8% over the period
August 20–22, 2007 (see Appendix A for detail).
6 Several other models have also been proposed to analyze asset trading based on heterogeneous beliefs (Q1Varian, 1989;
Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Chen et al., 2002; Kyle and Lin, 2003; Cao and Ou-Yang, 2009).
7 Blouin et al. (2000) showthat on theﬁrst tradingday following the S&P500 inclusion announcement, abnormal stock returns
are increasing in the difference between short-term and long-term capital gains tax treatment. In other words, shareholders
prefer to hold their stock to qualify for long-term capital gain treatment, so index funds have to offer a higher price to rebalance
their portfolio.
8 China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) monthly market statistics online (July 2008), may be available online at:
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4239016/n7828263/index.html.
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We argue that the mainland price premium over cross-listed Hong Kong counterparts is not likely
to be explained by limited liquidity and the lack of investor recognition in Hong Kong. Hong Kong
investors appear to highly value mainland ﬁrms with a weighted average P/E ratio of 38 (at Aug 17,
2007); however, Hang Seng composite index ﬁrms show a weighted average P/E ratio of below 20.
So, we argue that the mainland-Hong Kong price difference is more likely to be explained by the
speculative price premium in mainland market (Mei et al., 2009).
4. Hypotheses development
This study investigates the market response to the announcement of launching the “Hong Kong
through-train” scheme in August 2007 and the announcement of reassessing the scheme inNovember
2007, respectively. The main hypothesis is, the announcement to launch the scheme, although did
not bring any mainland investors into Hong Kong, would generate speculative motive in Hong Kong
market. Consistent with Harrison and Kreps (1978), Hong Kong speculators purchase shares at higher
prices as a response to the scheme, and they expect to make a proﬁt through re-selling their shares
to prospective mainland buyers, who are more optimistic on stock valuation. Prospective mainland
buyers are more optimistic, because shares in mainland market are traded much higher than their
Hong Kong counterparts.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that the announcement to launch the scheme in August 2007 results
in price bubble leading to positive Hong Kong market response. However, the announcement to
reassess the scheme in November 2007 could have a negative effect on the price bubble, because
of the uncertainty in the implementation of the scheme. In Appendix B, we present these two formal
announcements, as well as other three major informal events related to the scheme (e.g., informal
interview and journal articles). Expectedly, investors may learn from these informal information
sources and modify their price expectations, and those informal events are generally perceived as
negative news to the implementation of the scheme. So,we test the followingHongKongmarket-level
hypothesis:
H1a. The market returns of Hong Kong react positively to the event of August 20th announcement,
but negatively to the event of November 5th announcement and the other three negative informal
events.
We further examine the ﬁrm-level stock price responses to the two announcements, and nar-
row down the sample to those ﬁrms cross-listed in Hong Kong and mainland markets, because for
cross-listed ﬁrms with identical rights, it is possible to examine stock responses in the two markets,
respectively, and compare the results. So, we hypothesize:
H1b. The market-adjusted returns of cross-listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong are positively associated with
the event of August 20th announcement, but negatively associated with the event of November 5th
announcement.
Next, we test whether speculative trading hypothesis can explain price bubble generated in Hong
Kong market. Generally speaking, we expect the two announcements to generate excess trading vol-
ume, due to “hot”money or rising speculation: for example, the launching announcement in August is
likely to generate excess buying, but the reassessing announcement in November is likely to generate
excess selling. In order to distinguish between the effect caused by downward sloping stock demand
curve hypothesis and the effect caused by price pressure hypothesis, we test whether the associa-
tion between post-announcement abnormal return and excess trading is temporary or permanent.
The evidence of a temporary association between post-announcement abnormal return and excess
trading is consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. We then hypothesize:
H2a. In the August event, there is a positive relationship between excess trading (buying) and post-
announcement abnormal stock returns.
H2b. In the November event, there is a negative relationship between excess trading (selling) and
post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
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Fig. 2. Hong Kong stock price response to the “through-train” scheme announcements. Panel A: August announcement; Panel
B: November announcement.
Then, we further test the effect of cross-listing price difference on abnormal returns. This price
difference indicates the extent to which mainland investors are more optimistic in stock valuation
than their Hong Kong counterparts. We expect that cross-listing price difference is a key determinant
of price bubble, andHongKongprices are expectedly re-adjusted towardsmainland prices subsequent
to the August 20th announcement. On the one hand, Hong Kong stockholders are willing to hold
their shares longer, expecting to sell their shares to more optimistic mainland investors at a price
comparable to the mainland price. Hong Kong speculators (buyers) are willing to pay more, as they
expect to resell to incoming mainland investors for a proﬁt. Hong et al. (2006) label this source of
upward bias the resale option effect. On the other hand, the scheme could generate excess speculative
demand9 for Hong Kong stocks, which may further push stock prices higher.
In brief, the total effect of cross-listing price difference on post-announcement price bubble con-
sists of a direct effect and an indirect effect (see Fig. 2). We construct a partial mediation model to
explicate the mechanism that underlies the relationship between cross-listing price difference and
post-announcement returns via the inclusion of amediator variable, excess speculative trading (mea-
sured as excess turnover). Besides the direct causal relationship between cross-listing price difference
and post-announcement returns, we further hypothesize that cross-listing price difference causes
excess speculative trading, which in turn causes positive abnormal returns. The mediator variable,
excess speculative trading, serves to clarify the nature of the relationship between cross-listing price
difference and post-announcement returns.
9 Consistent with Q1Jones et al. (1990), we distinguish between expected and unexpected turnover to reﬂect the effects of
“fundamental trading” and “excess speculative trading”.
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H3a. In the August event, there is a positive relationship between cross-listing price difference and
post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
H3b. In the August event, there is a positive relationship between cross-listing price difference and
excess speculative trading (buying).
H3c. In the August event, excess speculative trading (buying) mediates the relationship between
cross-listing price difference and post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
In addition, we examine the effect of short-sale constraints on price bubble. Cross-listing price
differencemay generate speculative buying and consequently abnormal returns, onlywhen short sale
is not allowed or the ability to short over-valued shares is limited. Short sales tend to moderate the
tendency for stocks to be bid up to higher prices (Miller, 1977). In Hong Kong stockmarket, only stocks
speciﬁed on the “List of Designated Securities Eligible for Short Selling” can be sold short (Chang et al.,
2007). So, we expect that short sales could to some extent constrain the magnitude of price bubble,
because short sales increase the supply of stock by the amount of the outstanding short position. State
formally, we test the following hypotheses:
H3d. In the August event, there is a negative relationship between post-announcement abnormal
stock returns and stock short-sale eligibility.
For the November 5th announcement, we construct a similar partial mediation model to analyze
the relationship between cross-listing price difference and abnormal stock returns with the identical
mediator variable (excess speculative trading). However, in the November event, the effect of cross-
listing price difference on abnormal stock returns is negative, as the November announcement might
signal a signiﬁcant delay in the implementation of the scheme and Hong Kong shareholders/buyers
have to adjust stock valuation downwards. On the other hand, the delay in the scheme could also con-
strain Hong Kong market speculative motive and reduce speculative demand for Hong Kong stocks,
which may in turn drive stock prices down. So, hypothetically, we expect excess speculative trading
to partially mediate the relationship between cross-listing price difference and post-announcement
returns. Furthermore, Hong Kong speculators may actively short their speculative positions and
increase the supply of the stocks, due to the fear that the scheme could bewithdrawn. In theNovember
event, short sale is also likely to impose a negative effect on stock returns. So, we hypothesize that:
H4a. In the November event, there is a negative relationship between cross-listing price difference
and post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
H4b. In the November event, there is a positive relationship between cross-listing price difference
and excess speculative trading (selling).
H4c. In the November event, excess speculative trading (selling) mediates the relationship between
cross-listing price difference and post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
H4d. In the November event, there is a negative relationship between post-announcement abnormal
stock returns and stock short-sale eligibility.
5. Research design
5.1. Data
We ﬁrst examine the market-level responses (both Hong Kong and mainland) to the events on
August 20th, August 26th, September 2nd, October 16th and November 5th, 2007. Following main-
stream event studies we set a 3-day event window centered on the event day (t=−1, t=0 and t=1).
From Datastream we collect the data of Hang Seng Index, Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (Hong
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Kongmarket benchmarks)10 and China Securities Index 300 (CSI 300, mainlandmarket benchmark)11
from August 21, 2006 (one year before the ﬁrst event day in August, 2007) until August 20th, 2008
(one year after the ﬁrst event day).
Second,we focus on those stocks cross-listed on bothHong Kong (H-share) andmainland (A-share)
market. To qualify for the sample, a ﬁrm has to be cross-listed on both Hong Kong and mainland
stock market before July 20th, 2007, and the trading should be continuous between August 20th and
November 7th, 2007. The ﬁnal sample consists of 41 ﬁrms.12
FromDataStreamwe collect stock prices of bothA- andH-share stocks of the ﬁrm, daily trading vol-
ume,market to book ratio andmarket capitalization; from thewebsite of HKEx (Hong Kong Exchanges
and Clearing) we collect data about short-sale eligibility, to test the effects of short-sale eligibility and
price difference of cross-listed stocks13 on the daily abnormal returns of individual Hong Kong shares.
A/H difference is computed as the price difference in the prior trading day between the A-share and
H-share stocks of the same ﬁrmmeasured as a percentage of the A-share price, as we expect investors
to adjust their valuation by reacting to the existing price difference. We collect data over a ﬁve-day
period starting with the announcement day for the August 20th and November 5th events. Further-
more, we manually collect data of short-sale volume from China Finance Online (www.jrj.com.cn).
Finally, to test the investor recognition hypothesis we obtain data of registered shareholders from
H-share interim reports ended at June 30th, 2007.
5.2. Research method
5.2.1. Market-level responses to relevant events (Hong Kong and China)
Consistent with previous studies (Ali and Kallapur, 2001; Jain and Rezaee, 2005; Li et al., 2008) we
use the following model to estimate the market-level responses associated with the relevant events:
MarketRETt = ˛0 +
∑
ALLi
ˇiDi + εi (1)
where the market return MarketRETt is calculated using the change in percentage of Hang Seng index
and Hang Seng China Enterprises Index on day t relative to day t−1, and Di is a dummy variable equal
to 1 during event i, and 0 otherwise; (i=1–5). In order to control for contemporaneous performance
changes of major global markets, we bring a control variable into the regression analysis, which is the
lagged Dow Jones Industry Average index return at day t−1 relative to day t−2. In addition, we also
control for the possible inﬂuence caused by calendar effect. Two dummy variables are introduced and
take value of 1 if Monday or Friday of the week; another two dummy variables are used, taking value
of 1 if the ﬁrst and the last trading day of the month.
WeuseOLS regression toestimate themodel over a two-yearperiodbetweenAugust 21st, 2006and
August 20th, 2008. The coefﬁcient on each dummy variable (ˇi) represents an estimate of the average
daily return related to the event, namely, the daily market return incremental to the average market
return over the non-event days. We expect to ﬁnd a positive coefﬁcient for the events associated with
news favorable to the “through-train scheme”, and anegative coefﬁcient for the events associatedwith
news unfavorable to the “through-train scheme”. We also run the model for mainland stock market
with the China Securities Index 300 as the benchmark.
5.2.2. Firm-level responses to relevant events (Hong Kong and China)
To further investigate the impact of two important announcements on August 20th and November
5th on individual stocks, we run the following regression based on ﬁrm-level data for 41 cross-listed
10 The Hang Seng China Enterprises Index was launched on August 8, 1994 to track the performance of all Hong Kong listed
H-shares of Chinese enterprises, hence it is called “H-shares index”.
11 CSI 300 is a diversiﬁed index consisting of 300 constituentMainlandA Shares compiled andmanaged by the China Securities
Index Co., Ltd.
12 A full list of sample ﬁrms is provided in Appendix A, as well as short sale eligibility.
13 To calculate the A/H price difference, we collect data of exchange rate between US dollar/Hong Kong dollar and US dol-
lar/Chinese RMB to convert all stock prices into Chinese RMB on a daily basis.
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ﬁrms between July 1st and December 19th, 2007 (1month prior to the announcement on August 20th
and 4 months after):
ARi,t = ˛ + 0Augdummy + 1NovDummy + 2MTBi,t + 3Sizei,t + εt (2)
where ARi,t is the daily abnormal return for ﬁrm i in day t14; AugDummy is one for August 17th, 20th
or 21st, zero otherwise; NovDummy is one for November 2nd, 5th or 6th, zero otherwise. MTBi,t is the
market to book ratio for ﬁrm i in day t. Sizei,t is measured as the logarithm of market capitalization
for ﬁrm i in day t. In addition, we also control for lagged US market return and calendar effect in the
regression analysis.We run the regression for Hong Kong andmainland stocks separately. For H-share
stocks we expect the coefﬁcient of AugDummy to be positive and the coefﬁcient of NovDummy to be
negative; for A-share stocks, we expect the coefﬁcient of AugDummy to be negative and the coefﬁcient
of NovDummy to be positive.
5.2.3. Effect of excess turnover on Hong Kong post-announcement returns
We hypothesize that excess trading volume (buying) is positively associated with post-
announcement abnormal stock returns in the August event; however, in the November event, excess
trading volume (selling) is negatively associated with post-announcement abnormal stock returns.
So, we use the following model to test the hypothesis:
ARi,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1MTBi,t + ϕ2Sizei,t + ϕ3ExcessTurnoveri,t + εt (3)
where ARi,t is the market-adjusted abnormal return for Hong Kong stock i at post-announcement day
t. MTBi,t is the market to book value for stock i at day t. Sizei,t is the logarithm form of the market
capitalization for stock i at day t. ExcessTurnoveri,t is computed as the daily turnover rate for stock i at
day t net of the daily average turnover rate in July 2007.
5.2.4. Effect of cross-listing price difference on Hong Kong post-announcement returns
We rely on the following model to test whether excess turnover is mediating the association
between price different between cross-listed stocks and post-announcement abnormal returns:
ARi,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1A/H Differencei,t−1 + ϕ2MTBi,t + ϕ3Sizei,t + ϕ4Shortselling
+ϕ5ExcessTurnover + εt (4)
where ExcessTurnover, the mediating variable, is computed as the difference between daily turnover
rate for H-share stocks during the period of interest and the daily average turnover rate in July 2007.
Excess turnover is consideredasamediatingvariable to carryout the inﬂuenceofA/H Differenceonpost-
announcement abnormal returns when the four conditions are met: (1) A/H Difference signiﬁcantly
affects excess turnover, (2) A/H Difference signiﬁcantly affects post-announcement abnormal returns
in the absence of excess turnover, (3) excess turnover has a signiﬁcant effect on post-announcement
abnormal returns and (4) the effect of A/H Difference on post-announcement abnormal returns decreases
upon the inclusion of excess turnover into the model. Statistically, we use the Sobel test to examine
the mediating effect of excess turnover.
We present results of three regressions. In the ﬁrst regression, dependent variable (post-
announcement abnormal return) is regressed on A/H Difference (the price difference between A- and
H-share stocks), shortselling (short sale eligibility),market-to-book and sizewithout controlling for the
mediating variable excess turnover. Then, we regress excess turnover on A/H Difference, shortselling,
market-to-book and size. Finally, to identify the mediation effect, we regress abnormal returns on
A/H Difference, shortselling, market-to-book, size and excess turnover.
14 The daily abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the stock return of individual ﬁrms and themarket return,
which is computed based on Hang Seng index in Hong Kong market or China Securities 300 index in mainland Chinese market,
respectively.
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5.2.5. Test of investor recognition hypothesis
In order to test the investor recognition hypothesis, we follow Grullon et al. (2004) to estimate
the relationship between shareholder base and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics including market to book
ratio, market capitalization and share price. Then we name the residual of the regression as “excess
shareholder base”, and regress A/Hprice difference on “excess shareholder base”. The coefﬁcient being
negative and signiﬁcant provides support for the investor recognition hypothesis.15
No shareholdersi = 0 + 1Sizei + 2MTBi + 3H Pricei + εi
Excess shareholders = No shareholdersi −
∧
0 −
∧
1Sizei −
∧
2MTBi −
∧
3H Pricei
where No shareholdersi is the logarithm of the number of total H-share shareholders registered on
June 30th 2007; Sizei, MTBi and H Pricei are the logarithm of market capitalization, market-to-book
value and H-share stock price, respectively; ˆ0 is the estimated intercept; ˆ1, ˆ2 and ˆ3 are the slope
coefﬁcients for ﬁrm i.
Finally, we run the following regressions:
A/H Differencei = 0 + 1Excess shareholdersi + εi (5)
ARi = 0 + 1Excess shareholdersi + εi (6)
Investor recognition hypothesis is supported if 1 and 1 are negative and signiﬁcant.
6. Results
6.1. Market-level responses to the relevant events (Hong Kong and China)
Fig. 1 depicts the market returns based on both Hang Seng Index and Hang Seng China Enterprise
index between June 20th, 2007 and March 20th, 2008. It can be observed that the market returns
computed using both Hong Kong indices are positive after the August 20th announcement, but nega-
tive after the November 5th announcement, compatible with the results reported in Table 1 , panel A
and B.
As the test period of the November event coincides with the emerging sub-prime crisis in the US,
stock price inHongKongmaybe led by the plungingUSmarket due to the concern of troubledﬁnancial
institutions. Therefore, we control for the lagged US market return based on Dow-Jones Industry
Average.16 Furthermore, we control for the well-documented end-of-week and end-of-month effects
by introducing four dummies:Mondaydummy, Fridaydummy,Month-beginningdummyandMonth-
end dummy. The results are presented in Table 1.
In model 1 (panel A), the coefﬁcient of August 20th dummy is positive and signiﬁcant based on
one-tailed t-test (0.017, t=1.62) when market return is computed on Hang Seng Index, while the
coefﬁcient of November 5th dummy is signiﬁcantly negative (−0.022, t=−2.17). The coefﬁcients of
other events are insigniﬁcant. In model 2, after controlling the lagged US market return, the signs of
both August 20th and November 5th dummies remain unchanged, albeit their magnitude and signiﬁ-
cance levels slightly decline. The coefﬁcient of lagged USmarket return is signiﬁcantly positive (0.774,
t=10.61), consistent with the observation that Hong Kong market is well integrated with the major
markets around the world, as US market return has predictive power of market movements in Hong
Kong. In model 3, after controlling end-of-week and end-of-month effects, we ﬁnd that the estimated
coefﬁcients of both August 20th and November 5th dummies remain qualitatively unchanged.
The results based on Hang Seng China Enterprise Index also support our expectation, as the coef-
ﬁcient of August 20th dummy (November 5th dummy) is signiﬁcant and positive (negative) across
regressions, although the coefﬁcients of other events remain insigniﬁcant.
15 We only have the number of registered shareholders on June 30th 2007 for 30 ﬁrms, so the sample size for this test is 30.
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
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Table 1
Univariate market-level analysis. MarketRETt =˛+
∑
ALLiˇiDi +1USRETt−1 +2WeekEffect+3MonthEffect+ εt , where MarketRETt is the market return calculated using the change in per-
centage of market Index on day t relative to day t−1, and Di is a dummy variable equal to 1 during the three-day event i, and 0 otherwise. USRETt−1 is the lagged US market index return
(Dow Jones Industry Average) on day t−1 relative to day t−2. Week effect variables (Monday or Friday dummies) take the value of 1 if Monday or Friday, respectively, 0 otherwise;
Monthly effect dummy variables (beginning of the month and end of the month) take the value of 1 for the ﬁrst trading day or the last trading day of the month, respectively.
Event date Predicted sign Hang Seng Index returns Hang Seng China Enterprise Index returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Regression of Hong Kong returns on the events (from Aug 21, 2006 to Aug 20, 2008)
Aug 20, 2007 + 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.027* 0.023* 0.023*
(1.51) (1.91) (1.70) (1.70)
Aug 26, 2007 − 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.021 0.018 0.018
(0.51) (0.39) (0.39) (1.47) (1.33) (1.33)
Sept 02, 2007 − 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.50) (0.57) (0.55) (0.60) (0.53) (0.46)
Oct 16, 2007 − 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010
(0.48) (0.74) (0.76) (0.49) (0.68) (0.70)
Nov 05, 2007 − −0.022** −0.017* −0.018* −0.029** −0.023* −0.023*
(−2.17) (−1.89) (−1.88) (−2.05) (−1.69) (−1.68)
Lagged US market return NP 0.774*** 0.775*** 1.036*** 1.039***
(10.61) (10.52) (9.59) (9.52)
Monday dummy NP −0.000 −0.001
(−0.24) (−0.27)
Friday dummy NP 0.001 0.001
(0.30) (0.37)
Month-beginning dummy NP 0.000 0.002
(0.02) (0.29)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Event date Predicted sign Hang Seng Index returns Hang Seng China Enterprise Index returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Month-end dummy NP 0.000 0.001
(0.04) (0.10)
Observations 504 498 498 504 498 498
Event date Predicted sign China Securities 300 Index returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel B: Regression of mainland returns on the events (from Aug 21, 2006 to Aug 20, 2008)
Aug 20, 2007 − 0.016 0.015 0.015
(1.13) (1.04) (1.01)
Aug 26, 2007 + 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.41) (0.36) (0.33)
Sept 02, 2007 + 0.006 0.014 0.016
(0.42) (0.81) (0.86)
Oct 16, 2007 + 0.004 0.043 0.003
(0.24) (0.29) (0.23)
Nov 05, 2007 + −0.019 −0.017 −0.018
(−1.42) (−1.17) (−1.19)
Lagged US market return NP 0.300** 0.301**
(2.56) (2.55)
Monday dummy NP 0.003
(1.13)
Friday dummy NP −0.001
(−0.47)
Month-beginning dummy NP −0.007
(−1.10)
Month-end dummy NP 0.002
(0.45)
Observations 488 467 467
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
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Table 1 (panel B) provides the results of mainland market based on China Securities 300 Index. In
model 1, the coefﬁcients of August 20th and November 5th dummy, as well as coefﬁcients of other
events, are insigniﬁcant. After controlling for lagged US market return in model 2 and end-of-week
and end-of-month effects in model 3, respectively, the coefﬁcients of all event dummies remain con-
sistently insigniﬁcant. The results are consistent with the home bias effect (e.g., French and Poterba,
1991), which suggests that investors hold modest amounts of foreign equities, in spite of substantial
beneﬁts from international diversiﬁcation. That is probably because capital is internationally immo-
bile across countries and investors have superior access to information about local ﬁrms or economic
conditions. Hence, mainland investors in general are not likely to divert a substantial amount of cap-
ital into overseas markets at the early stage of “through-train” scheme. In addition, the coefﬁcient of
lagged US market return is positive and signiﬁcant, which implies that Chinese mainland market is
also likely to be integrated into the global ﬁnancial system in that US market return seems to herald
mainland Chinese market movements.
6.2. Firm-level responses to the relevant events (Hong Kong and China)
Table 2 provides the results of association between the abnormal returns of 41 cross-listed stocks
and the August 20th andNovember 5th announcements.We compute abnormal returns for each stock
using market-adjusted daily stock returns between July 1st and December 19th, 2007, then pool all
H-share (or A-share) stocks together and regress abnormal returns on two event dummies associated
with theAugust 20th andNovember 5th announcements after controlling formarket-to-book andﬁrm
size.17 Consistently,wecontrol for laggedUSmarket returnandend-of-weekandend-of-montheffects
inmodel 2 and3, respectively. Panel A (Table 2) presents the results forH-share returns. Inmodel 1, the
coefﬁcient ofAugustdummy ispositive and signiﬁcant (0.021, t=4.56), suggestingH-share stocks react
favorably to the announcement that the “through-train” schemewould kick off. This is consistentwith
themarket level response around August 20th event. In contrast, the coefﬁcient of November dummy
is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.004, t=−1.86). Hong Kong investors might interpret the information
contained in the re-assessing announcement as a temporary delay or even suspension of the scheme,
so they adjusted the stock valuation downwards. Inmodel 2 andmodel 3, the estimated coefﬁcients of
August and November dummy remain qualitatively unchanged. Meanwhile, the coefﬁcient of lagged
US market return is positive and signiﬁcant (0.174, t=4.63). The coefﬁcient of month-end dummy
is positive and signiﬁcant (0.003, t=1.90), compatible with the institutional trading and portfolio
pumping literature (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1991; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Carhart et al., 2002)18 that
fundmanagers aggressively buy stocks alreadyheld by their funds andpumpupprices at calendar-end
in order to beat benchmarks and claim decent league-table ranking.
Panel B (Table 2) reports the results of cross-listed stocks in Chinese Mainland market. The coef-
ﬁcient of August dummy is negative and signiﬁcant across the regressions, which suggests that the
“Hong Kong through-train scheme” has a negative effect on cross-listed stocks in Mainland market,
possibly due to the concern that mainland investors might divert their investments to Hong Kong
market for shares with exactly the same rights at a lower price. The coefﬁcient of November dummy
is insigniﬁcant across the regressions. Finally, the coefﬁcient of month-beginning dummy is negative
and signiﬁcant (−0.004, t=−3.12), consistent with the prediction of portfolio pumping literature that
stock returns increase at the close of calendar periods and decrease at the beginning of next periods.
17 As the abnormal stock return of cross-listed ﬁrms might be correlated with each other, we cluster standard error at ﬁrm
level.
18 Lakonishok et al. (1991) ﬁnd that fundmanagers window dress their portfolios at the end of reporting periods, as a reaction
to either implicit or explicit incentive compensation contracts. Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that on the last day of a reference
period, fund managers get more beneﬁts frommoving performance to that period from the next if their period-to-date perfor-
mances are near the top of the distribution. Carhart et al. (2002) present evidence that fund managers attempt equity trades at
the close of calendar quarters to temporarily inﬂate calendar quarter returns.
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Table 2
The ﬁrm-level response to August/November events. ARi,t = ˛ + 1Augdummy + 2NovDummy + 3MTBi,t + 4Sizei,t +
5USRETt−1 + 6WeekEffect + 7MonthEffect + εt , where ARi,t is the market-adjusted abnormal return for cross-listed stocks
i at day t. August dummy takes value 1 for the three days around the event (August 17,20,21) and 0 otherwise; November
dummy takes value 1 for three days around the event (November 2,5,6) and 0 otherwise. MTBi,t is the market to book value for
stock i at day t. Sizei,t is the logarithm of the market capitalization for stock i at day t. USRETt−1 is the lagged US market index
return (Dow Jones Industry Average) on day t−1 relative to day t−2. Week effect variables (Monday or Friday dummies) take
the value of 1 if Monday or Friday, respectively, 0 otherwise; Monthly effect dummy variables (beginning of themonth and end
of the month) take the value of 1 if the ﬁrst trading day or the last trading day of the month, respectively.
Predicted sign Cross-listed stocks in
Hong Kong
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Regression of abnormal returns of cross-listed stocks in Hong Kong (July 1 to December 19, 2007)
August dummy + 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(4.56) (4.88) (5.01)
November Dummy − −0.004* −0.005* −0.005*
(−1.86) (−1.69) (−1.71)
Market-to-book NP 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004**
(2.27) (2.48) (2.46)
Size NP 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(2.60) (2.62) (2.62)
Lagged US market return NP 0.174*** 0.162***
(4.63) (4.28)
Monday dummy NP 0.0008
(0.68)
Friday dummy NP −0.001
(−0.97)
Month-beginning dummy NP −0.0005
(−0.33)
Month-end dummy NP 0.003*
(1.90)
Observations 5043 (41 ﬁrms × 123 days)
Predicted sign Cross-listed stocks in
Mainland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel B: Regression of abnormal returns of cross-listed stocks in Mainland (July 1 to December 19, 2007)
August dummy −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.008***
(−3.26) (−2.92) (−3.03)
November Dummy + 0.003 0.003 0.002
(1.07) (0.92) (0.66)
Market-to-book NP 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
(1.25) (1.51) (1.48)
Size NP 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(1.77) (1.74) (1.73)
Lagged US market return NP −0.030 −0.027
(−0.77) (−0.70)
Monday dummy NP 0.001
(0.95)
Friday dummy NP −0.001
(−0.97)
Month-beginning dummy NP −0.004***
(−3.12)
Month-end dummy NP 0.001
(0.83)
Observations 5043
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
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Table 3
Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and excess trading (August and November events). ARi,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1MTBi,t + ϕ2Sizei,t +
ϕ3ExcessTurnoveri,t + ϕ4ExcessTurnoveri,t−1 + εt , where ARi,t is the market-adjusted abnormal return for Hong Kong stock i at
post-announcement day t (August 20–24 and November 5–9, 2007, respectively). MTBi,t is the market to book value for stock i
at day t. Sizei,t is the logarithm form of the market capitalization for stock i at day t. ExcessTurnoveri,t is computed as the daily
turnover for stock i at day t net of the daily average turnover in July 2007.
Predicted sign Hong Kong post-August
abnormal returns (5-day
event window)
Robustness check for a longer window
Event day 6 to day 10 Event day 6 to day 20
Panel A: Post-announcement abnormal returns during the period August 20–24
Market-to-book NP 0.002** 0.002** −0.0004 0.0003
(2.03) (2.04) (−0.59) (1.46)
Size NP −0.012*** −0.012*** 0.012*** 0.006***
(−3.43) (−3.01) (4.07) (3.90)
Excess Turnover + 0.804*** 1.372*** 0.494** 0.238
(5.21) (5.80) (2.39) (1.31)
Lagged Excess Turnover − −0.769***
(−2.78)
R-square 0.19 0.27 0.09 0.04
Observations 205 (41×5) 164 (41×4) 190 570
Predicted sign Hong Kong post-August
abnormal returns (5-day
event window)
Robustness check for a longer window
Event day 6 to day 10 Event day 6 to day 20
Panel B: Post-announcement abnormal returns during the period November 5–9
Market-to-book NP 0.00012 0.00026 −0.0001 0.0005**
(0.47) (0.60) (−0.24) (2.12)
Size NP 0.0008 0.003 −0.00004 −0.0008
(0.36) (1.15) (−0.00) (−0.87)
Excess Turnover − −0.651*** −1.176*** 0.091 0.516***
(−2.98) (−3.32) (0.21) (2.96)
Lagged Excess Turnover + 0.599*
(1.83)
R-square 0.05 0.07 0.0006 0.03
Observations 205 164 190 570
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
6.3. Post-announcement Hong Kong stock returns and excess trading (August and November)
We regress post-announcement stock returns in Hong Kong (August 20–24 and November 5–9,
2007, respectively) on excess turnover rate. Table 3, panel A shows that the coefﬁcient of excess
turnover rate is positive and signiﬁcant (1.372, t=5.80) in the August regression, while the coef-
ﬁcient of lagged excess turnover is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.769, t=−2.78). It implies that the
excess turnover is likely to impose a temporary push on stock price, as stock return reverses partly
in the next trading day.19 In contrast, the coefﬁcient of excess turnover rate is negatively signiﬁcant
(−1.176, t=−3.32) in theNovember regression. Thepositive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of lagged excess
19 Theﬁndingsmay also be explained by the declining speculative trading, as short-horizon speculative traders reap the proﬁts
by closing their long positions once the prices rise to their target level.
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turnover (0.599, t=1.83) also signals that abnormal return caused by excess turnover is not likely to
be permanent.
In order to formally examinewhether theprice change is permanent or temporary,we run the same
regression to test whether the abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly associated with excess turnover in
a longer post-event window. We run regressions separately with the data from the event period [day
6, day 10] and the event period [day 6, day 20], respectively. The results are reported in Table 3 (panel
A and B). Although post-August abnormal returns in Hong Kong from event day 6 to event day 10 are
signiﬁcantly and positively associated with excess turnover, the signiﬁcance level decreases (from 1%
to 5%). Based on a longer event period [day 6, day 20], there is no signiﬁcant association between post-
August abnormal returns and excess turnover. Panel B (Table 3) shows that post-November abnormal
returns at event period [day 6, day 10] are no longer signiﬁcantly associated with excess turnover.
For the event period [day 6, day 20], the association tends to be signiﬁcant but positive. The evidence
supports the price pressure hypothesis: the excess demand pushes stock price up or down, but the
effect seems to be temporary rather than permanent. Results in Table 3 support H2a and H2b. It
conﬁrms that post-announcement Hong Kong returns are associated with excess trading (buying and
selling). We argue that price pressure caused by excess trading imposes a temporary effect on Hong
Kong returns.20
6.4. Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and cross-listing price difference (August)
For theAugust 20thannouncement,weexpect theHongKong shareswith largeA/Hpricedifference
to react more strongly, because Hong Kong investors would push up the prices of less expensive
H-share stocks in more aggressive attempts to re-sell to incoming mainland investors for a larger
proﬁt. Furthermore, we expect excess turnover to play a mediating role: on the one hand, consistent
with the resale option effect (Hong et al., 2006), Hong Kong stock holders/buyers adjust their price
expectations upwards as a response to August 20th announcement, which is the direct effect of A/H
price difference on post-announcement stock returns. On the other hand, large A/H price difference
could further generate excess demand for H shares, which translates into high abnormal stock returns
in Hong Kong. This is the indirect effect of A/H price difference on post-announcement returns. Our
conjecture is supported by results reported in Table 4.
First, we run the regression of post-announcement abnormal returns on A/H price difference with-
out controlling for excess turnover, and A/H price difference exhibits a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient
(0.14, t=6.18), suggesting that Hong Kong price bubble subsequent to August 20th announcement
is associated with A/H price difference between stocks listed on two markets. After excess turnover
being controlled for, A/H price difference still has a strong positive impact (0.12, t=5.18), but rela-
tively less signiﬁcant. It is implied that the effect of A/H price difference on speculative overvaluation
is partially mediated by excess turnover. The regression of excess turnover on A/H price difference
also conﬁrms that excess turnover is associated with A/H price difference (0.08, t=5.09). Sobel test
(Z=1.83, P<0.10) shows that the mediation effect of excess turnover is signiﬁcant at 10% level, with
11.61% of total effect being mediated as indirect effect.
The results conﬁrm that the total effect of A/H price difference on speculation can be split into two
parts: direct effect and indirect effect. The direct effect is dominant, as it accounts for 88.39% of the
total effect. It suggests that Hong Kong stock holders/buyers adjust their price expectations upwards
directly as a response to August 20th announcement, expecting to re-sell tomore optimisticmainland
investors for a proﬁt. The results also show that part of the effect of A/H price difference on abnormal
returns is going through the mediator variable (excess turnover). The indirect effect is small (11.61%)
but still statistically signiﬁcant. In other words, A/H price difference generates excess demand for H
shares after the August 20th announcement, which results in high abnormal stock returns. Overall
H3a,b,c are supported.
20 In addition, recent studiesonhigh-volumereturnpremium(Gervais, 2001;Barber andOdean, 2008) also showthat investors
draw attention to stocks experiencing high turnover and become net buyers of these attention-grabbing stocks. This could be
an alternative plausible explanation for high-volume return premium after the launching announcement in August, but not for
high-volume lower return after the re-assessing announcement in November.
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Table 4
Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and cross-listing price difference (August event), ARi,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1A/H Differencei,t−1 +
ϕ2MTBi,t + ϕ3Sizei,t + ϕ4Shortselling + ϕ5ExcessTurnoveri,t + εt , where ARi,t is the market-adjusted abnormal return for Hong
Kong stock i at post-announcement day t (August 20–24, 2007). MTBi,t is the market to book value for stock i at day t. Sizei,t
is the logarithm form of the market capitalization for stock i at day t. A/H Differencei,t−1 denotes the price difference between
mainland and Hong Kong stocks scaled by mainland prices for stock i at day t−1. Shortselling takes the value of 1, if eligible for
short sales, 0 otherwise. ExcessTurnoveri,t is computed as the daily turnover for stock i at day t net of the daily average turnover
in July 2007. In the ﬁrst regression, dependent variable (abnormal return) is regressed on A/H Difference without controlling
for excess turnover, which is the mediating variable. Then, we regress excess turnover on A/H Difference. Finally, to detect the
mediation effect, we regress abnormal returns on A/H Difference with excess turnover controlled for.
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
Abnormal returns Excess turnover Abnormal returns
A/H price difference 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.12***
(6.18) (5.09) (5.18)
Market-to-book 0.003*** 0.0007 0.0003***
(3.62) (1.01) (3.50)
Size 0.000007 −0.0001 0.00003
(0.00) (−0.04) (0.01)
Short sale eligibility −0.02** −0.01 −0.02*
(−2.02) (−1.64) (−1.79)
Excess turnover 0.20**
(mediating variable) (2.00)
R-square 0.25 0.21 0.27
Observations 205 205 205
Sobel mediation test Coefﬁcient: 0.016 Z-statistics: 1.87 P-value: 0.062
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
6.5. The effect of short sales on Hong Kong returns (August)
In the regression where abnormal return is the dependent variable, the coefﬁcient of short sales
eligibility is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.019, t=−2.02), suggesting short sales tend to reduce the
magnitude of speculative overvaluation. The results are consistent with the theoretical argument that
A/H price differencemay generate speculative trading and consequently abnormal returns, onlywhen
short sale is not allowed or the ability of short sales is limited (Miller, 1977). In the regression where
excess turnover is the dependent variable, the coefﬁcient of short sales eligibility on excess turnover
is negative and marginally signiﬁcant (−0.01, t=−1.64).
To further investigate the effect of short sale constraints we replace dummy variable short sales
eligibility with the daily short sale volume scaled by turnover on the same trading day for a ﬁve-
day event window after the August 20th announcement. We also include one-day lagged short sale
volume to examine the possible time-lag effect. The results in Table 5 show the coefﬁcient of short sale
volume remains negatively signiﬁcant (-0.167, t=−2.57), consistent with early ﬁndings. The results
Table 5
Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and short sale volume (August event). ARi,t =0 +1ShortVolumei,t−1 +2ShortVolumei,t
+ εt . ARi,t is the daily abnormal return for ﬁrm i in post-August event day t (t=2, 3, 4, 5; t=1 when August 20th, 2007), and
ShortVolumei,t is the daily short selling volume scaled by the share turnover on the same day.
Predicted sign Coefﬁcient T-statistics P-value
Lagged shortselling volume – −0.087 −1.25 0.214
Shortselling volume – −0.167** −2.57 0.011
R-square 0.07
Observations 164 (41×4)
Data source: manually collected from www.jrj.com.cn (China Finance Online).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
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Table 6
Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and cross-listing price difference (November event). ARi,t = ϕ0 +
ϕ1A/H Differencei,t−1 + ϕ2MTBi,t + ϕ3Sizei,t + ϕ4Shortselling + ϕ5ExcessTurnoveri,t + εt , where ARi,t is the market-adjusted
abnormal return for Hong Kong stock i at post-announcement day t (November 5–9, 2007). MTBi,t is the market to book value
for stock i at day t. Sizei,t is the logarithm form of the market capitalization for stock i at day t. A/H Differencei,t−1 denotes
the price difference between mainland and Hong Kong stocks scaled by mainland prices for stock i at day t−1. Shortselling
takes the value of 1, if eligible for short sales, 0 otherwise. ExcessTurnoveri,t is computed as the daily turnover for stock i at
day t net of the daily average turnover in July 2007. In the ﬁrst regression, dependent variable (abnormal return) is regressed
on A/H Difference without controlling for excess turnover, which is the mediating variable. Then, we regress excess turnover
on A/H Difference. Finally, to detect the mediation effect, we regress abnormal returns on A/H Difference with excess turnover
controlled for.
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
Abnormal returns Excess turnover Abnormal returns
A/H price difference −0.023* 0.008*** −0.017
(−1.80) (2.75) (−1.35)
Market-to-book 0.00003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.07) (1.28) (0.28)
Size −0.001 0.002*** 0.0002
(−0.37) (2.81) (0.08)
Short sale eligibility −0.002 0.0004 −0.002
(−0.35) (0.25) (−0.31)
Excess turnover (mediating variable) −0.65**
(−2.26)
R-square 0.02 0.09 0.04
Observations 205 205
Sobel mediation test Coefﬁcient: −0.006 Z-statistics: −1.74 P-value: 0.08
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 5% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
corroborate that abnormal stock returns are negatively associated with short sales constraints, in line
with the arguments proposed by Miller (1977). Overall H3d is supported.
6.6. Post-announcement Hong Kong returns and cross-listing price difference (November)
Table 6 provides the results related to the hypothesis H4a to H4c that excess turnover is medi-
ating the relationship between A/H price difference and post-announcement abnormal stock returns
after the November 5th announcement in Hong Kong market. The negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
of A/H price difference (−0.02, t=−1.80) suggests that H-share stocks with larger price difference
lost more grounds after the announcement.21 As the speculative demand for Hong Kong stocks
is reduced due to the delay of the scheme, as well as the increased supply of shorting specula-
tive positions in the market, the stock price could be driven down, reﬂected by negative abnormal
returns.
The results in Table 6 conﬁrm our conjecture: the impact of A/H price difference on
speculative trading (measured as excess turnover) is positive and signiﬁcant (0.008, t=2.75), sug-
gesting larger A/H price difference generates larger speculative motive to trade (sell), which
could further drive down the share price. Finally, in the regression of abnormal returns on
21 For each sample ﬁrm its H share price is lower than A share price, so larger A/H price difference suggests H share price is
lagging behind A share price considerably. Those ﬁrms with larger A/H price difference in August remain on top of the list in
November, although the magnitude of A/H price difference becomes slightly smaller (details are provided in Appendix A). The
only exception is Datang Power, whose average A/H share price difference in August event window (75%) considerably shrank
(average 55% in November event window). We re-run the regression after excluding this ﬁrm and the results are still robust.
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Table 7
Post-announcement mainland returns and cross-listing price difference (August and November)
ARi,t =ϕ0 +ϕ1A/H Differencei,t−1 +ϕ2MTBi,t +ϕ3Sizei,t + εt , where ARi,t is the market-adjusted abnormal return for main-
land stock i at post-announcement day t (August 20–24 and November 5–9, 2007, respectively). MTBi,t is the market to book
value for stock i at day t. Sizei,t is the logarithm form of the market capitalization for stock i at day t. A/H Differencei,t−1 denotes
the price difference between mainland and Hong Kong stocks scaled by mainland prices for stock i at day t−1.
Predicted sign Coefﬁcient T-statistics P-value
Panel A: Post-announcement abnormal returns during the period August 20–24
A/H price difference – −0.04*** −3.17 0.002
Market-to-book NP 0.0001 0.32 0.749
Size NP −0.004* −1.76 0.083
R-square 0.07
Observations 205
Predicted sign Coefﬁcient T-statistics P-value
Panel B: Post-announcement abnormal returns during the period November 5–9
A/H price difference + −0.02 −1.94 0.056
Market-to-book NP −0.001 −1.92 0.059
Size NP −0.004 −1.50 0.137
R-square 0.03
Observations 205
*** Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% level (2-tailed).
* Coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 10% level (2-tailed).
A/H price difference with excess turnover being controlled for, the effect of A/H price dif-
ference becomes insigniﬁcant, indicating a strong mediating effect of excess turnover. Sobel
test (Z=−1.75, P<0.10) suggests that the mediating effect of excess turnover is signiﬁcant
at 10% level, with 24.31% of total effect being mediated. Overall H4a, H4b and H4c are
supported.
6.7. Responses of cross-listed stocks to the August and November events in Chinese mainland market
Wealso report the response of cross-listed stocks to the August 20th andNovember 5th announce-
ment in mainland market. Table 7, panel A provides results related to the abnormal returns of 41
A-share stocks after the August 20th announcement. Contrary to what has been found in Hong Kong
market, the coefﬁcient of A/H price difference is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.04, t=−3.17), suggest-
ing the “through-train” scheme was not perceived by mainland investors as favorable news for ﬁrms
with large A- and H-share price difference.22 One possible explanation is the growing concern that
shareholders might divert their investment from A-share to H-share market because they can buy
shares with the identical rights at a lower price. This pessimistic sentiment could drive down the
share price of cross-listed ﬁrms in mainlandmarket. In fact the “through-train scheme” was launched
to cool down the over-heated mainland stock market. The announcement of launching the scheme
could have direct impact on cross-listed stocks inmainlandmarket as rational investors now have the
option to buy stocks with identical rights at a discount in Hong Kong market.
Table 7, panel B provides results related to the abnormal returns of A-share stocks after theNovem-
ber 5th announcement. The coefﬁcient of A/H difference is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.02, t=−1.94),
which is inconsistent with our expectation. It is likely thatmainland investors did not see through this
ambiguous re-assessment message of the scheme, which proves to be the suspension of the scheme.
Alternatively, mainland investors may interpret the November announcement as a temporary delay
of the scheme, but have the concern that the “through-train” schemewould be re-launched sometime
in the future.
22 Althoughprevious results show the announcement inAugust has insigniﬁcant effect onmainlandmarket as awhole, it could
have unequal impacts on different market segments. The effect on the cross-listed ﬁrms might be direct and more profound.
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Table 8
Evidence on testing investor recognition hypothesis.
Predicted sign Coefﬁcient T-statistics P-value
Panel A: Regression of price difference on excess shareholder base A/H Differencei =0 +1Excess shareholdersi + εi , where
A/H Differencei denotes the price difference between mainland and Hong Kong stocks scaled by Hong Kong prices;
Excess shareholdersi is the excess shareholder base, which is the residual of the regression with the number of shareholders
as dependent variable and market-to-book, ﬁrm size and share price (all in logarithm terms) as independent variables
Excess shareholder base – 0.066 1.16 0.257
R-square 0.04
Observations 30
Predicted sign Coefﬁcient T-statistics P-value
Panel B: Regression of post-announcement (August) returns on excess shareholder base ARi,t =0 +1Excess shareholdersi
+ εi where ARi,t is the daily abnormal return for ﬁrm i at post-announcement day t (August 20–24); Excess shareholdersi
is the excess shareholder base.
Excess shareholder base – 0.010 0.64 0.520
R-square 0.01
Observations 150 (30×5)
7. Further discussions
7.1. Other explanation: investor recognition hypothesis
In this paper we argue that the price bubble is associated with the speculative motive gen-
erated by the announcement of “Hong Kong through-train” scheme. Our argument is based
on the assumption that the price premium of mainland stocks over their Hong Kong counter-
parts results from the optimistic valuation of mainland investors (Mei et al., 2009). However,
one may argue that the price difference may also be explained by investor recognition
hypothesis (Merton, 1987), primarily because of information asymmetry between Hong Kong
investors and mainland ﬁrms. Hong Kong investors are less informed about mainland ﬁrms,
which are not well-governed. In this regard, the base of Hong Kong shareholders for main-
land ﬁrms could be limited. So, the cross-listing price difference between mainland stocks and
Hong Kong stocks may be caused by the lack of investor recognition of mainland ﬁrms in
Hong Kong.
According to Merton (1987), the shareholder base measures the recognition of the ﬁrm
among investors. A big shareholder base indicates the ﬁrm has been well recognized, lead-
ing to the reduced magnitude of stock under-valuation. Therefore, we expect a negative
association between the shareholder base and price difference between the A- and H-share
contexts. Furthermore, more “under-valued” Hong Kong stocks (i.e., less recognized by Hong
Kong investors) are likely to respond more favorably to August 20th announcement, because
the shareholder base in Hong Kong will increase once mainland investors join in Hong Kong
market.
Table 8displays the results to test the investor recognitionhypothesis.Weﬁrst compute the “excess
shareholder base” as the residual of the regression with the number of shareholders as dependent
variable and market-to-book, ﬁrm size and share price (all in logarithm terms) as independent vari-
ables. Then we regress A/H share price difference and abnormal returns on excess shareholder base,
respectively. The coefﬁcient being negative and signiﬁcant would provide support for the investor
recognition hypothesis.
In Table 8, panel A, the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of excess shareholder base (0.066,
t=1.16) suggests that investor recognition hypothesis seems not powerful enough to explain
the share price difference between A-share and H-share. In Table 8, panel B, the coefﬁcient of
excess shareholder base on abnormal returns is positive and insigniﬁcant (0.01, t=0.64). These
ﬁndings, which fail to support the investor recognition hypothesis, imply the “optimistic valuation
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hypothesis” is amore likely interpretation of the share price difference betweenHong Kong andmain-
land
markets.
8. Conclusion
This research provides direct evidence to support the theoretical proposition that agents pay prices
that exceed their own valuation of assets if future buyers are willing to pay even more (Harrison
and Kreps, 1978). We focus on the Hong Kong “through train” scheme, through which mainland
investors are allowed to directly invest in Hong Kong market. We believe it provides a unique
research opportunity to distinguish investors with different beliefs in stock valuation, because main-
land investors are over-optimistic on stock valuation compared to their international counterparts
(Mei et al., 2009), so that mainland investors and Hong Kong investors are easily separated. After the
announcement to launch the “through-train” scheme, Hong Kong investors could take speculative
positions against perspective mainland investors, expecting to proﬁt from the re-selling to main-
land investors. However, the announcement to delay the scheme has a negative effect on Hong Kong
price bubble. We ﬁnd that price difference of cross-listed stocks in Hong Kong is positively associ-
ated with post-announcement returns in August, but negatively with post-announcement returns in
November.
Our ﬁndings also support price pressure hypothesis, since we ﬁnd that there is an association
betweenexcess turnoverandpost-announcement returns, but theassociation is temporary rather than
permanent.We further conduct apartialmediationanalysis, and identify themediating effect of excess
turnover on the association between price difference of cross-listed stocks and post-announcement
stock returns. On the one hand, Hong Kong stock holders/buyers directly adjust their price expectation
upwards as a response to the announcement in August. On the other hand, large price difference of
cross-listed stocks generates excess turnover (buying) in Hong Kongmarket, which further translates
into high stock returns. For the announcement to delay the “through-train” scheme, we also conduct
a mediation model to conﬁrm the robustness of the mediating effect of excess turnover. However,
our ﬁndings do not support investor recognition hypothesis, which suggests speculative bubble is a
more likely explanation of the price difference of cross-listed ﬁrms between Hong Kong andmainland
markets.
Furthermore, we show that Hong Kong stocks respond positively to the announcement that the
“through-train” scheme would be launched, but mainland stocks respond negatively. We argue that
Hong Kong prices are inﬂated by speculative motives associated with the announcement to kick off
the scheme, but mainland prices drop probably due to the concern that somemainland investors may
divert their investment into Hong Kong market.
Finally, this study also provides empirical evidence that short sales might constrain price bubble.
We ﬁnd that Hong Kong stocks ineligible for short sales experience large price bubble after August
announcement. Short-sale trading volume is negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. This
is consistent with extant literature about the effectiveness of short sales in constraining speculation
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong et al., 2004). The implication of the ﬁnding is, effective short sales
would help asset price not to deviate far from its fundamental value. However, the effectiveness of
short sales on stock returns is very limited in Hong Kong when the market falls, possibly due to the
re-introduction of tick rule. So, we call formore research to thoroughly clarify the impact of short sales
on ﬁnancial markets.
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Appendix A. A list of cross-listed ﬁrms and the average price difference as a percentage of
mainland price in two event windows
Company name Average A/H share price
difference during the
period August 20–22
Average A/H share price
difference during period
November 5–7
H-share eligible for
short selling
Datang Power Co. 75.2% 54.5% Yes
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co. 72.1% 71.4% Yes
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co. 71.5% 70.9% Yes
Northeast Electric Development Co. 67.4% 62.4% No
Nanjing Panda Electronic Co. 67.4% 63.5% No
Aluminum China 67.1% 56.5% Yes
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co. 66.7% 60.9% No
Beiren Printing 65.8% 62.5% Yes
Beijing North Star Co. 64.0% 52.4% No
Jiangxi Copper 63.8% 61.9% Yes
ZTE 60.5% 45.7% Yes
China Southern Airline 59.7% 56.0% Yes
Air China 59.3% 49.9% Yes
Huadian power International Co. 59.3% 43.5% Yes
Tianjin Capital Environmental
Protection Co.
58.7% 45.6% No
Chongqing Iron& steel 58.5% 45.6% Yes
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co 57.2% 53.4% No
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co. 55.3% 49.3% Yes
CITIC Bank 50.3% 49.6% Yes
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool
Co. Ltd.
49.4% 38.0% No
Huaneng Power International 44.0% 40.6% Yes
China COSCO Holding 43.7% 40.2% Yes
Weichai Power 43.1% 22.1% Yes
Yanzhou coal mining Co 42.9% 32.3% Yes
Shenzhen Expressway 42.6% 32.6% Yes
Maanshan Iron 41.5% 38.3% Yes
Bank of China 38.5% 37.2% Yes
China Life Insurance 38.4% 31.6% Yes
Bank of Communications Co. 38.0% 21.1% Yes
Guangshen Railway 37.3% 32.8% Yes
China shipping Development Co. 36.8% 32.6% Yes
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co. 35.4% 34.0% Yes
ICBC 33.8% 24.8% Yes
DongFang Electric Corporation 33.1% 9.2% Yes
Tsingtao Brewery 33.0% 25.6% Yes
Anhui expressway 32.8% 26.3% Yes
Angang Steel 31.6% 12.9% Yes
Ping An insurance 31.2% 23.8% Yes
Jiangsu Expressway 26.7% 17.3% Yes
China Merchants Bank 26.0% 18.3% Yes
Anhui Conch Cement Co. 22.8% 5.8% Yes
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Appendix B. A list of critical events associated with the scheme
No Date (in 2007) Type of event Announced by Event window Description
1 Aug 20 Ofﬁcial
announcement
Authority of
Foreign Exchange
Aug 17–21 Allows individual mainland
investors to invest directly in
overseas markets, and names
Tianjin City to initiate preparation
work
2 Aug 26 Informal interview President of HK
Exchange Clearing
Limited
Aug 24–28 Advises investors to carefully
guard against investment risks in
Hong Kong market
3 Sept 02 Top journal article Prior national
monetary
committee
member
Aug 31–Sept 04 Advises to learn a lesson from the
past, and slow down the process of
“through-train” scheme
4 Oct 16 Informal interview President of Bank
of China
Oct 15–17 The scheme is still under planning,
and no time table is set to formally
launch the scheme
5 Nov 05 Press conference Prime minister Nov 02–06 Urges the scheme to be rolled out
“cautiously and pragmatically”,
and it has to be regulated
Source: http://focus.jrj.com.cn/special/home/grzt.html, China Finance Online.
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We  use  the  search  volume  index  (SVI)  of  the  stock  ticker  provided  by  Google  Trends  to
capture  the  active  attention  that  retail  investors  pay  to stocks.  Based  on the  analysis  of S&P
500 stocks  from  2004  to  2009,  we show  that  the  majority  of  the  variation  in  SVI cannot  be
explained  by  passive  attention  measures,  including  Google  News  coverage  and  advertising
expenditure.  We  ﬁnd  that  retail  investor  attention,  reﬂected  by  the level and  change  in SVI,
signiﬁcantly  enlarges  the  shareholder  base  and improves  stock  liquidity.  The  results  are
robust  to the  control  of  endogeneity  issues.
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1. Introduction
The “under-diversiﬁcation puzzle” documented in the literature shows that investors have “home bias” because they
tend to favor investment in ﬁrms they are familiar with (French Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Cao et al., 2011). In
order to get familiar with such ﬁrms, investors have to spend time and effort collecting relevant information, which suggests
that attention from investors might predict the subsequent trading activity. On the theoretical side, studies on asset pricing
posit that investor attention is a necessary condition for a stock price to fully reﬂect public information, as investors need to
be aware of the information before they can analyze and react to it (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hou et al., 2009; Hirshleifer
et al., 2011). However, because of the limits on the information-processing capacity of human beings, attention is largely
concentrated on the stocks that investors are interested in or familiar with, which implies that attention paid to stocks by
investors could result in subsequent trading of these stocks. Our study aims to provide fresh insights into the capital market
consequences of investors’ attention.
Building on the assumption that the investors passively attend to publicly available information, previous studies have
used advertising expenditure (Grullon et al., 2004) and media coverage (Fang and Peress, 2009) to capture investors’ atten-
tion and examine its implications for stock liquidity and stock returns. In this paper, we  employ a measure of active attention
 The authors are grateful for valuable comments from an anonymous reviewer, John Doukas, Angelica Gonzalez, Michela Verardo and the participants
in  the EFA (European Finance Association) 2011 meeting in Stockholm for helpful comments. We are grateful to Lei Zhang for his assistance with the
collection of the SVI data.
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from investors, recently developed by Da et al. (2011), namely the aggregate search volume index (SVI) provided by Google
Trends (available from: www.google.com/trends), and test the impact of investors’ attention paid to listed ﬁrms on two
aspects of listed ﬁrms: breadth of ownership and liquidity. After controlling for the passive attention measures documented
in the literature, we ﬁnd that increased investors’ attention measured by the SVI contributes to a broader shareholder base.
This is in line with the argument of Barber and Odean (2008) that retail investors tend to search for information about
the ﬁrm’s history, product, environment and strategies when selecting stocks, and can be interpreted with the “investor
recognition hypothesis” (Merton, 1987), which states that the shareholder base measures the recognition of the ﬁrm among
investors, so that an enlarged shareholder base indicates that the ﬁrm has been well recognized. In other words, poten-
tial investors have to be aware of a ﬁrm before they can gradually become familiar with it and then eventually decide to
invest, suggesting that investor attention is a necessary condition for a ﬁrm to be recognized. The impact of passive atten-
tion measures, however, is not always signiﬁcant in the results, showing that retail investors do not necessarily invest in
ﬁrms with more advertising expenditure or media coverage1. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that increased investors’ attention, as
measured by the SVI, results in reduced bid-ask spread, and our results remain consistent after controlling for the pas-
sive attention measures, ﬁrm characteristics, and year and industry ﬁxed effects. Our ﬁndings remain robust to alternative
liquidity measures, including effective spread, relative effective spread, and turnover rate (trading volume divided by shares
outstanding).
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the broad literature
on the “investor recognition hypothesis” (i.e., Merton, 1987; Grullon et al., 2004; Tetlock, 2010; Fang and Peress, 2009)2.
Merton (1987) asserts that “ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative size of the ﬁrm’s investor base will reduce the
ﬁrm’s cost of capital and increase the market value of the ﬁrm.” A stock’s visibility is associated with its price, publicity
and popularity of the core products and social image. However, we  suggest that these measures are passive, in that it is
implicitly assumed that ﬁrms with high visibility will attract more attention from investors which is difﬁcult to empirically
verify. Our study is built on an active measure of ex post attention, as Google search is a conﬁrmed measure of attention: if
an individual intentionally searches for information about a stock, it is evident that one is paying attention to it (Da et al.,
2011)3. Furthermore, Google search index captures investors’ attention in a more timely way than passive measures of
attention. When individual investors actively search for a stock using Google, they acquire useful information relevant to
the stock, which mitigates the information asymmetry problem for these stocks. As a result, liquidity improves for stocks
with better investor recognition.
Second, our paper adds to the emerging literature on investor attention and asset pricing dynamics, including Barber and
Odean (2008) on investor attention and individual investors’ trading behavior, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) on the casual
impact of local media coverage on local trading, Da et al. (2011) on the impact of active attention on IPO returns and price
changes in subsequent periods and Aouadi et al. (2013) on the effect of investor attention on stock market liquidity and
volatility use Google French data.
Finally, our study extends the literature on the stock market consequence of investors’ information demand. For example,
Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) use the Google search volume of constituents of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index as a
proxy of investors’ information demand, and ﬁnd that such information demand has signiﬁcant impact on stock trading
volume and the conditional variance of excess return. Siganos (2013) use Google search volume of target ﬁrms involved
in a merger between 2004 and 2010 in the UK as a proxy for investor’s information demand for the target ﬁrms, and ﬁnd
that such measure can explain a large percentage of the price increase in target ﬁrms prior to the merger. Vozlyublennaia
(2014) use Google search to proxy for investor attention (investors’ information demand) and reports that attention has
a short-lived inﬂuence on performance of index of stocks, bonds and commodities. In addition, attention weakens the
predictability of index return because more revealed information due to increasing attention improves market efﬁciency.
We contribute to this stream of literature by showing investors’ attention leads to larger shareholder base and improved stock
liquidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design and the data. Sections 3 and
4 present the empirical results. Section 5 describes the robustness checks. Section 4 concludes by providing suggestions for
future research.
1 We argue that the SVI captures investor attention in a more timely and accurate manner than passive attention measures for the following reasons:
(1)  media coverage of a ﬁrm is sporadic, while the SVI is continuous; (2) media coverage does not necessarily guarantee attention unless investors attend
to  it, and the same news coverage could generate different levels of investor attention for different stocks (Da et al., 2011).
2 Empirical evidences largely support the investor’s recognition hypothesis. Chen et al. (2004) report an increased investor’s awareness after a ﬁrm is
added  to the S&P 500 index, which leads to a reduction in both the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread and the Merton (1987)’s
cost  of under-diversiﬁcation. By the same token, Lehavy and Sloan (2008) contend that an exchange listing increases investor’s recognition of a ﬁrm.
Furthermore, a positive association between investor’s recognition and contemporaneous stock return id documented. Bushee and Miller (2012) ﬁnd that
small  and mid-cap ﬁrms can enhance their visibility among investors and analysts by hiring an investor relation ﬁrm, which contributes to improved
market  valuation.
3 Our study is related to, but different from, Grullon et al. (2004) because our paper focuses on the relation between investors’ active attention (to a
stock) and the ﬁrm’s shareholder base as well as its liquidity, while Grullon et al. (2004) investigate ﬁrms’ advertising expenditure, as a (passive) approach
used  to reach a broad audience, and its impact on breadth of ownership and liquidity.
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2. Research design and data
2.1. Active attention measures
Since the beginning of 2004, Google Trends has provided data on the search frequencies of terms on a weekly basis
(http://www.google.com/trends)4. It shows how many searches have been made for a speciﬁc keyword relative to the total
number of searches over time5. Following Da et al. (2011) and Drake et al. (2012), we proxy investor attention by the search
volume index (SVI) provided by Google Trends. Speciﬁcally, we measure investor attention for a company based on the SVI
for the stock ticker rather than the company name, since searching for a stock using its ticker is less ambiguous (Da et al.,
2011) and searches using ticker symbols as the search term are more likely to reﬂect searches for ﬁnancial information than
searches for non-ﬁnancial information (Drake et al., 2012). We  download the weekly SVI for the ticker symbols of S&P500
stocks, which provides time-series variations in the information searches for each ﬁrm. If a ticker is rarely searched for,
Google Trends will return a zero value. In addition, we  exclude two types of noisy tickers. First, we  remove 12 companies
whose tickers are single or double alphabets (e.g., “C” for Citi group, “M”  for Macy’s and “AA” for Alcoa). Second, we  exclude
23 companies whose tickers have generic meanings (e.g., “DO” for Diamond Offshore Drilling, “GAS” for AGL resources, “LEG”
for Legget & Platt and “FAST” for Fastenal)6.
We  download weekly SVIs for all constituents of the S&P 500 index over a six-year period from January 2004 to December
2009. A retail investor can easily obtain a ﬁrm’s ticker from ﬁnancial news, where tickers are often reported in parentheses.
Following Da et al. (2011), we exclude SVIs with value of zero, and compute the change in SVI as follows:
SVIt = Ln (SVIt) − Ln [Med (SVIt−1, . . .,  SVIt−8)] (1)
where SVIt is the search volume index during week t obtained from Google Trends, and [Med (SVIt − 1, . . .,  SVIt − 8)] is the
median value of the SVI during the previous eight weeks. As a positive SVI would indicate a surge in investor attention, a
positive SVI is more likely to lead to subsequent trading behavior. Another beneﬁt of using SVI is that time trends and
low-frequency seasonality are removed (Da et al., 2011).
2.2. Passive attention measures
A commonly used passive attention measure is media coverage in newspapers. For example, Fang and Peress (2009) focus
on four daily newspapers with nationwide circulation in the US: the New York Times,  USA Today,  the Wall Street Journal, and
the Washington Post. We  argue, however, that the average retail investor is unlikely to subscribe to more than two to three
newspapers at the same time. A more convenient and inexpensive way  for them to obtain news is through the Internet, and
every piece of news on the Internet has “global circulation and access”.
The advanced “news search” section in Google News enables us to obtain a ﬁgure for the total number of relevant news
items per year, for each company in our sample, from 2004 to 20097. To obtain the number of news items, we  use the
company name instead of the ticker, because tickers are only reported in ﬁnancial newspapers but retail investors do not
necessarily get their information from ﬁnancial newspapers only. The multiple meanings of the names of some companies
may add noise to our data (e.g., Apple). However, due to the large number of news items, it would be unfeasible for us to
read every article in order to exclude the irrelevant ones. Nevertheless, this noise is expected to introduce some bias against
obtaining consistent results. A feature of the Google News is that it counts multiple newspaper distribution of the same
article. Thus, it also reﬂects the dissemination of news, which is closely related to the passive attention of individuals.
Prior research also suggests that advertising expenditure is a measure of passive attention because intensive advertise-
ment is able to promote the awareness of the product of the company among consumers and the stock of the company
among investors (Grullon et al., 2004). In our study, we control for both Google News and ﬁrm’s advertising expenditure so
that the incremental effect of active attention reﬂected by SVI can be disentangled.
4 http://www.google.com/intl/en/trends/about.html. The data are scaled to the average trafﬁc for the term in question over a ﬁxed time period (usually
January 2004).
5 In this study, search is deﬁned as the activity of submitting an enquiry regarding a particular term using Google. Consequently, the search volume is
the  number of enquiries submitted within a certain period.
6 To conﬁrm that the search of the tickers reﬂects retail investors’ attention on the stocks, we  employ a new application “Goolge Correlate”
(http://www.google.com/trends/correlate), which identiﬁes the most correlated SVIs. For example, the SVI of the ticker “APPL” is highly correlated with
SVIs  of “apple stocks” (correlation as 0.894), “apple quotes” (0.867) and “apple stock price”; while the SVI of “apple” is highly correlated with SVIs of
with  “apple store” (0.862), “iphone” (0.852) and “apple online store” (0.827). This indicates that investors tend to use tickers to search for stock-related
information whereas consumers tend to search company’s name for product and retail information, which justiﬁes our strategy to use SVI for stock ticker
instead of company name as a proxy for investors’ attention.
7 The number of news items related to a particular search term over a given period of time is available from Google News (http://news.google.com)
database, which aggregates news from 4500 English-language news sources worldwide. The stories are sorted without any consideration of political
viewpoint or ideology.
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2.3. Research design and data
To investigate how investor attention affects the breadth of ownership and stock liquidity, we incorporate the attention
measures to the models of Grullon et al. (2004) as follows:
LnNumS = 0 + 1SVI + 2LnNews + 3LnAdv
+4LnAge + 5RET + 6ROA + 7LnMC + 8
(
1
Pt
)
+9LnTurnover + 10LnVolatility + 11NASDAQ + ε
(2)
RBAS = 0 + 1SVI + 2LnNews + 3LnAdv
+4LnAge + 5ROA + 6LnMC + 7
(
1
Pt
)
+8LnTurnover + 9LnVolatility + 10NASDAQ + ε
(3)
where the number of shareholders (lnNumS) and the relative bid-ask spread (RBAS) are regressed against the search volume
index (SVI), the number of news items available online (LnNews), and the advertising expenses (lnAdv). To conﬁrm our
predictions, we expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive 1 in Eq. (2) and a signiﬁcantly negative 1 in Eq. (3). We  also use the
change in SVI (SVI) instead of the level of the SVI for robustness checks. The change in SVI deﬁned in Eq. (1) reﬂects an
abnormal “jump” in the SVI relative to the “normal” level over a longer time period (the previous eight weeks). As explained
earlier, it can also remove time trends and low-frequency seasonality (Da et al., 2011). The annual observations of the number
of shareholders, advertising expenses and other accounting data are obtained from Compustat. A large proportion of ﬁrms
do not report their advertising expenses. Replacing missing advertising expenditure with zero is an approach commonly
used in previous studies to maintain sample size (e.g., Grullon et al., 2004; Banker et al., 2011). In this study, because we
use the natural logarithm of advertising expenditure in our analysis, we replace any missing values with $0.01 rather than
zero. As a robustness check, we also replicate the analysis based on the smaller sample excluding those ﬁrms with missing
advertising expenditure and the results are consistent.
We calculate the relative bid-ask spread as the monthly average of the ratio of the daily inside spread to the midpoint of the
daily inside spread from CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices). Chung and Zhang (2009) suggest the daily CRSP-based
spread as a good substitute for the TAQ-based spread in that the former represents at least 91% (78%) of the cross-sectional
variation in the latter from NASDAQ (NYSE/AMEX) stocks. We  drop any observations of relative spread that are greater than
50% of the midpoint in order to ﬁlter the data for errors. We  remove 26,732 daily observations with relative spreads larger
than 50%, from the original 10,238,830 daily observations (accounting for 0.26%), by following Chung and Zhang (2009). We
then transform the daily data into monthly data to perform the analysis. For robustness checks, we replicate the analysis
using alternative liquidity measures, including the effective spread and the relative effective spread. The change in relative
spread is deﬁned as the monthly change in relative spread in percentage terms. The effective spread is constructed as twice
the difference between the transaction price and the spread midpoint. The relative effective spread is the effective spread
scaled by the midpoint of the spread.
In order to perform the empirical analysis, we transform the daily liquidity spread measures and the weekly attention
measures of SVI and SVI to monthly observations by taking the average in each calendar month. Then, we  merge the annual
observations of the advertisement expense into the ﬁrm-month panel data.
Following Grullon et al. (2004), we control for other factors that may  have an impact on stock liquidity. The market
microstructure model (Ho and Stoll, 1980) suggests that a high trading volume reduces the inventory cost per trade and
therefore leads to a smaller bid-ask spread. Hence, stocks with a high trading volume are expected to have smaller spreads.
We control for share turnover (LnTurnover), which is constructed as the monthly average of the share volume divided by
shares outstanding from CRSP. Large ﬁrms tend to have high trading volumes and thus smaller spreads, and therefore we
also control for ﬁrm market capitalization (lnMC) from CRSP. Investors may  have a preference for stocks within a certain
price range, so we also include the inverse of the closing price from CRSP (1/P) in our analysis. Return volatility and ﬁrm age
are included to proxy for risks. Return volatility is the monthly average of the standard deviation of daily returns, obtained
from CRSP. Firm age is the number of years for which the ﬁrm has been included in CRSP. Average monthly return (RET) and
return on assets (ROA) are used to control for market performance and proﬁtability. Average monthly return is the average
of the daily stock returns from CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as the annual operating income before
depreciation, scaled by total assets. Finally, an exchange dummy  (NASDAQ is assigned the value 1 for ﬁrms listed on the
NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise) is included to account for systematic differences in the market microstructure. Following Grullon
et al. (2004), for some variables we take their natural logarithm as shown in Eqs. (2) and (3), and we include industry and
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Table  1
Summary statistics.
Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% Obs.
Investor attention
SVI 1.1752 1.3412 0.8000 0.9800 1.2200 14,690
SVI  change (SVI) 0.0079 0.1200 −0.0400 0.0013 0.0470 14,690
Number of news 9914 49,515 313 1200 3320 14,690
Advertising(million) 511 729 50 212 629 6742
Advertising’ (million) 235 556 0.01 0.01 163 14,690
Breadth of ownership
Number of shareholders (thousand) 74 199 4 15 51 14,690
Liquidity measures
Relative spread 0.0297 0.0186 0.0181 0.0241 0.0347 14,690
Firm  characteristics
Firm age 35 24 15 34 47 14,690
Stock  return 0.0098 0.1000 −0.0400 0.0100 0.0600 14,690
ROA  0.5700 0.5000 0.3000 0.4400 0.6600 14,690
Firm  size 9.3300 1.1500 8.5100 9.1700 10.0800 14,690
1/Share price 0.0400 0.0400 0.0200 0.0300 0.0400 14,690
Log  (return volatility) −4.0200 0.5600 −4.4200 −4.0800 −3.6800 14,690
NASDAQ 0.1500 0.3600 0 0 0 14,690
This table reports the summary statistics of our sample. The sample includes the constituents of the S&P 500 over a period of six years from January 2004 to
December 2009. The SVI is the search frequency of a stock ticker, from Google Trends. The change in the SVI is the difference between the SVI during week
t  and the median value of the SVI during the previous eight weeks. Number of news is the online media coverage from Google News. Advertising expenses
and  number of shareholders are obtained from Compustat. Note that not all ﬁrms disclose their advertising expenditure, and the number of ﬁrm-year
observations is only 6742. In order to keep as many observations as possible in our analysis, we replace the missing observations with 0.01, assuming these
ﬁrms  spend roughly zero on advertising, following Grullon et al. (2004), and this is expressed as Advertising’. The relative bid-ask spread is the monthly
average of the ratio of the daily inside spread to the midpoint of the daily inside spread from CRSP. Firm age is the number of years for which the ﬁrm has
been  included in CRSP. The average monthly return is the average of the daily stock returns from CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as
the  annual operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization, calculated as the product of the total number
of  outstanding shares and the annual closing price. Share turnover is constructed from CRSP as the monthly average share volume divided by the shares
outstanding. Return volatility is the monthly average of the standard deviation of daily returns, obtained from CRSP. NASDAQ equals 1 for ﬁrms listed on
the  NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise.
year ﬁxed effects in the analysis8. The ﬁnal sample consists of 14,690 ﬁrm-month observations over the period from 2004
to 2009. The top and bottom 0.5% of the variables are winsorized to reduce the possible effects of spurious outliers.
2.4. Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. Both the mean and median of the SVI change (SVI)
are positive, showing an upward trend in the attention paid to the tickers of S&P 500 ﬁrms. The media coverage of the ﬁrms,
according to Google News, varies from 313 (25%) to 3320 (75%), with a mean (median) of 9914 (1200). This is substantially
larger than the amount of newspaper coverage documented in Fang and Peress (2009), where the mean (median) was 12 (5).
The difference indicates that ﬁrms are better covered by online media than by traditional media such as national newspapers.
The mean (median) advertising expenditure is $449 ($144) million, which is much larger than the ﬁgures documented in
Grullon et al. (2004) based on an earlier sample from 1993 to 1998. This shows that ﬁrms are spending much more on
advertising nowadays. The number of shareholders ranges from 4000 to 51,000, with a mean (median) of 74,000 (14,000).
The mean (median) of the relative spread is 0.029 (0.0241). The average ﬁrm in our sample is older and larger than that in
Grullon et al. (2004), presumably for two reasons. First, we only include the constituents of the S&P 500, in which newly
listed ﬁrms are less likely to be included. Second, there is a threshold of search volume for Google Trends to report the SVIs,
therefore SVIs are not available for some ﬂedgling ﬁrms.
2.5. The active and passive attention measures
In Table 2, we explore how the SVI and SVI, the newly proposed direct measures of active attention, are related to the
traditional passive attention measures, and to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Table 2 shows that news coverage and advertising
expenditure are positively associated with the SVI, which suggests that investors pay more attention to ﬁrms with greater
visibility in terms of news coverage and expenditure on advertising. The coefﬁcients of turnover, return on assets, ﬁrm size
and return volatility are signiﬁcantly positive, showing that ﬁrms with good operating performance, actively traded stocks,
high market value, and higher risk grab more attention from retail investors. This is in line with the ﬁnding of Seasholes and
8 By following Grullon et al. (2004), the average monthly return (RET) is only incorporated in Eq. (2), that is, when the dependent variable is the number
of  shareholders (lnNumS).
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Table  2
Active and passive attention measures.
Dependent variables
Model I: SVI Model II: change in SVI
Ln (number of news) 0.013*** (6.29) −0.0004 (−0.42)
Ln  (advertising) 0.008*** (7.64) 0.0002 (1.16)
Ln  (turnover) 0.08*** (9.13) 0.0004** (2.2)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.03*** (−4.24) −0.0004 (−0.35)
ROA  0.07*** (6.71) −0.0001 (−0.06)
Ln  (Firm size) 0.08*** (14.5) 0.005*** (5.02)
Ln (return volatility) 0.03*** (2.65) 0.007*** (2.75)
Obs.  14,690 14,690
Adj.  R2 0.05 0.003
This table shows to what extent the active attention (measured by SVI and the change in SVI) can be explained by the passive attention (measured by online
media  coverage and advertising expenditure), and ﬁrm characteristics. The SVI is the search frequency of the stock ticker, according to Google Trends. The
change  in the SVI is the difference between the SVI during week t and the median value of the SVI during the previous eight weeks. The “number of news” is
the  online media coverage, according to Google News. Advertising expenditure is obtained from Compustat. Firm age is the number of years for which the
ﬁrm  has been included in CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as the annual operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets.
Firm  size is the market capitalization, calculated as the product of the total number of outstanding shares and the annual closing price. Return volatility is
the  monthly average of the standard deviation of daily returns, taken from CRSP.
*, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
Wu (2007) that stocks with higher returns or higher risk receive more news coverage and therefore attract more attention
among investors. The coefﬁcient of ﬁrm age is signiﬁcantly negative, and this might be due to the impact of newly founded
Information Technology glamour companies9. Despite the signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables, the explanatory power
of the model is low, and 95% of the variation in the active attention measures remains unexplained. In model II, we regress
the change in SVI against the same set of explanatory variables. The only signiﬁcant variable here is turnover, and more than
99% of the variation is unexplained. This shows the distinction in the aspects of attention captured by the active and passive
measures.
3. Active attention measure and breadth of ownership
We  perform the regression analysis as shown in Eq. (2) to test the effect of investor attention on the shareholder base10.
We regress the natural logarithm of the number of shareholders against the active attention measures, passive attention
measures including online news coverage and advertising expenditure, and a set of control variables suggested in Grullon
et al. (2004) to explain cross-sectional variations in the breadth of ownership. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. In
model I we include only the SVI and the control variables. Here, the coefﬁcient of SVI is signiﬁcantly positive, which suggests
that active attention is positively associated with the size of the shareholder base. The coefﬁcients of ﬁrm age, ﬁrm size and
return on assets are signiﬁcantly positive, showing that proﬁtable ﬁrms, large ﬁrms and long-standing ﬁrms enjoy a larger
shareholder base. The coefﬁcient of 1/P  is positive and signiﬁcant, in line with the explanation that individual investors are
likely to buy stocks within a certain price range (i.e., higher 1/P).
We  incorporate online news coverage in model II, and advertising expenditure in model III. The effect of the SVI remains
signiﬁcant after controlling for the passive attention measures. The coefﬁcient of online news coverage is signiﬁcantly
positive, suggesting that ﬁrms that are widely covered by news stories on the Internet are associated with a larger shareholder
base. The impact of advertising expenditure is positive, but marginally insigniﬁcant. All active and passive measures are
incorporated in model III, and the positive effect of the SVI on the shareholder base remains signiﬁcant after controlling for
the passive attention measures. The results are also economically signiﬁcant. According to model I, a one standard deviation
(1.34) increase in the SVI leads to an increase of 1000 shareholders, which is 6% of the median number of shareholders
(15,000) for our sample ﬁrms.
Because S&P 500 ﬁrms are observed multiple times in the ﬁrm-month panel data, we correct for standard errors using
clustering in model IV by applying a bootstrapping regression as a robustness check. Standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm
9 We partition the sample according to the median of ﬁrm age, and run the regressions again on the two subsamples. We  ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of
ﬁrm  age is signiﬁcantly positive (p < 0.01) in the subsample of older ﬁrms, and signiﬁcantly negative (p < 0.01) in the subsample of younger ﬁrms. Since
there  are more Information Technology ﬁrms in the young subsample, we  conjecture that the negative coefﬁcient of ﬁrm age obtained for the full sample
is  attributed to their impact.
10 As shown in Panel A of the appendix, we ﬁrst conduct a univariate test in the following way: we classify the ﬁrms into low-attention and high-attention
subsamples based on the median value of the SVI. The former group of ﬁrms is associated with 47,310 fewer shareholders on average, and this difference
is  signiﬁcant at the 1% level. We further classify the two  subsamples into small and large ﬁrms, based on the median value of market capitalization. The
difference between the number of shareholders for the low-attention and high-attention sub-samples is 2270 and 74,380 for the small and large subsamples,
respectively, and the differences are statistically signiﬁcant. The results support our prediction that ﬁrms with a higher amount of active attention paid
to  them will be associated with a larger shareholder base, no matter how large the ﬁrm is. The results of these tests are available from the authors upon
request.
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Table  3
Active attention and breadth of ownership: multivariate analysis.
Panel A. SVI and breadth of ownership
Dependent variable
Ln (number of shareholders in thousand)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
SVI 0.02** (2.36) 0.02** (2.39) 0.02** (2.33) 0.19** (7.92) 0.21** (4.66)
Ln  (number of News) 0.04*** (5.51) 0.04** (5.42) 0.02** (2.41) 0.04*** (5.51)
Ln  (advertising) 0.01 (1.57) −0.01 (−0.74) 0.26*** (14.69)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) 0.27*** (12.2) 0.27*** (12.25) 0.27*** (12.25) 0.12*** (8.07) 0.34*** (7.1)
Return  −0.2 (−1.59) −0.2 (−1.58) −0.2 (−1.56) −0.14 (−1.09) 0.14 (0.86)
ROA  0.31*** (8.66) 0.31*** (8.77) 0.31*** (8.8) 0.03 (0.54) 0.83*** (7.56)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) 0.90*** (73.06) 0.88*** (66.07) 0.87*** (64.4) 0.97*** (41.41) 0.78*** (17.64)
1/share price 8.28*** (13.09) 8.18*** (12.97) 8.16*** (12.96) 11.53*** (13.22) 14.15*** (12.08)
Ln  (turnover) −0.07** (−2.47) −0.08** (−2.56) −0.08** (−2.62) −0.26*** (−5.89) −0.22** (−2.69)
Ln  (return volatility) −0.13*** (−3.74) −0.14*** (−3.80) −0.13*** (−3.72) −0.10*** (−2.63) 0.03 (0.61)
NASDAQ −0.67*** (−13.93) −0.65*** (−13.55) −0.65*** (−13.53) −0.77*** (−10.30) −0.46*** (−5.79)
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y Y
Adjust  clustered errors N N N Y Y
Exclude missing advertising N N N N Y
Obs.  14690 14690 14690 14690 6742
Adj.  R2 0.397 0.398 0.398 0.28 0.34
Panel  B. Change in SVI and breadth of ownership
Dependent variable
Ln (number of shareholders in thousand)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Change in SVI 0.21** (1.93) 0.21** (1.96) 0.21** (1.96) 0.37** (2.53) 0.22** (1.88)
Ln  (number of News) 0.04*** (5.52) 0.04** (5.42) 0.03*** (2.94) −0.01 (−0.69)
Ln  (advertising) 0.01 (1.64) −0.01 (−0.32) 0.30*** (17.83)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) 0.27*** (12.15) 0.27*** (12.2) 0.27*** (12.2) 0.13*** (6.49) 0.31*** (6.63)
Return  −0.21 (−1.64) −0.21 (−1.63) −0.2 (−1.60) −0.14 (−1.53) 0.1 (0.79)
ROA  0.31*** (8.59) 0.31*** (8.7) 0.31*** (8.73) −0.02 (−0.35) 0.80*** (8.19)
Ln  (Firm size) 0.90*** (72.68) 0.88*** (66.7) 0.88*** (64.1) 0.97*** (51.57) 0.80*** (25.95)
1/Share price 8.24*** (13.13) 8.14*** (13) 8.12*** (13) 11.02*** (20.76) 14.83*** (20.61)
Ln  (turnover) −0.07** (−2.47) −0.08** (−2.57) −0.08** (−2.64) −0.26*** (−6.92) −0.13** (−1.82)
Ln  (return volatility) −0.14*** (−3.83) −0.14*** (−3.90) −0.14*** (−3.81) −0.10** (−2.53) 0.02 (0.4)
NASDAQ −0.67*** (−13.95) −0.65*** (−13.56) −0.65*** (−13.55) −0.76*** (−11.23) −0.52*** (−8.42)
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y Y
Adjust  cluster errors N N N Y Y
Exclude missing advertising N N N N Y
Observation 14,690 14,690 14,690 14,690 6742
Adj.  R2 0.397 0.398 0.398 0.28 0.34
This table reports the estimates from the panel regressions relating the number of shareholders to the active investor attention (SVI). The sample includes
the  constituents of the S&P 500 over a period of six years from January 2004 to December 2009. The SVI is the search frequency of a stock ticker, obtained
from  Google Trends. The change in the SVI is the difference between the SVI in week t and the median value of the SVI during the previous eight weeks.
The  “number of news” is the online media coverage obtained from Google News. Advertising expenses and the number of shareholders are taken from
Compustat. Firm age is the number of years for which the ﬁrm has been included in CRSP. Average monthly return is the average of the daily stock returns
from  CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as the annual operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets. Firm size is the
market  capitalization, calculated as the product of the total number of outstanding shares and the annual closing price. Share turnover is constructed from
CRSP  as the monthly average of the share volume divided by the shares outstanding. Return volatility is the monthly average of the standard deviation of
daily  returns, drawn from CRSP. NASDAQ equals 1 for ﬁrms listed on the NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise.
*, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
to account for heteroskedasticity. The coefﬁcient of the SVI remains signiﬁcantly positive. In model V, we  replicate the test
based on a smaller sample of 6742 observations by excluding ﬁrms with missing advertising expenditure. The result shows
that our main result hold for a subsample of ﬁrms with positive advertising expenditures11. When ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are
applied to control static ﬁrm-level effects in untabulated test, the results remain consistent. Overall, the results reported
11 We use the full sample to perform the main test in that the subsample might be subject to selection bias. We thank the anonymous referee for this
point.
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in Panel A show that the positive impact of active attention on the shareholder base is robust to the control of the passive
attention measures, ﬁrm characteristics, and year and industry ﬁxed effects.
In Panel B, we replicate the test by replacing the SVI with the change in SVI, and examine its impact on the shareholder
base. Consistent with our prediction, the coefﬁcient of the change in SVI is signiﬁcantly positive in model I, showing that
an increase in active attention leads to a larger number of shareholders. A one standard deviation (0.12) increase in the
change of SVI leads to an increase of about 1000 in the shareholder base, which is about 6% of the corresponding ﬁgure
(15,000) for a median ﬁrm. The positive impact, again, is robust to the control of the passive attention measures, ﬁrm
characteristics, and year and industry ﬁxed effects, as shown in models II and III. The signs of the coefﬁcients for online
news and advertising expenditure and the other control variables are consistent with those reported in Panel A. Finally, we
adjust for standard errors and apply the bootstrapping regression in model IV as a robustness check, and replicate the test
based on a smaller sample of 6742 ﬁrm-month observations excluding observations with missing advertising expenditure
in model V. The ﬁndings remain consistent. To sum up, the results reported in Table 3 show that retail investors tend to
become shareholders of the listed ﬁrms to which they pay attention through Internet searches. The results suggest that the
Internet has become an important tool for retail investors to gather information and make investment decisions.
4. Active attention and stock liquidity
Table 4 reports the results of the impact of investor attention on the stock liquidity. As shown in Eq. (3), we regress the
relative bid-ask spread on the SVI, online media coverage, advertising expenditure and a set of control variables12. In model
I, we include only the SVI and the control variables. Capturing the impact of active attention, the coefﬁcient of the SVI is
signiﬁcantly negative, which suggests that higher level of investor attention reﬂected by search frequency leads to a reduced
bid-ask spread and therefore improved stock liquidity. Models II and III incorporate passive attention measures including
Google online news coverage and advertising expenditure, while model IV adjusts the clustered standard error by applying
the bootstrapping regression. Model V is based on the reduced sample of 6742 observations with non-missing advertising
expenditure. The coefﬁcients of the SVI remain negative and signiﬁcant across the models, suggesting that investors’ active
attention helps to improve stock liquidity. Consistent with Grullon et al. (2004), the coefﬁcient of advertising expenditure
is signiﬁcantly negative in model V.
We  also replicate the analysis by replacing the SVI with the change in SVI, and present the results in Panel B of Table 4. In
model I, the coefﬁcient of the SVI change is signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that an increase in investor attention improves
liquidity. The results remain robust after controlling for the passive attention measures in models II and III, after applying
the bootstrapping regression model to adjust the clustered standard error in model IV and after dropping the observations
with no advertisement expenditure in model V. In untabulated test, we also apply ﬁrm ﬁxed effects or replace the level of
liquidity with the change in liquidity13 as the dependent variable. The results remain consistent in that the signiﬁcantly
negative coefﬁcients of the change in SVI support our prediction that increased investor attention helps to promote stock
liquidity14.
There are several aspects of liquidity, and bid-ask spread reﬂects the inventory aspect. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll
(1981) argue that liquidity depends on factors that inﬂuence the risk of holding inventory and extreme events that provoke
order imbalance and thereby cause inventory overload. To compensate the inventory holding cost, dealers will purchase
shares at the bid price below the “true” price and sell shares at the ask price above the “true” price, generating the bid-ask
spread.
Bid-ask spread, however, may  fail to capture other aspects. For example, Grossman and Miller (1988) show that liquidity is
also determined by the demand and supply of immediacy, and bid-ask spread does not reﬂect the cost of supplying immediacy
to the market. Kyle (1985) notes the informed speculation aspect of liquidity when market makers cannot distinguish
between order ﬂow generated by informed traders or liquidity traders, they set the price as an increasing function of the
imbalance in the order ﬂow, which may  indicate informed trading. This suggests a positive relation between the transaction
volume and price change, known as price impact. It can be considered as the ﬁrst derivative of the effective spread with
respect to the order size and reﬂects the cost of demanding additional instantaneous liquidity. Amihud (2002) measures it
as the daily price response associated with one dollar of trading volume, calculated as the daily ratio of absolute stock return
to dollar trading volume averaged over all positive volume days.
12 As shown in the Panel B of the Appendix, we divide our sample ﬁrms into low-attention and high-attention subsamples based on the median level
of  the SVI and test the difference in the means of the relative bid-ask spread. The results show that the relative bid-ask spread is signiﬁcantly smaller in
the  high-attention subsample. When we further divide the sub-samples according to market capitalization, into small and large ﬁrms, the difference in
the  bid-ask spread still exists in both types of ﬁrm. The difference is more pronounced for smaller ﬁrms because they are, in general, less recognized by
investors, and therefore more likely to beneﬁt from increased active attention from investors. The results are available upon request.
13 The change in liquidity is measured by the relative spread in month t minus the average relative spread between month t − 1 and month t − 3.
14 The panel C in appendix also reports the results by applying the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. The results of three out of four regression models are broadly in
line  with our main results. Petersen (2009) gives possible explanations for the minor inconsistency: the standard errors clustered by ﬁrm are unbiased
and  produce correctly sized conﬁdence intervals whether the ﬁrm effect is permanent or temporary while the ﬁxed effect and random effects model only
produces unbiased standard errors when the ﬁrm effect is permanent.
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Table  4
Active attention and stock liquidity.
Panel A. SVI and relative bid-ask spread
Dependent variable relative spread in %
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
SVI −0.01** (−2.18) −0.01** (−2.17) −0.01*** (−2.11) −0.01* (−1.73) −0.01** (−1.87)
Ln  (number of news) 0.01* (1.71) 0.01* (1.8) 0.01 (1) 0.01 (0.15)
Ln  (advertising) −0.003 (−1.42) −0.01 (−0.34) −0.02*** (−2.56)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.01 (−0.73) −0.01 (−0.69) −0.01 (−0.70) −0.02*** (−2.44) −0.04*** (−3.72)
ROA  −0.01 (−0.46) −0.01 (−0.41) −0.01 (−0.44) −0.03*** (−2.72) −0.12*** (−5.88)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) 0.003 (0.39) −0.001 (−0.17) 0.001 (0.16) 0.01 (0.43) 0.03*** (4.22)
1/share  price 2.95*** (8.04) 2.93*** (7.99) 2.94*** (7.99) 3.17*** (11.58) 3.64*** (9.77)
Ln  (turnover) 0.12*** (7.68) 0.12*** (7.64) 0.12*** (7.69) 0.15*** (13.24) 0.16*** (8.32)
Ln  (return volatility) 2.47*** (84.99) 2.47*** (84.95) 2.47*** (84.86) 1.93*** (87.23) 1.82*** (38.39)
NASDAQ  −0.03 (−1.28) −0.03 (−1.14) −0.03 (−1.14) 0.02 (1.43) 0.01 (0.11)
Year  Y Y Y Y Y
Industry  Y Y Y Y Y
Adjust  cluster errors N N N Y Y
Exclude  missing advertising N N N N Y
Observation  14,690 14,690 14,690 14,690 6742
Adj.  R2 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.56 0.55
Panel  B. Change in SVI and relative bid-ask spread
Dependent variable relative spread in %
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Change in SVI −0.24*** (−4.30) −0.24*** (−4.30) −0.24*** (−4.30) −0.19*** (−4.58) −0.27*** (−6.45)
Ln  (number of news) 0.01* (1.7) 0.01* (1.79) 0.01 (0.88) 0.01 (0.12)
Ln  (advertising) −0.003 (−1.42) −0.01 (−0.16) −0.01** (−2.47)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.01 (−0.67) −0.01 (−0.63) −0.01 (−0.64) −0.02*** (−3.23) −0.04*** (−4.05)
ROA  −0.01 (−0.39) −0.01 (−0.35) −0.01 (−0.39) −0.03*** (−3.85) −0.11*** (−6.11)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) 0.003 (0.38) −0.001 (−0.19) 0.001 (0.16) 0.01 (0.32) 0.03*** (3.56)
1/share  price 2.97*** (8.11) 2.95*** (8.05) 2.96*** (8.06) 3.25*** (10.31) 3.74*** (10.54)
Ln  (turnover) 0.12*** (7.76) 0.12*** (7.71) 0.13*** (7.77) 0.15*** (17.47) 0.16*** (8.3)
Log(return  volatility) 2.48*** (85.28) 2.47*** (85.24) 2.47*** (85.16) 1.93*** (89.67) 1.83*** (43.63)
NASDAQ  −0.03 (−1.24) −0.02 (−1.11) −0.02 (−1.11) 0.01 (0.94) 0.01 (0.2)
Year  Y Y Y Y Y
Industry  Y Y Y Y Y
Adjust  cluster errors N N N Y Y
Exclude  missing advertising N N N N Y
Observation  14,690 14,690 14,690 14,690 6742
Adj.  R2 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.56 0.55
Panel  C. Active attention and amihud illiquidity measures
Dependent variable
ILLIQ ILLIQMA SD(ILLIQ)
Model I Model II Model III
Change in SVI 0.02 (1.01) 0.01 (1.4) 0.01 (0.22)
Ln  (number of news) 0 (0.81) 0 (0.81) 0 (0.79)
Ln  (advertising) 0 (1.37) 0 (1.38) 0 (1.36)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.01 (−1.16) −0.01 (−1.19) −0.01 (−1.12)
ROA  −0.02 (−1.33) −0.02 (−1.32) −0.02 (−1.34)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) −0.02 (−1.48) −0.02 (−1.51) −0.02 (−1.47)
1/share  price −0.08 (−1.17) −0.1 (−1.17) −0.1 (−1.24)
Ln  (turnover) −0.14 (−1.52) −0.16 (−1.51) −0.16 (−1.52)
Ln  (return volatility) 0.1 (1.53) 0.11 (1.47) 0.11 (1.53)
NASDAQ  0.04 (1.44) 0.04 (1.43) 0.04 (1.53)
Year  Y Y Y
Industry  Y Y Y
Observation  14690 14690 14690
Adj  R2 0.2423 0.1561 0.2311
Panel A and B of this table reports the estimates from panel regressions relating the relative bid-ask spread to active investor attention (SVI). The sample
includes the constituents of the S&P 500 over a period of six years from January 2004 to December 2009. The SVI is the search frequency of the stock ticker,
obtained from Google Trends. The change in the SVI is the difference between the SVI in week t and the median value of the SVI during the previous eight
weeks. The “number of news” is the online media coverage from Google News. Advertising expenses are obtained from Compustat. The relative bid-ask
spread is the monthly average of the ratio of the daily inside spread to the midpoint of the daily inside spread, obtained from CRSP. Firm age is the number
of  years for which the ﬁrm has been included in CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as the annual operating income before depreciation,
scaled by total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization, calculated as the product of the total number of outstanding shares and the annual closing
price.  Share turnover is constructed from CRSP as the monthly average of the share volume, divided by shares outstanding. Return volatility is the monthly
average of the standard deviation of daily returns, from CRSP. NASDAQ equals 1 for ﬁrms listed on the NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise.
Panel C presents the results based on the Amihud (2002) liquidity measures. ILLIQ is the monthly average for the daily ratio of absolute return to the dollar
volume of the stock. ILLIQMA is the ratio of the variable ILLIQ to its monthly mean across all stocks. SD(ILLIQ) is the monthly standard deviation of ILLIQ
(Lang and Maffett, 2011). We correct for standard errors using clustering.
*, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
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To explore whether the active attention of retail investors also affects other aspects of liquidity, we  replace the dependent
variable with the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (ILLIQ) and the results are reported in Panel C. The coefﬁcient of Change
in SVI is insigniﬁcant. When we incorporate ILLIQMA, estimated as the ratio of the ILLIQ to the average ILLIQ of all stocks in
the market, or incorporate the standard deviation of ILLIQ (Lang and Maffett, 2011), the coefﬁcients of attention measures
remain insigniﬁcant. The results suggest that the active attention could signiﬁcantly mitigate the adverse-selection type of
illiquidity, but not the price-impact type of illiquidity. Amihud (2002) also indicates that although bid-ask spread is a ﬁner
and better measure, there is no one single measure that captures all its aspects. As suggested by Da et al. (2011), SVI largely
reﬂects the attention of retail investors because institutional investors have access to professional information vendors. In
general the trading volume (in dollar term) of an average retail investor is less likely to be large, which suggests that their
trading behavior might have diminished effect on the stock price reaction to trading.
5. Robustness checks
5.1. Alternative bid-ask spread measures
To conﬁrm that our ﬁnding is robust to other liquidity measures, we replicate the regressions by replacing the relative
bid-ask spread with the effective spread and the relative effective spread as the dependent variables. Following Grullon et al.
(2004), the effective spread is deﬁned as twice the difference between the transaction price and the spread midpoint, and the
relative effective spread is deﬁned as the effective spread divided by the midpoint of the spread. Table 5 provides the results
of the analysis. The change in the SVI is signiﬁcantly negative in both models I and II of Panel A. This is consistent with our
main ﬁnding that active attention helps to improve stock liquidity. Both online news coverage and advertising expenditure
are found to reduce the bid-ask spread as well. Next, we use the turnover rate as an alternative liquidity measure and repeat
the analysis (see Datar et al., 1998)15. In Panel B, we show that both the active and passive attention measures are positively
associated with the share turnover. This conﬁrms that our results are robust to various speciﬁcations of liquidity.
5.2. Propensity score matching
Our research design may  be subject to endogeneity concern. The concern stems from possible reverses causality or
selection effects in that retail investor attention is not randomly assigned to ﬁrms. For example, liquidity shocks may  affect
retail investor attention. In addition, corporate announcements, events or ﬁrm characteristics may  affect both liquidity level
and retail investor attention. To control for the endogeneity issue and to draw causal inferences, and to explore attributors
of substantial increase in retail investor attention, we apply propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)
to replicate our main tests. To implement the approach, we ﬁrst deﬁne substantial increase in SVI (SIn SVI) is equal to 1
if the change in SVI is above the 10% percentile and 0 otherwise. We  then estimate a logit regression to the incidence of
substantial increase in SVI (SIn SVI) based on traditional attention measures and ﬁrm characteristics as shown in Table 5D.
Then, we construct a one-to-one nearest-neighbor matched sample based on the closest predicted value (propensity scores)
from the logit regression. In this way, each ﬁrm with substantial increase in attention (SIn SVI = 1) is matched with another
counterpart ﬁrm with similar characteristics, but without substantial increase in attention (SIn SVI = 0). It is worth to note
that the results of model I that ﬁrms with more advertising costs, larger size, higher operating performance, higher turnover,
and higher volatility, and ﬁrms listed in NASDAQ are more likely to experience substantial increase in SVI, whereas ﬁrms
which also attract high media coverage are less likely to experience such change. Such randomized experiment sample with
3002 observations is less subject to the endogeneity issue. As shown in Table 5C, we  replicate the main tests by using the
matching sample to get the more reliable and rigorous results. The results remain consistent in that substantial increase in
SVI improves breadth of ownership and stock liquidity.
To control for possible confounding effects of corporate events, we  replicate the PSM test by incorporating dummy
variables capturing index inclusion, corporate splits or dividend payments. It is also worth to note that these corporate
events do not signiﬁcantly affect the change in attention as documented in the ﬁrst step of the PSM approach. The results
from the second step remain consistent.
5.3. Test for causality
To further strengthen the causal inferences of the results, we also employ the Granger test as additional robustness
checks by following the studies of the determinants of stock liquidity (e.g., Roulstone, 2003; Chordia et al., 2005; Goyenko
and Ukhov, 2009)16. The Granger causality test is used to determine whether one time series is useful in forecasting another.
The logic is as follows: suppose that we have three time series: the change in investor attention (SVI), the liquidity (RBAS)
15 Trading activity reﬂected by turnover rate is a weak measure of liquidity because trading volume could be high when liquidity is low (Pastor and
Stambaugh, 2003). Grullon et al. (2004) ﬁnd the turnover rate to be weakly correlated with advertising expenditure.
16 For example, Roulstone (2003) uses Granger causality test to identify the causal relationship between analyst following and market liquidity. His results
show  that analyst following causes stock liquidity to improve, because post levels of analyst following are related to future liquidity levels.
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Table  5
Robustness checks.
Panel A. SVI change and relative spread
Dependent variables
Effective spread Relative effective spread
Model I Model II
Change in SVI −0.11** (−2.02) −0.01*** (−2.47)
Ln (number of News) −0.01*** (−3.07) −0.001*** (−3.87)
Ln  (advertising) −0.02*** (−4.97) −0.001*** (−5.46)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) 0.05*** (3.87) 0.001*** (4.74)
ROA 0.11*** (4.75) 0.01*** (5.22)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) 0.13*** (5.28) 0.01*** (5.67)
1/share price 0.62*** (3.19) 0.03*** (3.91)
Ln  (turnover) 1.00*** (5.32) 0.05*** (5.8)
Ln  (return volatility) −0.68*** (−5.39) −0.03*** (−5.79)
NASDAQ −0.25*** (−5.21) −0.01*** (−5.66)
Year Y Y
Industry Y Y
Observation 14,690 14,690
Adj.  R2 0.79 0.79
Panel B. SVI change and turnover
[1,0] Dependent variable: turnover
Model I Model II Model III
Change in SVI 0.12*** (3.8) 0.12*** (3.8) 0.12*** (3.8)
Ln  (number of news) 0.01*** 0.01*** (3.59) (2.99)
Ln  (advertising) 0.01*** (10.44)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.06*** (−9.47) −0.05*** (−9.41) −0.05*** (−9.37)
ROA −0.06*** (−6.71) −0.06*** (−6.60) −0.06*** (−6.31)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) −0.08*** (−16.87) −0.08*** (−15.79) −0.09*** (−17.37)
1/share price −0.65*** (−5.87) −0.68*** (−6.00) −0.71*** (−6.21)
Ln  (return volatility) 0.65*** (62.04) 0.65*** (62.01) 0.65*** (62.25)
NASDAQ 0.27*** (20.62) 0.28*** (21.13) 0.27*** (21.03)
Year  Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y
Observation 14,690 14,690 14,690
Adj.  R2 0.483 0.484 0.487
Panel  C. Substantial increase in SVI and propensity score matching
Dependent variable
Substantial increase in SVI Ln (number of shareholders in thousand) Relative spread in %
Model I Model II Model III
SIn SVI 0.14*** (2.59) −0.08** (−2.52)
Ln  (number of news) −0.02*** (−2.79) 0.04*** (2.64) 0 (−0.25)
Ln  (advertising) 0.01* (1.87) 0.02*** (2.76) −0.01* (−1.92)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) 0.03* (1.7) 0.36*** (7.51) −0.03* (−1.66)
ROA  0.06** (2.06) 0.60*** (9.71) −0.01 (−0.16)
Ln  (Firm size) 0.11*** (7.13) 0.92*** (31.16) −0.03 (−1.54)
1/share price −0.87** (−2.01) 15.30*** (10.70) 5.09*** (5.96)
Ln  (turnover) 0.06** (2.05) −0.12 (−1.56) 0.08** (2.2)
Ln  (return volatility) 0.15*** (4.21) −0.36*** (−4.53) 2.47*** (38.33)
NASDAQ 0.30*** (7.63) −0.71*** (−7.96) −0.13*** (−2.65)
Year  Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y
Observation 14690 3002 3002
Adj  R2 0.0214 0.4739 0.7873
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Table  5 (Continued )
Panel D. Corporate events and transparency
Dependent variable
Ln(number of shareholders in thousand) Relative spread in %
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Change in SVI 0.21* (1.7) 0.27** (2.07) −0.24*** (−3.43) −0.23*** (−3.01) −0.23*** (−3.28)
Ln  (number of news) 0.04 (0.88) 0.03 (0.78) 0.01 (1.02) 0.01 (1.02) 0 (0.27)
Ln  (advertising) 0.01 (0.24) 0 (0.04) 0 (−0.74) 0 (−0.94) 0 (−0.65)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) 0.27** (2.01) 0.25* (1.96) −0.01 (−0.44) 0 (−0.21) 0 (−0.04)
Return −0.20* (−1.75) −0.27** (−2.31)
ROA 0.31 (1.52) 0.35* (1.75) −0.01 (−0.21) 0 (−0.12) 0 (0.01)
Ln  (ﬁrm size) 0.87*** (10.4) 0.88*** (10.28) 0 (0.04) 0 (−0.04) 0.01 (0.45)
1/share  price 8.13*** (3.35) 8.28*** (3.42) 2.97*** (4.76) 2.87*** (4.62) 2.92*** (4.6)
Ln  (turnover) −0.08 (−0.47) −0.11 (−0.64) 0.12*** (2.78) 0.13*** (2.77) 0.14*** (3.2)
Ln  (return volatility) −0.13 (−1.09) −0.15 (−1.11) 2.48*** (36.71) 2.50*** (35.36) 2.44*** (34.07)
NASDAQ −0.64** (−2.11) −0.64** (−2.05) −0.02 (−0.55) −0.02 (−0.54) −0.02 (−0.4)
Event dividend 0.08 (0.77) 0.04* (1.89)
Event split −0.17 (−0.59) −0.14 (−1.4)
Big4 −0.24 (−1.3)
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y Y
Adjust  cluster errors Y Y Y Y Y
Exclude event months N Y N Y N
Obs  14690 12591 14690 12591 14690
Adj.  R2 0.3981 0.3906 0.7937 0.7918 0.7923
Panel A and B of this table report the estimates from panel regressions relating the alternative liquidity measures to active investor attention (SVI). The
sample includes the constituents of the S&P 500 over a period of six years from January 2004 to December 2009. The effective spread is deﬁned as twice the
difference between the transaction price and the spread midpoint. The relative effective spread is deﬁned as the effective spread divided by the midpoint
of  the spread. Share turnover is constructed from CRSP as the monthly average of the share volume divided by the shares outstanding. The SVI is the search
frequency of a stock ticker, obtained from Google Trends. The change in SVI is the difference between the SVI in week t and the median value of the SVI during
the  previous eight weeks. The “number of news” is the online media coverage from Google News. Advertising expenditure is obtained from Compustat. The
relative bid-ask spread is the monthly average of the ratio of the daily inside spread to the midpoint of the daily inside spread, obtained from CRSP. Firm
age  is the number of years for which the ﬁrm has been included in CRSP. Return on assets is constructed from Compustat as the annual operating income
before depreciation, scaled by total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization, calculated as the product of the total number of outstanding shares and
the  annual closing price. Return volatility is the monthly average of the standard deviation of daily returns, obtained from CRSP. NASDAQ equals 1 for ﬁrms
listed  on the NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise.
Panel B presents the results based on the propensity score matching. Substantial increase in SVI (SIn SVI) is set to 1 if the change in SVI is above the top
10  percentile and 0 otherwise. Matching sample of 3002 observation is constructed by Model 1, with 1501 ﬁrms as treatment group (SIn SVI = 1) and 1501
ﬁrms  as control group (SIn SVI = 0).
Panel C presents the results after controlling for corporate events or ﬁnancial reporting transparency. Event split that equals 1 if share splits happened in
the  month and 0 otherwise; similarly, Event dividend equals 1 if the dividend distribution was announced in the month and 0 otherwise.
*, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
and a vector of control variables that have predictive power for liquidity (Control). We ﬁrst use past values of RBAS (up to
previous 10 weeks), SVI and Control to forecast RBAS (Eq. (4)). Then, we use past values of SVI, RBAS and Control to
predict SVI. If the results reject the hypothesis that past values of RBAS can predict SVI (Eq. (5)) but fail to reject the
hypothesis that past values of SVI can predict RBAS (Eq. (4)), this indicates that the past values of SVI provide statistically
signiﬁcant information about RBAS. That is, SVI is able to Granger-cause RBAS.
First, in order to check whether changes in the SVI lead to changes in liquidity, we  use a standard F test to test the joint
hypothesis that ı1 = ı2 = . . . ı10 = 0 for the following regression:
RBASi,t =  ˛ +
10∑
j=1
ˇjRBASi,t−j +
10∑
k=1
ıkSVIi,t−k +
∑
Control (4)
Then, we test the joint hypothesis that 1 = 2 = . . . 10 = 0 for the following regression:
SVIi,t =  +
10∑
j=1
jRBASi,t−j +
10∑
k=1
kSVIi,t−k +
∑
Control (5)
The untabulated results show the hypothesis that a change in the SVI does not cause a change in liquidity is rejected at
the 10% conﬁdence level. However, we fail to reject the hypothesis that liquidity does not cause a change in the SVI at a
conventional level. The ﬁndings stay robust to the inclusion of higher-order lags of liquidity. Therefore, our inference is that
an increase in investors’ attention paid to a stock (reﬂected by a change in the SVI) causes liquidity to improve.
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5.4. Other confounding factors
To show that our results are not driven by confounding corporate events such as stock split and dividends, we  incorporate
them as additional control variables in our tests. The ﬁrst dummy  variable is Event split that equals 1 if share splits happened
in the month and 0 otherwise; similarly, Event dividend equals 1 if the dividend distribution was announced in the month
and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we also replicate the tests by excluding the ﬁrm-month observations with these corporate
events, and the results are robust. The results reported in the columns I to IV in Panel D of Table 5 remain consistent in that
investor attention measured by Change in SVI increases shareholder base and improve stock liquidity. The results also hold
when we incorporate other events such as Index, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm is newly included in S&P500 index in the month
and 0 otherwise.
As previous literature shows that ﬁnancial reporting transparency is associated with stock liquidity (i.e., Lang and Maffett,
2011), we create a dummy  variable to proxy for ﬁnancial reporting transparency. Speciﬁcally, Big4 is set to 1 for ﬁrms audited
by Big four auditing ﬁrms (namely KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and 0
otherwise. We  add them as additional control variables in the analysis as reported in column V of Panel D, and ﬁnd that
the results remain consistent. We  also consider alternative measures for ﬁnancial reporting transparency such as going on
concern audit opinions from auditing ﬁrm but ﬁnd that S&P500 ﬁrms in our sample do not receive going on concern audit
opinions.
6. Conclusion
The “home bias” literature suggests that investors are inclined to invest in ﬁrms that they are familiar with. In order
to get familiar with a ﬁrm, investors need to acquire relevant information. Individual investors, who are generally unable
to access professional information vendors such as Reuters or Bloomberg, may  increasingly rely on Google, the dominant
Internet search engine, to search for relevant information before making investment decisions. In this paper, we use search
frequency data on S&P 500 stocks between January 2004 and December 2009, provided by Google Trends, as a direct measure
of active investor attention, and examine the impact of this active attention from retail investors on the shareholder base and
stock liquidity. We  ﬁnd this active attention measure to be distinct from passive measures such as the number of news items
available on the Internet (based on Google News; news.google.com)17 and advertising expenditure. Despite the positive
correlation between the active and passive attention measures, almost 95% of the cross-sectional variation in the former
cannot be explained by the latter. We  further show that the increased investor attention indicated by the search volume
index (SVI) and Google News contributes to a broader shareholder base. Furthermore, increased investor attention leads to
a reduced relative bid-ask spread and a higher turnover rate. Our ﬁndings are robust to the control of ﬁrm characteristics
suggested in Grullon et al. (2004), and to alternative measures of stock liquidity.
Our study contributes to the burgeoning literature on the role of investor attention in the dynamics of asset pricing.
Studies in this stream of literature include Barber and Odean (2008) on investor attention and individual investors’ trading
behavior, Yuan (2009) on recording-breaking events related to the Dow index and front-page coverage in newspapers as
proxies for investor attention, and its impact on trading behavior and market returns, and Da et al. (2011) on investor
attention measured by Google search frequency, and its effect on IPO returns and the price pressure hypothesis proposed
by Barber and Odean (2008). This study also extends the literature on the “investor recognition hypothesis” (e.g., Grullon
et al., 2004; Fang and Peress, 2009). In markets with information asymmetry, investors are less likely to possess the required
information. Consequently, securities with lower investor recognition become less liquid and have to offer a higher return
to compensate for their “illiquidity”. The fact that a security is attracting more attention from investors can enable it to be
“better recognized”. As a result, stocks with increased investor attention become more liquid. Our results generally lend
credence to the “investor recognition” hypothesis.
The ﬁndings of our study have implications for companies that wish to promote investor recognition. Companies may
intentionally make themselves more visible on the Internet and especially in the Google search engine in order to attract
the attention of potential investors. Our results might be of interest to participants in the ﬁnancial markets (e.g., liquidity
traders), in that they may  beneﬁt from sophisticated models that incorporate individuals’ information acquisition behavior
into predictions of stock liquidity. Finally, our ﬁndings may  incentivize Google and other search engine companies to further
improve their service in terms of providing more timely and accurate data on public search behavior, and to proﬁt by selling
such services.
Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, although we apply propensity score matching and Granger test
to address the concern of endogeneity problem, future research may  attempt to identity some exogenous shift in investor’s
attention and further explore the casual relation between investors’ attention and stock liquidity. We  notice that corporate
events could not trigger substantial change in retail investors’ attention in that non-professional investors do not tend to
17 Yuan (2009), Tetlock (2010) and Fang and Peress (2009) use either the LexisNexis database or the Dow Jones news archive to determine the number
of  newspaper articles related to a stock. The Google news channel includes news from the most popular English-language news sites, such The New York
Times, Bloomberg, Reuters, the Guardian, CBS News, BBC News, Times Online, and CNN, and thus offers broader news coverage. We argue that online media
coverage is more accessible than newspaper coverage for retail investors, who are more likely to search for information on the Internet.
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closely follow corporate announcements. We  conjecture that retail investor attention could be affected by proxies related
to coverage on social media. Second, our analysis is exclusively built on the sample of S&P 500 stocks, which are large and
well-established ﬁrms with high visibility. It is expected that smaller and less recognized ﬁrms would beneﬁt more from
increased investor attention, therefore adding small ﬁrms to future studies might strengthen the analysis. Note that if the
tickers of some small ﬁrms are rarely searched for, Google will return a value of zero. Third, as suggested by Da et al. (2011),
SVI largely reﬂects the attention of retail investors because institutional investors have access to professional information
vendors such as the Bloomberg or Reuters. In general the trading behavior of an average retail investor is less likely to have
a remarkable effect on the stock price, which might plausibly explain why active attention measure of retail investors is
insigniﬁcantly related to the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Further research may  examine a wide range of liquidity
measures. Finally, the majority of research in this area is based on US data18. As Google becomes an increasingly important
source of information for investors around the world, it might be interesting to explore the capital market consequences of
investors’ active demand for information in other markets (e.g., the UK, other European countries and Asia). We leave this
for future research.
Appendix A.
Panel A. Active attention and breadth of ownership: univariate analysis
SVI Difference t-statistics
Low High
All 46.96 94.27 47.31*** 14.38
Small  22.45 24.72 2.27** 2.06
Large  78.86 153.24 74.38*** 11.54
Panel  B. Active attention and stock liquidity: univariate analysis
SVI Difference t-statistics
Low high
All stock 3.08 2.89 −0.19*** 6.38
Small  3.44 3.27 −0.17*** 3.43
Large  2.62 2.56 −0.06* 1.72
Panel  C. Firm ﬁxed effects
Dependent variable
Ln(number of shareholders in thousand) Relative spread in %
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Change in SVI 0.01** (2.11) 0.02 (0.64) −0.03*** (−3.57) −0.24*** (−4.44)
Ln  (number of News) 0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (0.74) 0.04** (2.36) 0.04** (2.53)
Ln  (advertising) −0.06*** (−12.28) −0.06*** (−12.2) −0.01 (−0.96) −0.01 (−1.13)
Ln  (ﬁrm age) −0.01 (−0.22) −0.01 (−0.27) 0.27*** (4.17) 0.27*** (4.24)
Return  0.05 (1.49) 0.05 (1.47)
ROA  0.08*** (4.45) 0.08*** (4.4) 0.03 (0.74) 0.03 (0.8)
Ln  (Firm size) 0.02 (1.15) 0.02 (1.2) −0.14*** (−4.88) −0.14*** (−4.89)
1/Share  price 0.95*** (6.57) 0.94*** (6.53) 2.08*** (7.53) 2.11*** (7.65)
Ln  (turnover) 0.10*** (7.73) 0.10*** (7.75) 0.14*** (5.74) 0.14*** (5.87)
Ln  (return volatility) −0.04*** (−3.91) −0.04*** (−3.9) 2.48*** (121.89) 2.48*** (121.97)
NASDAQ  Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted
Year  Y Y Y Y
Industry  Y Y Y Y
Firm  ﬁxed effects Y Y Y Y
Obs.  14690 14690 14690 14690
Overall  R2 0.0198 0.0209 0.7674 0.7673
Panel A reports the number of shareholders (in thousand) for stocks with low and high attention. The sample includes the constituents of S&P 500 over
a  period of 6 years from January 2004 to December 2009. The attention is measured by SVI, the search frequency of stock ticker from Google Trends. The
ﬁrms are further classiﬁed into small and large ones based on the mean of market capitalization. *, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level.
Panel  B reports presets the relative bid-ask spread (in %) for stocks with low and high attention. The sample includes the constituents of S&P 500 over a
period of 6 years from January 2004 to December 2009. The attention is measured by SVI, the search frequency of stock ticker from Google Trends. The
ﬁrms  are further classiﬁed into small and large ones based on the mean of market capitalization. *, ** and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level.
Panel  C reports the estimates from panel regressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects applied.
18 One exception is Aouadi et al. (2013), which construct attention measure with French investor’s online search behavior, provided by Google, and show
that  investor attention is a determinant of the stock market liquidity and volatility.
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Do financial analysts perform a monitoring role in China? 
Evidence from modified audit opinions 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of analyst coverage on the financial reporting quality of firms 
as reflected by modified audit opinions (MAOs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms 
between 2003 and 2009, we find that analyst coverage, which serves as an external 
governance mechanism, has a positive influence on the financial reporting quality of Chinese 
listed firms. More significantly, such effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned 
enterprises (i.e. private firms), in that they are more dependent on external equity capital and 
therefore under greater pressure from analysts to provide high-quality accounting information. 
Furthermore, we show that analyst coverage plays a more positive role for firms reporting 
consecutive losses (ST firms). Our findings are robust to various specifications of analyst 
coverage and to the control of endogeneity with instrumental variable approach.  
 
 
Keywords: Modified Audit Opinion (MAO), Analyst Coverage, Analyst Following, State-
owned enterprises, China 
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1. Introduction 
 
The accounting literature has paid considerable attention to the determinants of financial 
reporting quality. Prior studies provide evidence on the roles institutional environments and 
accounting regulations have in determining the quality of financial reporting (Ali and Hwang, 
2000; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).
1
 Furthermore, firms’ operating characteristics (e.g., financial performance, leverage, growth), 
as well as internal governance structures (e.g., independence and financial expertise of board/ 
audit committee), have been found to be associated with various proxies of financial 
reporting quality (Beatty and Harris, 1995; Keating and Zimmerman, 1999; Penman and 
Zhang, 2002; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). However, there is limited research exploring the 
governance or monitoring role of financial analysts in enhancing financial reporting quality, 
especially in emerging markets. Our study aims to fill this gap. 
 
We are analyzing the financial analysts because they are considered to be one of the 
most important financial intermediaries between corporate insiders and external investors. 
They collect firm-specific information from corporate insiders (e.g., managers) and 
subsequently disseminate the information to current and prospective users such as investors 
(Chung and Jo, 1996). Managers themselves are cognizant of the influence analysts have on 
investor sentiment as reflected by share prices (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005) and 
extant research thus far concentrates on analyzing the monitoring effects of analyst on 
managerial decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chung and Jo, 1996; Lin and McNichols, 
1998; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckauser, 1999; Irvine, 2003; Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary, 2006).  
                                                 
1
 Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) report that earnings are less timely in recognizing economic loss in code law 
countries than in common law countries. Based on the analysis of over 8,000 firms from 31 countries, Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki(2003) find less earnings management in countries with strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement, developed stock market and dispersed ownership. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), monitoring activities designed to constrain 
managerial opportunism should become specialized to those institutions and individuals who 
possess competitive advantage, and financial analysts are individuals who have the capability 
and expertise to perform such tasks. Financial analysts are professionals with substantial 
industry background and knowledge. In addition, they track corporate information on a regular 
basis and have opportunity to interact directly with managers. Previous studies show that 
analysts play an important role in disciplining managerial behavior. For example, analysts act 
as whistle blowers of corporate fraud (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010), and corporate 
governance deteriorates after a reduction in analyst coverage due to brokerage merger and 
closure (Chen, Harford and Lin, 2013). Moyer et al (1989) provide supporting evidence for 
the monitoring role of analysts as a device to mitigate the agency problem. As a result, 
managers from the firms followed by a large number of analysts tend to act more cautiously 
under the continuous and intense scrutiny.  
 
Prior research shows that analysts are an important information intermediary in China 
that helps to improve market efficiency. For example, Chen et al. (2014) analyze a large 
sample of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2008, and report a negative association 
between analyst coverage and the incidence of corporate fraud. Their findings suggest that in 
China analyst plays a monitoring role in disciplining manger’s opportunistic behavior that is 
detrimental to shareholders’ welfare. Following this logic, we suggest that analyst coverage 
effectively reduces manager’s opportunistic behavior in financial reporting, leading to higher 
financial reporting quality reflected by a lower incidence of the issuance of modified audit 
opinions (MAOs). However, we note that there is a large body of literature suggesting that 
analysts issue biased forecasts or recommendations to attract investment banking business 
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and curry favor with management (Lim, 2001; Irvine, 2004; Agrawal and Chen, 2008). The 
self-serving incentives of analysts might therefore attenuate their monitoring role in 
promoting the quality of accounting information of those firms under their coverage. To 
summarize, we consider the relation between analyst following and firm’s financial reporting 
quality reflected by MAOs as an empirical question that deserves investigation. 
 
We believe that our use of the issuance of MAOs as a proxy for (lower) financial 
reporting quality is appropriate in our research setting. It is well established that firm audits, 
which serve as an external monitoring mechanism to constrain managers’ opportunistic 
behavior that results from the separation of ownership and control, can reduce information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Kinney and Martin, 1994). An auditor, when 
exercising his independent role in certifying financial reporting quality, would be unable to 
provide an unmodified audit opinion if he finds that the financial statements as a whole are 
not free from material misstatements; or he has been unable to obtain enough evidence to 
conclude that the financial statements as a whole are in full compliance of GAAP. Once the 
auditor determines that the statements have been qualified, he will classify his qualification as 
an explanatory paragraph, disclaimer or adverse opinion. The issuance of MAOs therefore is 
an appropriate proxy for financial reporting quality, or financial statements not meeting 
acceptable standards at the outset.
2
 Prior research has identified the negative signaling effect 
of MAO. For example, using data on Chinese listed firms, Chen et al. (2000) show that 
MAOs are associated with negative abnormal stock return over a three-day window centered 
on the announcement of MAO, suggesting that firms receiving MAO have an increased cost 
of capital.  By employing the issuance of MAOs as an ex post signal of (lower) financial 
                                                 
2
 We suggest that high quality auditors to consider not only whether the client’s accounting choice are in 
compliance with GAAP, but also how faithfully the financial statements reflect the firm’s underlying economic 
transaction. In this sense, auditors help improve financial reporting quality by increasing the credibility of the 
financial reports. 
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reporting quality, we are able to investigate the role of analyst coverage in affecting the 
financial reporting quality.
3
  
 
We use the Chinese setting to investigate the effect of analyst coverage on financial 
reporting quality for various reasons. China has become one of the largest emerging 
economies since the inception of its economic reform in 1978. Since early 1990’s China’s 
capital market and in turn, financial intermediation, have experienced significant growth. 
Unlike the U.S therefore, China is a fast-developing, but nevertheless still developing, private 
equities market therefore investors are more reliant on analyst coverage in making decisions. 
The analysts’ financial and industrial expertise, along with their ability to monitor the firms 
not only more regularly but also more rigorously, serve an important role in mitigating the 
arguably higher information asymmetries and agency problems Chinese investors face (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, prior studies 
explore the role of analyst coverage as a determinant of financial reporting quality by using 
only one single measure: the number of analysts following a firm. By using Chinese data, we 
are able to differ significantly in our research as we use three different but related measures 
of analyst coverage: 1) the number of analyst reports issued for a firm (monitoring frequency) 
2) the number of analysts following a firm (monitoring intensity) and 3) the number of 
brokerage houses that issue analyst reports for a firm (monitoring scope). As a result our 
study is expected to provide an enhanced understanding of the role analyst coverage plays in 
the financial reporting process. 
                                                 
3
 We acknowledge that the issuance of MAOs reflects both auditor’s competence (auditor’s ability to detect 
problematic issues in the financial reporting process) and auditor’s independence (auditor’s willingness to 
publicly disclose such problems). Assuming at a given level of auditor competence and independence, if 
analysts effectively serve as whistle blowers in monitoring manager’s self-serving behavior, the financial 
statement will faithfully reflect the underlying economic transaction of the firm to a greater extent, leading to 
higher financial reporting quality and lower incidence of MAO. In this study we do not explore the impact of 
analyst coverage on firm’s auditor choice, although we believe this can be an interesting question for future 
research. 
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As the direct result of the partial privatization of former state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) since 1990’s, a majority of Chinese listed firms are ultimately controlled by the state 
(e.g., central government, local government or a government agent).
4
 Due to political 
connections, SOEs receive preferential treatment from the central government and thus have 
easy access to equity and credit markets (e.g. Chen et al., 2011), which implies that SOEs are 
under less pressure to reduce information asymmetry than non-state owned enterprises 
(NSOEs). In contrast, NSOEs are more dependent on the capital market to finance their 
investments, which suggests that they are incentivized to reduce information asymmetry (i.e., 
responding to the enquiry of analysts or providing high quality/frequent voluntary disclosures) 
to ensure a lower cost of raising capital. We are able to analyze the effectiveness of analyst 
coverage and determine whether their monitoring role is potentially reduced (enhanced) 
depending on ownership structure. In addition to taking into account ownership structure, we 
also analyze the effect more intense scrutiny by analysts would have on firms. China is also 
characterized as an earnings-based regulatory regime. For example, in 1998 the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) required a listed firm reporting losses for two 
consecutive years to be labeled a special treatment (ST) firm, and its daily stock quotation 
fluctuation be reduced from 10% to 5%. As soon as the ST firm incurs a third-year loss, its 
stock trading would be immediately suspended.
5
 At the same time, ST firms are subject to 
stringent scrutiny from financial intermediaries such as analysts. Therefore, in this study we 
explicitly investigate whether analyst coverage has an impact on the quality of financial 
reporting carried out by both SOEs and NSOEs, and also firms under normal versus intense 
                                                 
4
 In this study state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as enterprises with the government as the largest 
controlling shareholder. In contrast, non state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) are controlled by individuals, families 
or investment fund. In this sense NSOEs can be considered as private firms. However, throughout the paper we 
use SOEs and NSOEs to indicate that they are two exclusive groups.  
5
 In 2001 CSRC formally introduced a delisting procedure by mandating a firm be compulsorily delisted when 
it reports four-year consecutive losses. 
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scrutiny. 
 
Based on our analysis of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2009, we find that 
analyst coverage is negatively associated with the propensity of a MAO being issued, and the 
relationship is more pronounced for NSOEs. The results are robust to different measures of 
analyst coverage and to the inclusion of firm-specific characteristics documented by prior 
studies. Due to less financial and political backing from the government, Chinese NSOEs are 
relatively more reliant on the capital market for external financing (e.g. Chen et al. 2011). 
The issuance of a MAO undermines the credibility of a firm’s financial reporting, indicating 
poor corporate governance and high information asymmetries thus potentially increasing the 
firm’s cost of raising capital. This suggests that NSOEs are more likely to respond to issues 
raised by analysts, leading to improved financial reporting quality. Furthermore, we show that 
analyst coverage plays a significant role in reducing the propensity for ST firms to receive 
MAOs. This finding suggests that more intense analyst coverage subsequently leads to 
enhanced financial reporting quality and a lower likelihood of a firm being issued a MAO. 
 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we extend the 
literature on the effectiveness of external governance mechanism by providing original 
evidence on the role of financial analysts in enhancing financial reporting quality. Second, 
our study is linked to the growing stream of literature on how economic and institutional 
development shape the reporting incentive and practice in China. Finally, our results are of 
interest to regulators and policymakers with a continued interest in further reform to promote 
corporate transparency in China, and shows that the development of financial analysts in 
China has an important implication on investor protection. 
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The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional 
background, reviews the literature, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our 
research design. Section 4 and 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and development of hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Background 
 
The financial analyst industry has experienced substantial growth in parallel with the fast 
development of Chinese stock market since 1990s. In August 1991, the Securities Association 
of China, which serves as the nationwide self-regulatory body of the Chinese capital market, 
was officially launched. Securities Analysts Association of China (SAAC), which is under the 
supervision of the Securities Association of China, was formally established in July 2000. On 
December 13
th
, 2002, SAAC held its first meeting in Beijing, announcing the establishment 
of the securities analysts and investment advisors committee. The “Code of conduct for 
Chinese security analysts”, which provides guidance on the responsibility of analysts, was 
first released in 2000 and later amended in 2005.
6
 By the end of 2013, there are 115 security 
companies in China. 84 consultancy firms have been approved by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to provide investment consultancy service, with more than 
2,500 qualified financial analysts being employed by both security firms and consultancy 
firms.  
2.2 Related literature 
 
Numerous studies have examined the role of financial analysts as information intermediaries 
                                                 
6
 Based on a careful check of the law/regulations that governs the Chinese financial analyst industry issued 
between 2000 and 2013, we conclude that there is still no Chinese version of the Regulation Fair Disclosure, 
which prohibits the selective disclosure of non-public information, unless such information is simultaneously 
released to the public. 
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between firms and external investors. Because analysts collect information from public and 
private sources, continuously evaluate the performance of the firm, make forecasts about its 
future prospects and issue buy, hold or sell recommendation to investors, analyst coverage is 
likely to improve the transparency and reduce the information asymmetry of the firm under 
scrutiny. Empirical evidence largely supports this prediction. Hong et al. (2000) report a 
negative association between analyst coverage and the profitability of the momentum strategy. 
Roulstone (2003) shows that increased analyst following leads to increased liquidity because 
analysts are able to reduce information asymmetry between investors and managers of the 
firm. Ayers and Freeman (2003) find that prices of firms with high analyst coverage 
incorporate future earnings more rapidly than firms with low analyst coverage. Consistent 
with the view that analysts are key information intermediaries between the firm and market, 
Sun (2011) shows that income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more 
significantly for firms with high analyst coverage. Finally, Sun and Liu (2011) find that firms 
with high analyst coverage adopt more conservative accounting practices and conclude that 
analyst coverage has an important effect on the financial reporting process.  
 
As analysts have the relevant experience and industry-wide knowledge to scrutinize 
the financial statements of listed firms, an emerging literature explores the association 
between financial reporting quality and analyst coverage. For example, Yu (2008) employs 
discretionary accruals as the proxy of earnings management and reports that firms with more 
analyst coverage have higher financial reporting quality (lower level of earnings 
management). Focusing on the mergers between U.S. brokerage firms which result in the 
reduction of analysts following a particular stock, Irani and Oesch (2013) show that the 
quality of financial reporting decreases after a decline in analyst following. Furthermore, the 
reduction in financial reporting quality is concentrated among firms with low initial coverage 
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and poor internal governance. 
 
2.3 Development of hypotheses 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), “to the extent that security analysis 
activities reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control, 
they are indeed socially productive”.  One such benefit is that financial analysts are effective 
in constraining earnings management practices, because they are well trained to go through 
numerous financial statements and track firms on a regular basis, which enables the 
improvement of corporate transparency and the identification of financial reporting 
irregularities (Yu, 2008). Analysts are also reported to monitor managerial behavior and make 
it difficult for managers to expropriate company wealth (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2004; Dyke, 
Morse and Zingales, 2010). This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1a: Analyst coverage improves the financial reporting quality of Chinese listed firms as 
reflected by the reduced propensity to receive MAOs. 
 
          Prior studies show that investment banking incentives and other self-interests to 
access private information f r o m  management motivate analysts to provide biased 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (i.e., Michaely and Womack, 1999; Lim, 
2001; Irvine, 2004; Agrawal and Chen, 2008). Empirically, Irvine (2004) finds that forecasts 
that deviate more from the consensus (‘‘bold’’ forecasts) are associated with increase in the 
analyst’s employers’ share of the trading in the covered stock shortly after the release of the 
forecast. Agrawal and Chen (2008) show that more favorable recommendations (relative to 
the consensus recommendation) are associated with a larger share of the securities firm’s 
revenue obtained from investment banking and brokerage business.
7
 The claim that analysts 
                                                 
7
 Although there is a substantial body of literature suggesting that analysts issue biased forecasts or 
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face incentives to be optimistic implicitly relies on the assumption that managers provide 
private information to analysts who issue biased forecasts and recommendation. Given that 
analysts have preferential access to information provided by management in China, we argue 
that analysts’ incentive to curry favor with management attenuates their monitoring function 
in enhancing financial reporting quality of those firms under their coverage, suggesting that 
there is a negative association between analyst following and financial reporting quality 
reflected by the higher propensity of MAO. 
H1b: Analyst coverage reduces the financial reporting quality of Chinese listed firms as 
reflected by the higher propensity to receive MAOs. 
 
Taking into consideration of the institutional or ownership characteristics of Chinese 
listed firms, we suggest that the monitoring effects of analyst tend to be more pronounced in 
NSOEs. Because SOEs have easy access to equity and credit markets due to political reason 
(e.g. Chen, Lobo and Wang, 2011), they generally have weaker incentives to reduce 
information asymmetry and are under less pressure from analysts to provide high-quality 
accounting information. Compared with the SOEs that receive preferential treatment from the 
government, NSOEs have to rely on the capital market for external financing. In order to 
lower the cost of raising capital, NSOEs have to provide high quality financial statements. 
Furthermore, when NSOEs are approached by financial analysts, they are incentivized to 
respond to analyst enquiries or any other clarifications sought from analysts, which results in 
the enhanced quality of accounting information. Hypothesis 2 thus follows: 
H2: The effect of analyst coverage in reducing the incidence of MAOs is more pronounced in 
                                                                                                                                                        
recommendations to attract investment banking business, other studies report contradictory results. For example, 
based on a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find little evidence that 
analysts employed by investment banks bias their research to earn investment banking deals. In a similar vein, 
Jacob et al. (2008) document that more accurate earnings forecasts are issued by analysts employed by firms 
that offer investment banking. 
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NSOEs.  
 
Extant literature shows that earnings-based regulation induces earnings management 
to meet the regulatory requirements (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Liu and Lu, 2007).
8
 For example, Jiang and Wang (2008) show that Chinese listed 
firms experiencing consecutive losses (ST firms) use earnings management to avoid 
compulsory delisting, as the ratio of small-profit to small-loss firms have increased 
significantly since 1998. These practices are likely to result in a higher probability of 
receiving MAOs.
9
 However, prior studies suggest that analysts are effective in detecting 
serious financial reporting irregularities (i.e. fraud). For example, examining the alleged 
corporate frauds in U.S. between 1996 and 2004, Dyke, Morse and Zingales, (2010) conclude 
that analysts played a central role in detecting corporate frauds, in that auditors and analysts 
collectively account for 24% of whistleblowers. Although analysts do not receive monetary 
compensation from disclosing fraudulent behavior of the firms they cover, they do benefit 
from improved reputation and better career prospects (Hong, Kubik and ùsoloman, 2003) due 
to their obvious diligence. Building on the premise that analysts are able to use their 
experience and industry-specific expertise to identify financial reporting problems that arise 
from earnings management, we expect to find support for the following hypothesis:  
H3: The effect of analyst coverage in reducing the incidence of MAOs is more pronounced for 
firms under more intense scrutiny (i.e. ST firms facing potential delisting risk) 
                                                 
8
 Anecdotal evidence shows that Chinese firms use financial packaging in the pre-IPO period to inflate earnings 
(Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000) and manage earnings with non-operating items to meet regulatory requirement 
for seasonal offering (Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
9
 Previous literature (e.g., Chen and Yuan, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007) suggests that Chinese listed firms manage 
earnings to qualify for seasonal offerings (issuing additional shares to existing shareholders). According to 
CSRC, publicly listed firms are only allowed to make seasonal offerings if they have not received Modified 
Audit Opinions (MAO) for 3 consecutive years before the seasonal offering. Therefore, such regulation may 
deter firms interested in seasonal offerings from engaging in earnings management (which leads to high 
propensity of MAO), suggesting a negative association between seasonal offerings and Chinese listed firms 
receiving MAO. However, firms may use real earnings management (i.e. transaction with related party) to meet 
the regulatory requirement of seasonal offerings.  
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3. Research design 
3.1 Various measures of analyst coverage 
 
In this study we use three different measures of analyst coverage: 1) Report is the number of 
analyst reports issued for firm i in a given calendar year, which reflects the monitoring 
frequency; 2) Analyst is the number of analysts following firm i in a given calendar year, 
which reflects the monitoring intensity; 3) Broker is the number of brokerage houses that 
issue analyst reports for firm i in a given calendar year, which reflects the monitoring scope. 
An important reason to take into account the number of brokerage houses covering a firm is 
that prior research has found evidence of potential distortions in analyst recommendations, 
particularly if the brokerage is associated with an investment bank that has an underwriting 
relationship with the covered firm (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999, 
Hong and Kubik., 2003a). However, if the firm is followed by more brokerage firms, analysts 
from other brokerage firms are expected to issue less biased reports and therefore play a more 
objective monitoring role. 
3.2 Research model 
 
We rely on the following Logit model to test hypothesis 1. In order to mitigate the concern of 
endogeneity, we take the lead-lag approach by regressing MAO for firm i in year t on analyst 
coverage measures in year t-1. We suggest that using the lagged analyst coverage measure 
effectively reduces concerns that the relation is running from MAO to analyst coverage (i.e. 
less analysts are following firms receiving MAOs), because analysts make their coverage 
decisions before they learn about MAOs issued. This approach has been used in recent 
studies in accounting (e.g., Degeorge, Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2013). 
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MAOi,t =a0 +a1Coveragei,t-1 + ak+2Controlk +e
k=1
k
å
                                (1)
 
MAOs, which are ex post manifestations of inferior financial reporting quality, have received 
considerable attention from regulators, investors and the public (Firth, Mo and Wong, 2012). 
Following Firth, Rui and Wu (2012), we classify audit opinions that are qualified with an 
explanatory paragraph, disclaimer and adverse opinion as MAO. The dependent variable 
MAOi,t takes a value of one if the auditor issues a MAO for firm i in year t, and zero 
otherwise. The main explanatory variable is Coverage, which represents the following three 
measures of analyst coverage: 1) Report is the number of analyst report issued for firm i in 
year t-1; 2) Analyst is the number of financial analyst following firm i in year t-1; 3) Broker is 
the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports for firm i in year t-1; hypothesis 1 is 
supported if the coefficient of Coverage (a1 ) is negative and significant. 
 
To test hypothesis 2 we introduce a binary variable NSOE (one for non state-
controlled firms, zero otherwise) into the model. We further include an interaction term 
between NSOE and Coverage. Hypothesis 2 is supported if the coefficient of the interaction 
term ( b3) is negative and significant. 
  


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k
k kk
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NSOENSOECoverageMAO
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1,1,31,210,
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
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(2)
 
          Finally, we introduce a dummy variable ST (one if a listed firm has experienced losses 
for two consecutive years, zero otherwise) and use the following model to test hypothesis 3. 
A negative and significant coefficient of interaction term between ST and Coverage lends 
support to the hypothesis that analyst coverage plays a more significant role in reducing the 
propensity for ST firms to receive MAOs. 
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3.3 Control variable 
 
We employ three sets of control variables in our analyses. Our first set of control variables are 
related to firm-specific characteristics. We use the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
of firm i in year t-1 as a measure of Size, and the price to book ratio as a proxy for Growth. 
SEOF is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a listed firm announced proposals for 
seasonal offerings and zero otherwise. Foreign is the percentage of total shares owned by 
foreign investors. RSR is the ratio of restricted shared to total shares. Fund represents the 
percentage of shares owned by mutual funds. OwnCon, which measures the ownership 
concentration, is the Herfindahl index of the top 10 block-holders. Big4 is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors (Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), zero otherwise.
10
 Finally, IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 for observations after 2007 when CGAAP (Chinese Generally Accepted 
Accounting principles) converged towards IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards), zero otherwise.
11
 
 
Previous studies suggest that boards characterized by a high percentage of 
independent directors that hold more frequent meetings can effectively safeguard the interests 
of shareholders (Beasley, 1996). Therefore we include the following governance variables as 
the second set of control variables. First, we include a dummy variable Duality, which takes 
                                                 
10
 In China, Big 4 auditing firms are legally required to launch a joint venture with a local firm to provide 
auditing service. We therefore regard an auditor as Big 4 if one of its partners is a Big 4. 
11
 Because all Chinese listed firms have their fiscal year ending in December, we expect that the convergence of 
CGAAP towards IFRS would only affect financial statements issued in 2008 and 2009.  
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the value of one if the CEO of the firm also holds the position of chairman of the board, zero 
otherwise. Bmeet is the annual board meetings frequency, and Bsize is the number of board 
member. Indr is the percentage of independent directors on the board and Supsize is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the number of supervisory board member is above the median of 
all the observations in a sample year, and zero otherwise. Smeet is annual supervisory 
boarding meeting frequency. 
 
Finally, we include Year, Industry and Region fixed effects. The year fixed effect 
captures the potential changing regulatory environment during our sample period (2003-
2009), and the industry fixed effect captures the industry-specific impact on our analyses. We 
define industry according to the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GICS). We include the region fixed effect to control for the effect of differentiated 
levels of market and institutional development across China.
12
 Following Firth, Fung and Rui 
(2006), we classify firms into four different regions based on their level of economic and 
institutional development. We summarize the definition of variables in Appendix 1. 
<< Insert Appendix 1 about here >> 
3.4 Data 
 
The data used in this study are collected from CCER (China Center for Economic Research) 
and CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) database. Our sample period 
begins in 2003, the first year when data on firm ownership structure is made available. All the 
data except NSOE (ownership status) and ST (profit status) are extracted from CSMAR. We 
include all firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2009. 
                                                 
12
 For example, the market development level is eastern area is more advanced than that in central and western 
provinces (Fan and Wang, 2005). It is recognized that institutional and market development has a significant 
impact on financial reporting quality (Firth, Mo and Wong, 2012; Firth, Rui and Wu, 2012).  
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Our final sample consists of 9,844 firm-year observations, in which 791 MAOs are identified 
over the sample period. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 1 provides the change of analyst coverage for Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2009. 
For an average firm in our sample, the number of reports issued (number of analysts 
following) has increased from 1 (1) in 2003 to 12 (7) in 2009. The number of brokerage 
house that issue reports also show a comparable increase. The evidence reflects the 
substantial growth of the financial analyst profession in China over the period under 
consideration. 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables and compares the mean and 
median of the variables across the sub-samples partitioned based on whether a firm received a 
MAO from its auditor. As shown in Table 1, Panel A, firms that receive MAOs are covered 
by fewer analyst reports, followed by less analysts and brokerage houses, and the difference 
(median) is significant at the 1% level. Consistent with findings documented by prior studies 
(Chen et al., 2000), firms receiving MAOs are generally small in terms of market 
capitalization. Furthermore, firms with MAOs have less mutual fund ownership and are less 
likely to be audited by Big 4 auditors. NSOEs (non state-owned enterprise) and ST firms are 
more likely to receive MAOs. Finally, firms that receive MAOs tend to have less board 
members and smaller supervisory boards. 
 
We further divide the sample into NSOEs (Panel B) and SOEs (Panel C) sub-samples 
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and compare characteristics of firms that receive and don’t receive MAOs in each sub-sample. 
For both NSOEs and SOEs, we find that firms receiving MAOs are covered by fewer analyst 
reports, followed by less analysts and brokerage houses, which provides initial evidence 
supporting hypothesis 1. Firms that receive MAOs are smaller in terms of market 
capitalization. For both NSOEs and SOEs, firms that receive MAOs have less mutual fund 
ownership, suggesting that mutual fund ownership may have a positive effect on the financial 
reporting quality. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
4.2 Correlation 
 
Table 2 presents the non-parametric Spearman correlation among the variables. The 
correlation between three measures of coverage (Report, Analyst and Broker) is positive and 
highly significant, consistent with the expectation that they reflect inter-related dimensions of 
external monitoring mechanisms. MAOs are negatively correlated with three measures of 
coverage, suggesting that external monitoring by analysts reduce the propensity that a firm 
would receive a MAO. MAOs are positively correlated with NSOEs, which implies that 
NSOEs are more likely to receive MAOs. The correlation between MAOs and ST firms is 
positive, suggesting that firms experiencing consecutive losses have incentives to manipulate 
earnings to avoid being delisted, which results in higher propensity for the issuance of MAOs. 
The correlation between MAOs and SEOF is negative, indicating that firms proposing 
seasonal offerings are less likely to receive MAOs. This is consistent with the regulation that 
listed firms would only be allowed to make seasonal offerings if they haven’t received MAOs 
for three consecutive years prior to the offering. Size, fund ownership and Big 4 are 
negatively correlated with MAOs, which suggest that large firms, firms with high fund 
ownership and a Big 4 as auditors are less likely to receive MAOs. Analyst (Broker) is 
positively correlated with size and growth, which suggests that large firms and firms with 
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high growth potential are followed by more analysts (brokerage houses). NSOE is negatively 
correlated with size and fund ownership, indicating that NSOEs are firms with smaller market 
capitalization attracting less investment from funds. The correlation between NSOE and 
growth is positive, which implies that NSOEs have high growth potential. Among the control 
variables, size is positively correlated with fund ownership and Big 4, and the correlation 
between size and ST is negative. The correlation between growth (ST) and fund ownership is 
positive (negative), suggesting that mutual funds have higher ownership in growing firms but 
are less likely to invest in firms that experience consecutive losses. 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
4.3 Empirical results 
 
4.3.1 Test of hypothesis 1 
Table 3 presents results consistent with our prediction that analyst coverage is negatively 
associated with the propensity for firms to receive MAOs from their auditors. First we use 
Report (the number of analyst reports issued for firm i in year t-1) as a proxy for analyst 
coverage and regress MAO in year t on Report and the control variables. The coefficient of 
Report is negative and significant (-0.0793, t= -2.62), suggesting that firms are less likely to 
receive MAOs when more analyst reports were issued in the previous year. When we 
compute the marginal effect, a one standard deviation increase in Report (12.218) leads to 
3.15% decrease in the incidence of MAO, implying the economic significance of our finding. 
Next we replace Report with Analyst (number of analyst following firm i in year t-1) and 
repeat the analysis. The negative and significant coefficient of Analyst (-0.1527, t= -3.76) 
indicates that firms are less likely to experience MAOs if they are followed by more analysts 
in the previous year. Finally we substitute Analyst with Broker (number of brokerage house 
that issue report for firm i in year t-1) and repeat the regression. We find the coefficient of 
Broker is negative and significant (-0.1765, t= -4.12), confirming that more brokerage houses 
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following a firm reduces the propensity that MAOs would be issued.  
 
Among the control variables, the coefficient of ST is positive and significant across 
the models, consistent with the conjecture that firms reporting consecutive losses are more 
likely to manipulate earnings to avoid being delisted, which results in the issuance of a MAO. 
The coefficient of size is negative and significant, suggesting that large firms are less likely to 
receive MAOs. The coefficient of SEOF is significantly negative, indicating that firms 
proposing seasonal offerings are less likely to receive MAOs. The coefficients of Fund and 
OwnCon are negative and significant across the models, indicating that firms with high 
ownership by mutual funds and high ownership concentration are less likely to receive MAO. 
It is worth noting that the IFRS dummy variable is positively significant, which suggests 
more MAOs after accounting standards in China converge toward IFRS. This may be 
attributed to the increase of managerial discretionary influence in financial reporting under 
principles-based accounting standards such as IFRS (Agoglia et al., 2011; Ahmed et al., 
2013). Regarding the governance variables, the coefficients of Indr are negative (although 
marginally significant) across the models, which implies that an independent board is more 
effective in constraining earnings management and therefore contributes to high financial 
reporting quality. The findings are consistent with the view that independent directors have 
incentives to be effective monitors to maintain their reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Overall we find supporting evidence for hypothesis 1. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
4.3.2 Test of hypothesis 2 
To test hypothesis 2 we first regress MAO on NSOE and other control variables (excluding 
analyst coverage) in regression I. Then we add Coverage and interaction between Coverage 
and NSOE. We use Report, Analyst and Broker as proxies for analyst coverage in regression 
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II, III and IV. The results are presented in Table 4. In regression I the positive and significant 
coefficient of NSOE (0.36, t= 3.95) indicates that NSOEs are more likely to receive MAOs. 
This is consistent with the findings documented in Wang et al. (2008) that state-controlled 
firms are economically protected by central or local government, so auditors are less likely to 
issue MAOs for these firms. In regression II the coefficient of the interaction term between 
NSOE and analyst coverage is negative and significant (-0.1225, t= -1.93), which suggests 
that analyst monitoring of NSOEs (in terms of number of analyst reports issued) plays a more 
significant effect in decreasing the propensity that these firm would receive MAO.
13
 When 
we compute the marginal effect, a one standard deviation increase in Report (12.218) reduces 
the incidence of MAOs among NSOEs by 4.73%, confirming the economic significance of 
our results. It is plausible that NSOEs are more susceptible to the external monitoring of 
analysts, because they have to maintain their good reputations to access the capital market at 
a lower cost. Consequently they are more likely to react to the issues raised in the analyst 
reports, leading to improved financial reporting quality and reduced propensity of receiving a 
MAO. In contrast, SOEs are under less pressure from analyst monitoring because they can 
enjoy the preferential treatment from the central and local government. The results in 
regression III are consistent with those in regression II, as the coefficient of the interaction is 
negative and significant (-0.1837, t= -2.22). In regression IV we use Broker as the proxy for 
analyst coverage and repeat the analysis. In line with results based on Report and Analyst, we 
find that the coefficient of NSOE (interaction) is significant and positive (negative). Our 
results thus support hypothesis 2. 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
4.3.3 Results on the test of hypothesis 3 
                                                 
13
 The net effect of Report on the propensity that NSOEs would receive MAO is -0.16, the sum of b1 and b3 . 
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To test hypothesis 3 we first regress MAO on ST and other control variables (excluding 
analyst coverage) in regression I. The positive and significant coefficient of ST is consistent 
with the conjecture that firms with consecutive losses are more likely to engage in earnings 
management to avoid compulsory delisting, which in turn results in high propensity of 
receiving MAOs. Next we include analyst coverage and an interaction term between ST and 
analyst coverage in the regression. In regression II we use Report as the first proxy for 
analyst coverage. The coefficients of Report and interaction are negative and significant (-
0.08, t=-2.70; -0.3674, t=-2.18), suggesting that analyst coverage reduces the propensity that 
firms would receive MAO, and the effect is more pronounced for firms experiencing 
consecutive losses. The result of the marginal effect shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in Report (12.218) reduces the incidence of MAOs among ST firms by 14.46%, 
indicating the economic significance of our result. It is plausible that due to their sensitive 
and rather urgent status on the market ST firms attract more intense attention from analysts, 
who are able to utilize their expertise to identify and disclose the earnings management 
practice of ST firms. Consequently, ST firms have to take corrective action, which results in 
improved reporting quality and reduced propensity of receiving MAOs. Consistent with prior 
findings that analysts are more effective in detecting corporate fraud (Dyck et al., 2010), our 
results suggest that analysts play a disciplinary role in monitoring the financial reporting 
practice of ST firms. Next, we replace Report with Analyst (Broker) in regression III (IV), 
and get qualitatively consistent results. Taken together, our empirical evidence support 
hypothesis 3 that analyst coverage plays a more significant role in reducing the propensity 
that ST firms would receive MAOs from their auditors. 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
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5 Robustness checks 
 
We perform a battery of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our main findings. 
5.1 Endogeneity Issue 
 
A common concern with the studies of financial analysts is the potential endogeneity problem 
stemming from the fact that they do not follow listed firms randomly. We employ the lead-lag 
approach to alleviate the concern in the baseline tests. To further strengthen the rigor of the 
study, we also carry out additional robustness test. He and Tian (2013) summarize two 
strategies to address the issue. The first approach is to rely on quasi-natural experiments, 
namely brokerage closures (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2011, 2012) and brokerage mergers (Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2010), which directly affect firms' analyst coverage but are exogenous to 
firms' outcome. The second approach is to reply on instrumental variables and the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) analysis. For example, Yu (2008) uses the index inclusion to capture 
exogenous variations in analyst coverage.  Because the constructed quasi-natural experiments 
in the literature are based on the US samples and we failed to find the complete list of 
brokerage closures and mergers in China, we follow the strategy of Yu (2008) by using the 
index inclusion as the instrumental variable.  Specifically, we use the Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 
300 index (CSI 300) inclusion as instrumental variables, and estimate the predicted level of 
analyst coverage with whether a firm is included in the CSI 300 and firm-specific attributes. 
Firm as index constituents tends to attract more following analysts than a similar firm that is 
not included in the index. In addition, Yu (2008) note that the criteria for being added to the 
index are based on the industry conditions to which the firm belongs as well as on how 
representative a firm is of its industry.  
 
We test the association between predicted analyst coverage and the incidence of 
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MAO. As the CSI 300 is compiled by the China Securities Index Company since April 8, 
2005, this robustness check is based on a subsample from 2005 to 2009. The results, which 
are reported in Table 6 are consistent with our main finding. The predicted number of analyst 
reports help to reduce the incidence of MAOs in NSOEs, but not in SOEs.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
 
The literature has also recognized that analyst coverage is associated with firm factors 
such as firm size and institutional ownership. This is also reflected in the correlation matrix in 
Table 2 that the correlations of Report with both Size and Fund are greater than 0.5, 
indicating the strong size and fund effects. We control for these factors by following the 
approach of Yu (2008). We first run the regression model as follows:  
 
itititi
FundizeSCoverage  
 1,11,10,
                 (4) 
 
where Coverage is the number of reports issued on the firm; Size is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization, and Fund is the number of shares held by mutual fund relative to the 
total number of shares. The residual of this regression is defined as the residual coverage 
and we incorporate it in Model (2) to perform the tests. The variation of the residual 
coverage is not attributed to firm size or fund ownership.  
 
The results are reported in Table 7. The results of Regression I show that both firm 
size and fund ownership are significantly associated with analyst coverage and they explain 
as much as 39.28% of the variation. The results of Regression II show that the coefficient  of 
residual coverage is negative but insignificant. However, the coefficient of the interaction 
term of residual coverage and NSOE is significantly negative, showing that analyst coverage 
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reduces the incidence of MAOs in NSOEs. The findings are consistent with the main results 
of Table 4 and further support our hypotheses, suggesting that our results are not driven by 
the size or fund effects.  
 
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
 
5.2 Controlling for firm performance 
 
We use return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for firm performance and introduce a dummy 
variable “Under” which takes 1 for firms whose ROA is below the industry median in a given 
year, zero otherwise. It is likely that firms underperforming their industry peers would engage 
in earnings management, resulting in a high propensity of receiving MAO. Analyst coverage 
is expected to have a more significant effect in decreasing the propensity that 
underperforming firms would receive MAO. Therefore we include in the regression an 
interaction between Coverage and Under. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient of 
Under is positive and significant, suggesting that underperforming firms are more likely to 
receive MAO. The coefficient of interaction is significantly negative, indicating that analyst 
coverage plays a more important role in reducing the propensity that underperforming firms 
would receive MAO. The results are presented in Table 8. 
 
<< Insert Table 8 about here >> 
 
5.3 Audit Shopping 
 
In addition, the literature suggests that firms’ audit choice decision is affected by their 
governance quality. For example, Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) find that governance 
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quality is associated with suspicious auditor switching. Previous research on auditing suggests 
that small and local auditors in China are more likely to issue clean audit opinions under 
pressure from their clients. If firms with lower analyst coverage tend to switch to local 
auditors that are less likely to detect problems in financial statement, there will be a positive 
association between analyst coverage and the incidence of Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs), 
because firms with lower analyst coverage are less likely to receive MAOs. This would bias 
us against finding the results. Taking this into account, we narrow down our sample to firms 
audited by Big 4 auditors, and repeat the analysis within the reduced sample. Our results again 
remain consistent. 
 
5.4 Other tests 
 
Given that various analyst coverage measures (Report, Analysts and Broker) are positively 
correlated (cf. Table 2), we repeat the analysis using Report and Broker conditional on 
Analyst being non-zero. That is, after removing all observations with zero analyst following, 
we conduct regression analysis with Report and Broker as proxies for analyst coverage. Our 
results (unreported) are qualitatively consistent.  
 
To control for potentially omitted variables, we follow prior studies (Firth et al., 2011) by 
including additional control variables: LagMAO (dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
received MAO in the previous year, zero otherwise), ROE (return on equity), Current (current 
assets divided by current liabilities), Inventory (inventory divided by total assets), AR 
(accounts receivable divided by total assets), and re-run the analyses. Our main findings 
remain qualitatively unchanged (un-tabulated). 
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To take into consideration the effect of the split share structure reform in 2005,
14
 we repeat 
our analysis in two sub-sample periods 2003-2004 and 2006-2009, and find consistent results 
in both periods. Finally we repeat our analysis for each of the sample year (2003 to 2009), 
and find our results stay robust for each year from the sample period. This mitigates concerns 
that our results are driven by observations from any particular year from the sample period. 
 
5.5 Additional test on analyst recommendations 
 
In addition to our main results based on the three measures of analyst coverage, we also 
examine whether the content the analyst reports is related to MAOs. Analysts often make 
their recommendation to the investors based on their analysis in the report. The standard 
recommendation is classified in the following five categories: strong buy (Grade 1), buy 
(Grade 2), hold (Grade 3), sell (Grade 4) and strong sell (Grade 5). It is worth noting that 
analysts do not explicitly give standard recommendation in some reports, and we denote them 
as Grade 0. We collect the analyst recommendation data from CSMAR and present the 
descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 9. The total number of reports received by each firm 
ever year is 11.14 and 11.08 of them come with standard recommendations. It shows the 
average numbers (ratio) of reports with recommendation of strong buy, buy and hold (i.e. 
Grade 1-3) received by each firm in each year are respectively 2.64, 5.86 and 2.41 (17.82%, 
40.94% and 37.53%), while the average numbers (ratio) of sell and strong sell (Grade 4-5) 
are as small as 0.05 and 0.11 (1.41% and 2.30%). This shows that financial analysts in China 
are reluctant to give negative recommendations presumably because of their concern of the 
relationship withlisted firms: recommendation of sell or strong sell could make it more 
                                                 
14
 Since this reform promotes the gradual elimination of the trading restriction of non-tradable shares, which are 
largely held by state shareholders, it is more likely to affect SOE listed firms than NSOE listed firms (Hou et al., 
2012). 
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difficult for the analysts to get access to the listed firms in future
15
.  
 
Panel B of Table 9 shows the relation between analyst recommendation and MAOs in 
the subsequent year. Regression I shows that the coefficients of Grade 2 and Grade 4 are -
0.3934 and 1.0081 respectively and significant at 1% level, indicating that recommendation 
of buy is significantly related to lower incidence of MAOs, while the recommendation of sell 
is related to higher incidence.  When we classify the recommendation into three categories, 
we still obtain consistent results
16
. These findings are in line with our results in Table 7 that 
firms with better performance or prospects are more likely to provide high quality accounting 
information.  In untabulated tests, we also replace the number of each type of 
recommendations with their ratio, as shown in regression II, the results are broadly consistent.   
<< Insert Table 9 about here >> 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study we find that analyst coverage is negatively associated with the propensity 
that Chinese listed firms would receive MAOs, and the negative association is more 
pronounced for non state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Our results are robust after controlling 
firm-specific characteristics documented by previous research to affect the propensity of 
issuing MAOs. Furthermore, we show that analyst coverage plays a more significant role in 
reducing the propensity that firms confronting high delisting risk (ST firms) receive MAOs. 
In other words, ST firms may have strong incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid 
compulsory delisting. At the same time, due to their sensitive status ST firms are likely to 
attract increasing attention from analysts, who may use their experience and expertise to 
identify the financial reporting irregularities. This subsequently leads to a lower propensity of 
                                                 
15
 http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/qsth/20091211/01237087405.shtml (in Chinese) 
16
 We thank one anonymous reviewer for the suggestion.  
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issuing MAOs for ST firms. 
 
Our study opens a broad avenue for ongoing research in this arena, so we provide 
some suggestion for future research. First, Xu et al. (2013) differentiate between “star” 
analyst (analyst selected by business magazine as one of the best analysts based on 
performance) and non-star analyst, and find that firms followed by “star” analyst show 
decreased return synchronicity, while this doesn’t hold for firms followed by non-star 
analysts. Future research might examine whether star analyst coverage plays a more 
significant role in reducing the incidence of MAO, as “star” analysts in general have superior 
skills in producing firm-specific information and have greater influence on the market. 
Second, a combination between an archival study and a field study (e.g., interview with 
financial analyst and corporate managers) could provide more insights into the role of analyst 
in shaping the financial reporting incentive and practice. Third, it would be promising to 
conduct cross-country analysis to investigate how different cultural and institutional contexts 
can affect the relationship between analyst coverage and the quality of financial reporting. 
Fourth, given that financial analysts play a crucial governance role, it will be interesting to 
explore whether analyst coverage has any impact on firms’ audit choice, as audit is 
considered as an important external governance mechanism that safeguards the interests of 
financial statement users. Finally, it might be interesting to examine the issue from the 
perspective of auditor by factoring analyst coverage into the risk-assessment framework of 
the external auditing. We encourage more research in these directions. 
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Appendix 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Main test variables: 
MAO  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if modified audit opinion has been 
issued for firm i in year t, zero otherwise.  
Report  The number of analyst reports issued for firm i in year t-1. 
Analyst  The number of financial analysts following firm i in year t-1. 
Broker  The of brokerage house that issue analyst reports for firm i in year t-1. 
NSOE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the controlling shareholder of the firm is not the 
central or local government; 0 otherwise. 
 
Control Variables:  
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization 
Growth Price-to-book ratio  
ST 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if a listed firm experiences consecutive two-year or 
longer loss; 0 otherwise 
SEOF 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if a listed firm announce a proposal of seasonal offering 
in the year; 0 otherwise. 
Foreign The number of foreign shares relative to the total number of shares 
RSR The number of restricted shares relative to the total number of shares 
Fund The number of shares held by mutual fund relative to the total number of shares 
OwnCon The Herfindahl index of the top 10 largest blockholders of the firm 
Big4 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the audit firm is one of the big 4 (i.e. PwC, Deloittee, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG); 0 otherwise 
IFRS 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 for observations after 2007 onwards when Chinese 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (CGAAP) converged with the International 
Financial Reporting Standard(IFRS); 0 otherwise 
Duality 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the position of board chair; 0 
otherwise 
BMeet Annual board meeting frequency 
Bsize The number of board members 
Inder The ratio of independent directors in the board 
Supsize 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is above the 
median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
Smeet Annual supervisory board meeting frequency 
 
 
Industry and region dummies are defined  in our empirical analysis are defined as follow: 
 
The industry dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global 
Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region dummies are constructed by following 
Frith et al. (2006), in which the firms are grouped into four different regions by the levels of 
economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed areas including 
the eastern and coastal provinces; 3. The inland provinces; and 4. The least developed 
provinces in the north-western part of the country.   
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Figure 1. Analyst Coverage in China 
 
Figure 1 presents the average analyst coverage of the Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2009. 
Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst denotes the number 
of financial analysts following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue 
analyst reports on the firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables and the partitioned samples based on the audit opinion, as well as the difference of 
median test. MAO equals 1 if modified (non-standard option) audit opinion is issued by the auditors and 0 otherwise. Coverage denotes the 
following three measures of analyst coverage. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst denotes the number of 
financial analysts following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports on the firms. NSOE equals 1 if the firm 
is non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
significance respectively. Panel A is based on the whole sample, whereas Panel B and C are based on NSOE samples and SOE samples 
respectively. The median values in Panel A are compared by using the Mann-Whitney U-test (i.e. Wilcoxon rank-sum test). It is worth to note 
that the Z-value is significant when the median values of two samples are same because the test also detects difference in shape and spread.  
 
 41 
 
Panel A 
    Total     MAO=1     MAO=0   Difference 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean t-value   Median z-value   
MAO 0.0858 0.2801 0 
  
  
  
    
    
  
Report 5.8107 12.2180 1 0.6030 2.7681 0 6.2658 12.6127 1 5.6627 12.6002 *** 1 22.653 *** 
Analyst 3.7266 6.6934 1 0.4336 1.7597 0 4.0144 6.8860 1 3.5807 14.5828 *** 1 22.69 *** 
Broker 3.3782 5.8022 1 0.4096 1.6286 0 3.6376 5.9615 1 3.2280 15.1787 *** 1 22.707 *** 
NOSE 0.3533 0.4780 0 0.4766 0.4998 0 0.3425 0.4746 0 -0.1341 -7.5864 *** 0 -7.565 *** 
Size 13.8878 1.2121 13.7434 13.0302 1.0428 12.9185 13.9627 1.1970 13.8067 0.9326 21.2191 *** 0.8882 20.268 *** 
Growth 3.7306 4.1802 2.6442 3.7418 8.5167 2.0751 3.7296 3.5596 2.6774 -0.0122 -0.0785 
 
0.6023 7.971 *** 
ST 0.0883 0.2837 0 0.5145 0.5001 1 0.0510 0.2201 0 -0.4635 -49.1773 *** -1 -44.063 *** 
SEOF 0.0489 0.2156 0 0.0063 0.0793 0 0.0526 0.2232 0 0.0463 5.7966 *** 0 5.787 *** 
Foreign 0.0140 0.0643 0 0.0115 0.0524 0 0.0142 0.0652 0 0.0028 1.1562 
 
0 0.657   
RSR 0.4863 0.2113 0.5284 0.4892 0.1897 0.5225 0.4861 0.2130 0.5293 -0.0031 -0.4016 
 
0.0068 0.578   
Fund 0.0346 0.0697 0.0015 0.0037 0.0215 0 0.0373 0.0718 0.0027 0.0336 13.1259 *** 0.0027 24.955 *** 
OwnCon 0.1911 0.1288 0.1585 0.1426 0.1118 0.1095 0.1958 0.1310 0.1636 0.0531 11.0785 *** 0.0542 12.316 *** 
Big4 0.0718 0.2582 0 0.0278 0.1645 0 0.0757 0.2645 0 0.0479 5.0046 *** 0 4.999 *** 
IFRS 0.4675 0.4990 0 0.3552 0.4789 0 0.4773 0.4995 0 0.1221 6.6118 *** 0 6.597 *** 
Duality 0.1399 0.3469 0 0.1745 0.3797 0 0.1369 0.3437 0 -0.0376 -2.9248 *** 0 -2.924 *** 
Bsize 9.4708 2.1067 9 8.9760 2.0260 9 9.5141 2.1082 9 0.5381 6.9053 *** 0 6.728 *** 
Bmeet 8.3770 3.4757 8 8.3666 3.2820 8 8.3779 3.4923 8 0.0113 0.0874 
 
0 -0.784   
Indr 0.3517 0.0529 0.3333 0.3498 0.0690 0.3333 0.3519 0.0512 0.3333 0.0021 1.051 
 
0 -0.203   
Supsize 4.0977 1.4277 3 3.9229 1.3818 3 4.1130 1.4307 3 0.1901 3.5937 *** 0 3.676 *** 
Smeet 4.0623 1.7809 4 3.8053 1.6801 4 4.0847 1.7877 4 0.2794 4.2353 *** 0 4.468 *** 
Obs.    9844     791     9053               
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Panel B 
Sample: NSOE MAO=1 MAO=0 Difference 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean t-value   
Report 0.4508 2.4632 0 5.6144 11.3179 1 5.1636 8.6976 *** 
Analyst 0.3060 1.4653 0 3.5155 6.0769 1 3.2095 10.0607 *** 
Broker 0.2869 1.3436 0 3.1543 5.2532 1 2.8674 10.3924 *** 
Size 12.8922 1.0381 12.7987 13.8349 1.0901 13.7723 0.9427 15.5615 *** 
Growth 3.4917 8.7477 1.9305 4.3590 4.3095 3.1530 0.8673 3.0521 *** 
ST 0.5847 0.4934 1 0.0707 0.2563 0 -0.5140 -30.9986 *** 
SEOF 0.0055 0.0738 0 0.0699 0.2550 0 0.0644 4.8036 *** 
Foreign 0.0162 0.0616 0 0.0239 0.0875 0 0.0078 1.6388   
RSR 0.4819 0.1954 0.5186 0.4497 0.2153 0.4871 -0.0322 -2.7085 *** 
Fund 0.0024 0.0131 0 0.0365 0.0700 0.0012 0.0341 9.3047 *** 
OwnCon 0.1085 0.0787 0.0874 0.1449 0.1011 0.1189 0.0364 6.6263 *** 
Big4 0.0137 0.1162 0 0.0353 0.1847 0 0.0217 2.184 ** 
IFRS 0.3825 0.4867 0 0.5720 0.4949 1 0.1895 6.8654 *** 
Duality 0.2077 0.4062 0 0.1998 0.4000 0 -0.0078 -0.3485   
Bsize 8.6284 2.1399 9 8.8602 1.7786 9 0.2318 2.2687 ** 
Bmeet 8.5355 3.2066 8 8.9183 3.6833 8 0.3828 1.8881 * 
Indr 0.3577 0.0770 0.3333 0.3600 0.0505 0.3333 0.0023 0.7642   
Supsize 3.6148 1.1356 3 3.5826 1.0174 3 -0.0321 -0.5561   
Smeet 3.7623 1.6505 4 4.3404 1.8411 4 0.5781 5.6876 *** 
Obs.    366     2547         
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Panel C 
 
Sample: SOE   MAO=1     MAO=0   Difference 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean t-value   
Report 0.7415 3.0394 0 6.1391 12.8617 1 5.3976 8.5217 *** 
Analyst 0.5459 1.9955 0 3.8538 6.9294 1 3.3079 9.6847 *** 
Broker 0.5169 1.8539 0 3.4844 5.9612 1 2.9675 10.0941 *** 
Size 13.1431 1.0402 13.0262 14.0402 1.2183 13.8807 0.8971 14.6161 *** 
Growth 4.0910 8.3629 2.2224 3.4188 3.2202 2.4757 -0.6722 -3.5049 *** 
ST 0.4493 0.4980 0 0.0472 0.2121 0 -0.4021 -32.7989 *** 
SEOF 0.0072 0.0849 0 0.0489 0.2157 0 0.0416 3.9079 *** 
Foreign 0.0076 0.0431 0 0.0078 0.0438 0 0.0002 0.0692   
RSR 0.5022 0.1770 0.5278 0.4817 0.2068 0.5269 -0.0205 -1.9664 ** 
Fund 0.0050 0.0270 0 0.0387 0.0748 0.0024 0.0337 9.1284 *** 
OwnCon 0.1741 0.1267 0.1323 0.2167 0.1373 0.1922 0.0426 6.1329 *** 
Big4 0.0411 0.1987 0 0.0885 0.2841 0 0.0475 3.3438 *** 
IFRS 0.3285 0.4702 0 0.4326 0.4955 0 0.1041 4.1479 *** 
Duality 0.1498 0.3573 0 0.1000 0.3000 0 -0.0498 -3.2222 *** 
Bsize 9.2923 1.8761 9 9.7564 2.1140 9 0.4641 4.3494 *** 
Bmeet 8.2536 3.3585 8 8.2834 3.3931 8 0.0298 0.173   
Indr 0.3435 0.0596 0.3333 0.3479 0.0510 0.3333 0.0044 1.6818 * 
Supsize 4.1981 1.5165 4 4.3384 1.4889 5 0.1403 1.8517 * 
Smeet 3.8357 1.7037 4 4.0492 1.7621 4 0.2135 2.3885 ** 
Obs.    414     5952         
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the nonparametric spearman rank correlation matrix of the variables used in our analyses. MAO equals 1 if modified (non-standard option) audit opinion is 
issued by the auditors and 0 otherwise. Coverage denotes the following three measures of analyst coverage. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. 
Analyst denotes the number of financial analysts following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports on the firms. NSOE equals 1 if the 
firm is non-state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
[1]MAO 1.00 
                    [2]Report -0.23* 1.00 
                   [3]Analyst -0.23* 1.00* 1.00 
                  [4]Broker -0.23* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00 
                 [5]NOSE 0.08* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 1.00 
                [6]Size -0.20* 0.57* 0.57* 0.56* -0.10* 1.00 
               [7]Growth -0.07* 0.20* 0.20* 0.20* 0.12* 0.36* 1.00 
              [8]ST 0.36* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* 0.07* -0.22* 0.01 1.00 
             [9]SEOF -0.06* 0.16* 0.16* 0.15* 0.02 0.19* 0.10* -0.03* 1.00 
            [10]Foreign -0.01 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
           [11]RSR 0.00 -0.10* -0.09* -0.08* 0.03* -0.44* -0.07* -0.01 -0.02 0.12* 1.00 
          [12]Fund -0.24* 0.69* 0.69* 0.69* -0.04* 0.54* 0.15* -0.35* 0.17* 0.05* -0.06* 1.00 
         [13]OwnCon -0.12* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* -0.23* -0.05* -0.05* -0.12* 0.00 -0.02 0.54* 0.10* 1.00 
        [14]Big4 -0.05* 0.21* 0.21* 0.21* -0.07* 0.20* -0.02 -0.07* 0.02 0.09* 0.04* 0.15* 0.13* 1.00 
       [15]IFRS -0.08* 0.35* 0.35* 0.34* 0.11* 0.55* 0.39* -0.01 0.15* 0.02 -0.43* 0.14* -0.14* -0.01 1.00 
      [16]Duality 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14* -0.03* 0.07* 0.06* -0.01 0.05* 0.01 -0.02 -0.06* -0.04* 0.06* 1.00 
     [17]Bsize -0.05* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* -0.18* 0.12* -0.06* -0.12* 0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.14* 0.04* 0.15* -0.09* -0.11* 1.00 
    [18]Bmeet 0.01 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.04* 0.20* 0.14* 0.03* 0.15* 0.01 -0.16* 0.05* -0.09* 0.04* 0.28* -0.01 -0.06* 1.00 
   [19]Indr -0.02 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.06* 0.01 0.04* 0.00 -0.08* 0.04* -0.04* 0.02 0.16* 0.05* -0.21* 0.08* 1.00 
  [20]Supsize -0.03* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* -0.24* 0.11* -0.08* -0.07* -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.08* 0.07* 0.09* -0.07* -0.10* 0.34* -0.05* -0.10* 1.00 
 
[21]Smeet -0.05* 0.18* 0.18* 0.17* 0.02 0.28* 0.17* 0.00 0.11* -0.01 -0.23* 0.08* -0.06* 0.03* 0.39* 0.01 -0.04* 0.38* 0.09* 0.01 1.00 
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Table 3. Analyst Coverage and Modified Audit Opinions 
This table presents the results of the Logit regression model: 
  
k
k kktiti
ControloverCMAO
21,10,

 
The dependent variable MAO equals 1 if modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, and 0 otherwise. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued 
for the firm. Analyst denotes the number of financial analysts following the firm. Broker is the number of brokers house that issue analyst reports on the firms. 
Other variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period covers 2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level significance respectively. 
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  Regression I Regression II Regression III 
Report -0.0793 -2.62 *** 
   
  
 Analyst 
   
-0.1527 -3.76 ***   
 Broker 
      
-0.1765 -4.12 *** 
Size -0.4560 -5.75 *** -0.4376 -5.55 *** -0.4316 -5.47 *** 
Growth -0.0102 -1.19 
 
-0.0104 -1.22 
 
-0.0104 -1.23 
 ST 1.8429 18.57 *** 1.8200 18.39 *** 1.8145 18.36 *** 
SEOF -1.8620 -3.3 *** -1.8750 -3.32 *** -1.8708 -3.32 *** 
Foreign 0.0197 0.03 
 
0.0798 0.13 
 
0.0958 0.15 
 RSR -0.7501 -2.29 ** -0.6389 -1.94 * -0.6120 -1.85 * 
Fund -6.6057 -2.5 ** -5.5024 -2.2 ** -5.1865 -2.12 ** 
OwnCon -2.8091 -5.83 *** -2.8212 -5.85 *** -2.8253 -5.86 *** 
Big4 0.1313 0.6 
 
0.1653 0.75 
 
0.1763 0.8 
 IFRS 0.4234 2.32 ** 0.4704 2.56 ** 0.4816 2.62 *** 
Duality -0.0293 -0.26 
 
-0.0224 -0.2 
 
-0.0226 -0.2 
 Bsize -0.0173 -0.73 
 
-0.0155 -0.65 
 
-0.0147 -0.62 
 Bmeet 0.0344 3 *** 0.0341 2.96 *** 0.0339 2.94 *** 
Indr -1.3417 -1.57 
 
-1.3126 -1.53 
 
-1.3049 -1.53 
 Supsize 0.0535 1.54 
 
0.0530 1.52 
 
0.0527 1.51 
 Smeet -0.0249 -0.99 
 
-0.0260 -1.03 
 
-0.0263 -1.04 
 Constant 4.3028 3.56 *** 4.0126 3.33 *** 3.9217 3.26 *** 
Region effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.229 
  
0.2313 
  
0.232 
 N   9844     9844     9844   
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Table 4. Non-State-Owned Enterprises, Analyst Coverage and Modified Audit Opinion 
 
This table presents the results of the Logit model: 
   
k
k kktititititi
ControlNSOEoverCNSOEoverCMAO
1 31,1,31,21,10,
   
The dependent variable MAO equals 1 if modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, 0 otherwise. Coverage denotes the following three 
measures of analyst coverage. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst denotes the number of financial analysts 
following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports on the firms. NSOE equals 1 if the firm is non-state-owned 
enterprise and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 
5%, and 1% level significance respectively. 
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  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
        Cover=Report Cover=Analyst Cover=Broker 
Cover 
   
-0.0401 -1.45 
 
-0.0871 -2.05 ** -0.0324 -1.37 
 NSOE 0.3600 3.95 *** 0.4851 4.82 *** 0.5063 5.07 *** 0.5342 5.43 *** 
Cover×NSOE 
  
-0.1225 -1.93 * -0.1837 -2.22 ** -0.2417 -3.12 *** 
Size -0.4933 -6.46 *** -0.4321 -5.44 *** -0.4152 -5.24 *** -0.4310 -5.42 *** 
Growth -0.0102 -1.14 
 
-0.0106 -1.23 
 
-0.0109 -1.27 
 
-0.0107 -1.25 
 ST 1.8991 19.14 *** 1.8280 18.24 *** 1.8068 18.14 *** 1.8092 18.14 *** 
SEOF -1.9009 -3.34 *** -1.8812 -3.31 *** -1.8914 -3.33 *** -1.8871 -3.32 *** 
Foreign -0.3295 -0.53 
 
-0.1333 -0.21 
 
-0.0889 -0.14 
 
-0.0949 -0.15 
 RSR -1.2195 -3.93 *** -0.7864 -2.31 ** -0.6904 -2.03 ** -0.7104 -2.09 ** 
Fund -11.7532 -3.97 *** -7.0973 -2.65 *** -6.1124 -2.38 ** -7.0725 -2.67 *** 
OwnCon -2.2993 -4.67 *** -2.3396 -4.73 *** -2.3367 -4.72 *** -2.3615 -4.77 *** 
Big4 0.0291 0.13 
 
0.1225 0.56 
 
0.1541 0.7 
 
0.1212 0.55 
 IFRS 0.2196 1.21 
 
0.3760 2.02 ** 0.4186 2.24 ** 0.4149 2.23 ** 
Duality -0.0717 -0.63 
 
-0.0433 -0.38 
 
-0.0380 -0.33 
 
-0.0379 -0.33 
 Bsize -0.0185 -0.78 
 
-0.0136 -0.57 
 
-0.0115 -0.48 
 
-0.0133 -0.56 
 Bmeet 0.0328 2.83 *** 0.0315 2.69 *** 0.0310 2.62 *** 0.0304 2.58 *** 
Indr -1.6269 -1.89 * -1.6445 -1.92 * -1.6279 -1.9 * -1.6633 -1.94 * 
Supsize 0.0707 2.02 ** 0.0679 1.92 * 0.0681 1.93 * 0.0672 1.91 * 
Smeet -0.0233 -0.92 
 
-0.0242 -0.95 
 
-0.0252 -0.99 
 
-0.0247 -0.97 
 Constant 4.9229 4.24 *** 3.8706 3.19 *** 3.5950 2.97 *** 3.8268 3.15 *** 
Region effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R
2
 0.2278 
  
0.2343 
  
0.2368 
  
0.2363 
 N   9844     9844     9844     9844   
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Table 5. Delisting Risks, Analyst Coverage and Modified Audit Opinion 
This table presents the results of the Logit model: 
   
k
k kktititititi
ControlSToverCSToverCMAO
1 31,1,31,21,10,
  
The dependent variable MAO equals 1 if modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, 0 otherwise. Coverage denotes the following 
three measures of analyst coverage. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst denotes the number of 
financial analysts following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports on the firms. ST is a dummy 
variable assigned to 1 if a listed firm experiences consecutive two-year or longer loss and labelled as “special treatment” by the 
regulatory commission to indicate the delisting risk; and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample 
period covers 2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level significance respectively. 
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  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
        Cover=Report Cover=Analyst Cover=Broker 
Cover 
   
-0.0808 -2.7 *** -0.1550 -3.87 *** -0.1782 -4.24 *** 
ST 1.8991 19.14 *** 1.9211 18.15 *** 1.8924 17.81 *** 1.8934 17.84 *** 
Cover × ST 
  
-0.3674 -2.18 ** -0.3930 -1.9 * -0.4588 -2.18 ** 
Size -0.4933 -6.46 *** -0.4071 -5.09 *** -0.3894 -4.89 *** -0.3818 -4.79 *** 
Growth -0.0102 -1.14 
 
-0.0112 -1.29 
 
-0.0113 -1.32 
 
-0.0114 -1.32 
 NSOE 0.3600 3.95 *** 0.3846 4.21 *** 0.3977 4.36 *** 0.4005 4.4 *** 
SEOF -1.9009 -3.34 *** -1.8345 -3.24 *** -1.8493 -3.27 *** -1.8459 -3.27 *** 
Foreign -0.3295 -0.53 
 
-0.1620 -0.26 
 
-0.1167 -0.18 
 
-0.1017 -0.16 
 RSR -1.2195 -3.93 *** -0.9007 -2.73 *** -0.7863 -2.37 ** -0.7576 -2.28 ** 
Fund -11.7532 -3.97 *** -6.9846 -2.57 *** -5.8760 -2.27 ** -5.5824 -2.2 ** 
OwnCon -2.2993 -4.67 *** -2.2725 -4.61 *** -2.2712 -4.6 *** -2.2708 -4.59 *** 
Big4 0.0291 0.13 
 
0.1485 0.68 
 
0.1816 0.83 
 
0.1921 0.88 
 IFRS 0.2196 1.21 
 
0.3381 1.83 * 0.3897 2.09 ** 0.4036 2.17 ** 
Duality -0.0717 -0.63 
 
-0.0548 -0.48 
 
-0.0485 -0.42 
 
-0.0483 -0.42 
 Bsize -0.0185 -0.78 
 
-0.0104 -0.44 
 
-0.0085 -0.36 
 
-0.0074 -0.31 
 Bmeet 0.0328 2.83 *** 0.0348 2.95 *** 0.0343 2.88 *** 0.0339 2.86 *** 
Indr -1.6269 -1.89 * -1.5841 -1.84 * -1.5531 -1.81 * -1.5516 -1.81 * 
Supsize 0.0707 2.02 ** 0.0677 1.92 * 0.0681 1.93 * 0.0678 1.92 * 
Smeet -0.0233 -0.92 
 
-0.0254 -1 
 
-0.0265 -1.05 
 
-0.0269 -1.06 
 Constant 4.9229 4.24 *** 3.5478 2.9 *** 3.2556 2.67 *** 3.1418 2.57 *** 
Region effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R
2
 0.2278 
  
0.2332 
  
0.2355 
  
0.2364 
 N   9844     9844     9844     9844   
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Table 6. Exogenous variations from index inclusion. 
The table repots the results of two-stage least squares regressions with Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 index inclusion dummy as the 
instrumental variable. The index is compiled by the China Securities Index Company since April 8, 2005, and therefore the sample 
period is from 2005 to 2009. Index Inclusion is set to one if a firm is included in the index and zero otherwise. Predicted Report is the 
estimated number of analyst reports in the first stage. Other control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 
2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level significance respectively. 
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  Dependent Variable 
 
Report   Modified Audit Opinion   
 
First Stage 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
All Firms 
 
NSOE=1 
 
NSOE=0 
 Index Inclusion 4.5727 9.09 *** 
      Predicted Report 
   
-0.1651 -2.47 ** 0.0298 0.98 
 Size 4.9311 23.43 *** 0.3611 1.11 
 
-0.5139 -2.74 *** 
Growth -0.1579 -6.95 *** -0.0299 -2.66 *** 0.0175 2.12 ** 
NSOE 0.2880 1.05 
 
1.1605 9.58 *** 1.1850 12.15 *** 
SEOF -0.5496 -0.9  -0.7918 -2.63 *** -0.2020 -1.13  
Foreign 2.2506 1.37  -1.2890 -1.69 * -0.5338 -0.65  
RSR 12.7612 17.31 *** 1.3184 1.23 
 
-0.3546 -0.98  
Fund 60.1739 23.18 *** 7.9210 1.56 
 
-3.2066 -1.73 * 
OwnCon -0.0423 -0.03 
 
-1.8543 -3.13 *** -1.3561 -3.58 *** 
Big4 8.2820 10.07 *** 0.9209 1.2 
 
-0.1479 -0.51  
IFRS -5.2769 -14.76 *** 0.6961 1.74 * 0.2187 1.15  
Duality 0.9001 3.32 *** -0.0358 -0.32 
 
0.0891 0.89  
Bsize 0.6087 7.72 *** 0.1294 2.18 ** -0.0055 -0.21  
Bmeet -0.0921 -2.23 ** -0.0131 -0.68 
 
0.0046 0.44  
Indr 6.4419 2.49 ** 2.1792 1.86 * 1.0485 1.48  
Supsize 0.0612 0.59 
 
0.0657 1.31  0.0130 0.52  
Smeet 0.2382 3.14 *** 0.0660 1.6  -0.0077 -0.34  
Constant -69.7042 -10.93 *** -9.3779 -1.56  4.9658 1.65 * 
Region effect 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Industry effect 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Year effect 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Obs.   9282 
  
3796 
  
5445   
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Table 7. Robustness checks: residual analyst coverage  
 
The table repots the results of the ordinary least squares regression that generates residual analyst 
coverage in Regression I and the results of the impact of residual analyst coverage on the incidence of 
modified audit opinions in Regression II. Residual coverage is the residuals from a regression of the 
number of analyst reports on firm size and fund ownership ratio. Other control variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
significance respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                Regression I   Regression II 
  
Dependent Variable: 
Report 
Dependent Variable: 
MAO 
Resi_Report 
  
  -0.0401 -1.45 
 NSOE 
  
  0.4851 4.82 *** 
Resi_Report×NSOE 
  
  -0.1225 -1.93 ** 
Size 3.75 41.39 *** -0.5826 -4.94 *** 
Growth 
   
-0.0106 -1.23 
 ST 
   
1.8280 18.24 *** 
SEOF 
   
-1.8812 -3.31 *** 
Foreign 
   
-0.1333 -0.21 
 RSR 
   
-0.7864 -2.31 ** 
Fund 62.21 39.47 *** -9.5935 -3.49 *** 
OwnCon 
  
  -2.3396 -4.73 *** 
Big4 
  
  0.1225 0.56 
 IFRS 
  
  0.3760 2.02 ** 
Duality 
  
  -0.0433 -0.38  
Bsize 
  
  -0.0136 -0.57  
Bmeet 
  
  0.0315 2.69 *** 
Indr 
  
  -1.6445 -1.92 * 
Supsize 
  
  0.0679 1.92 * 
Smeet 
  
  -0.0242 -0.95 
 Constant 
  
  5.8141 3.58 *** 
Region effect 
 
Yes   
 
Yes  
Industry effect 
 
Yes   
 
Yes  
Year effect 
 
Yes   
 
Yes  
R
2 
(I) & Pseudo R
2
(II) 
 
0.3928   
 
0.2343  
Obs.   9844     9844  
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Table 8. Firm Performance, Analyst Coverage and Modified Audit Opinion 
This table presents the results of the Logit model: 
   
k
k kktititititi
ControlUndepoverCUndepCoverMAO
1 31,1,31,21,10,
  
The dependent variable MAO equals 1 if modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, 0 otherwise. Coverage denotes the following 
three measures of analyst coverage. Report denotes the number of analyst reports issued for the firm. Analyst denotes the number of 
financial analysts following the firm; Broker is the number of brokerage house that issue analyst reports on the firms. Undep is a 
dummy variable of underperformance assigned to 1 if the ROA (return on asset) of a listed firm is below the median value of the the 
firms in the same industry in the same year, and 0therwise. The industry are classified by using the first two digits of the GICS code. 
Other control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
significance respectively. 
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  Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
        Cover=Report Cover=Analyst Cover=Broker 
Cover 
   
-0.0460 -2.2 ** -0.1054 -3.16 *** -0.1269 -3.42 *** 
Undpe 1.2905 12.83 *** 1.3289 12.43 *** 1.3014 12.05 *** 1.2902 11.92 *** 
Cover × Undpe 
  
-0.0970 -2.6 *** -0.1317 -2.44 ** -0.1341 -2.3 ** 
Size -0.8064 -10.19 *** -0.7276 -10.28 *** -0.7064 -9.97 *** -0.7008 -9.89 *** 
Growth -0.0013 -0.12 
 
-0.0030 -0.38 
 
-0.0034 -0.44 
 
-0.0034 -0.44 
 NSOE 0.4782 5.33 *** 0.4880 5.58 *** 0.4966 5.67 *** 0.4985 5.7 *** 
SEOF -1.6521 -2.82 *** -1.6538 -2.8 *** -1.6642 -2.82 *** -1.6657 -2.82 *** 
Foreign -0.5680 -0.95 
 
-0.5211 -0.73 
 
-0.4928 -0.69 
 
-0.4882 -0.68 
 RSR -1.1139 -3.47 *** -0.7565 -2.31 ** -0.6184 -1.87 * -0.5867 -1.77 * 
Fund -8.7368 -2.92 *** -4.5204 -2.02 ** -3.5183 -1.61 
 
-3.2556 -1.5 
 OwnCon -2.4972 -5.07 *** -2.5675 -5.64 *** -2.5939 -5.68 *** -2.6049 -5.71 *** 
Big4 0.1009 0.42 
 
0.2037 0.89 
 
0.2337 1.02 
 
0.2424 1.06 
 IFRS 0.5817 3.1 *** 0.7428 4 *** 0.8080 4.32 *** 0.8224 4.39 *** 
Duality 0.1032 0.97 
 
0.1104 1.03 
 
0.1178 1.1 
 
0.1181 1.1 
 Bsize -0.0327 -1.44 
 
-0.0251 -1.11 
 
-0.0231 -1.02 
 
-0.0224 -0.98 
 Bmeet 0.0267 2.24 ** 0.0279 2.31 ** 0.0277 2.28 ** 0.0275 2.27 ** 
Indr -1.4053 -1.81 * -1.3334 -1.81 * -1.3082 -1.78 * -1.3057 -1.77 * 
Supsize 0.0646 1.88 * 0.0653 2 ** 0.0653 1.99 ** 0.0651 1.99 ** 
Smeet -0.0191 -0.76 
 
-0.0204 -0.79 
 
-0.0218 -0.84 
 
-0.0221 -0.85 
 Constant 8.5433 7.18 *** 7.2270 6.56 *** 6.8965 6.25 *** 6.8163 6.18 *** 
Region effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R
2
 0.1987 
  
0.2037 
  
0.2062 
  
0.2069 
 N   9844     9844     9844     9844   
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Table 9. Analyst Recommendation and Modified Audit Opinion 
 
Panel A  
 
This panel shows the descriptive statistics of the grade of the analyst recommendation. Grade 1-5 
represent the number of analyst reports received by each firm recommending strong buy (1), buy (2), 
hold (3), sell (4) and strong sell (5). Grade 0 denotes the number of reports without standard 
recommendation. R_Grade 0-5 denote the ratio of recommendation in each grade relative to the total 
number of reports received by each firm. 
 
 
  Mean Std. 25% Median 75% Obs 
Grade1 2.6446 5.4162 0 1 3 4935 
Grade2 5.8640 10.0021 0 2 7 4935 
Grade3 2.4148 3.6879 0 1 3 4935 
Grade4 0.0501 0.2711 0 0 0 4935 
Grade5 0.1086 0.4785 0 0 0 4935 
Grade0 0.0582 0.6759 0 0 0 4935 
Grade 1-5 11.0821 16.4562 2 5 13 4935 
Grade 0-5 11.1402 16.5138 2 5 14 4935 
R_Grade1 0.1782 0.2460 0 0.0357 0.3022 4926 
R_Grade2 0.4094 0.3385 0 0.4409 0.6667 4926 
R_Grade3 0.3753 0.3775 0 0.2500 0.6667 4926 
R_Grade4 0.0141 0.0977 0 0 0 4926 
R_Grade5 0.0230 0.1266 0 0 0 4926 
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Panel B.  
 
This panel shows the relation between analyst recommendation and the incidence of MAOs. The 
dependent variable MAO equals 1 if modified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Grade 1-5 represent the number of analyst reports received by each firm recommending strong buy 
(1), buy (2), hold (3), sell (4) and strong sell (5). Grade 0 denotes the number of reports with no 
standard recommendation. R_Grade 1-5 denote the ratio of recommendation in each grade relative to 
the total number of reports received by each firm. The industry is classified by using the first two 
digits of the GICS code. Other control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 
2003 to 2009. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level significance respectively. 
 
  Regression I   Regression II 
Grade1 -0.0112 -0.06 
    Grade2 -0.3934 -2.8 *** 
   Grade3 -0.2552 -1.55 
 
-0.2819 -1.69 * 
Grade4 1.0081 2.79 *** 
   Grade5 -0.1377 -0.31  
   Grade0 -0.2137 -0.38  
   Grade1+2 
   
-0.3825 -3.02 *** 
Grade4+5 
   
0.4697 1.65 * 
Size -0.3151 -2.12 ** -0.2969 -2.01 ** 
Growth -0.0010 -0.04  -0.0014 -0.05  
NSOE 0.2505 1.21  0.2484 1.2  
ST 1.7561 7.17 *** 1.7664 7.24 *** 
SEOF -2.1652 -2.08 ** -2.1594 -2.09 ** 
Foreign -6.2651 -2.12 ** -6.0292 -2.04 ** 
RSR -0.5901 -0.97  -0.5780 -0.96  
Fund -2.4787 -1.06  -2.0238 -0.92  
OwnCon -1.6890 -1.72 * -1.6954 -1.74 * 
Big4 -0.9070 -1.63  -0.9564 -1.72 * 
IFRS 0.0967 0.32  0.0845 0.27  
Duality -0.0398 -0.17  -0.0282 -0.12  
Bsize 0.0684 1.47  0.0679 1.46  
Bmeet 0.0466 2.4 ** 0.0482 2.44 ** 
Indr -0.9807 -0.48  -0.8294 -0.41  
Supsize -0.0369 -0.53  -0.0336 -0.48  
Smeet -0.0206 -0.4  -0.0209 -0.41  
Constant 1.7245 0.74  1.4659 0.63  
Region effect Yes 
 
 Yes  
Industry effect Yes 
 
 Yes  
Year effect Yes 
 
 Yes  
Psedo R2 
 
0.1826 
 
 0.1807  
N   4935    4935  
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Focusing on the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers &
Lybrand in 1998, we document increased audit quality (measured
by earnings quality of the clients) for the merged ﬁrm and other
big-X auditors (The big-X auditors are Ernst & Young, Deloitte,
KPMG and Arthur Anderson.) during the post-merger period
because: (1) controlling for economic conditions, clients of big-X
auditors have lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals and
(2) the value relevance of earnings has signiﬁcantly increased. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd evidence that in the post-merger period, there is
a signiﬁcant increase in audit fees for PricewaterhouseCoopers and
other big-X client ﬁrms, which suggests that the effect of collec-
tively enhanced market power of big-X auditors (which tends to
increase audit fees) dominates the effect of cost savings from the
merger (which tends to lower audit fees). The results have implica-
tions for regulators and policy makers.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The accounting literature has paid considerable attention to the consequences of the mergers
between former ‘‘big-eight’’ auditors over the past three decades (Wootton et al., 1994; Pong, 1999;
Wolk et al., 2001), addressing their direct impacts on industry concentration. Prior literature has been
less salient on the association between auditor mergers and audit quality, however. On the one hand,
after merging, big-X auditors1 have collectively gained market power. According to the Financial Times
(September 19, 1997, p. 13): ‘‘Not only is this (merger) undesirable on competitive grounds; it will also
0278-4254/$ - see front matter  2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2011.08.002
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 69 154008839.
E-mail address: y.jia@fs.de (Y. Jia).
1 ‘‘Big-X’’ auditors refer to the ‘‘top-tier’’ auditors. In particular, Big-8 (1985–1989), Big-6 (1990–1997), Big-5 (1998–2002) and
Big-4 (after 2002).
J. Account. Public Policy 31 (2012) 69–85
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
J. Account. Public Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jaccpubpol
allow the merged ﬁrm to exercise an unhealthy degree of inﬂuence over the standards and practices of
the profession as a whole.’’ On the other hand, when two auditors merge, they can cut down their costs
by combining their specialists and complementary locations (Sullivan, 2002), leading to higher operating
efﬁciency and lower costs in providing auditing services, which might help to improve audit quality. It is
an intriguing question to examine whether mergers between auditors positively or negatively affect
audit quality. Because it is difﬁcult to measure audit quality directly (e.g., through the evaluation of going
concern opinion), instead, we indirectly test audit quality in terms of the earnings quality of auditees
(e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Callaway Dee et al., 2006; Bryan et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2006). Following
prior literature (Becker et al., 1998; Reynolds and Francis, 2000; Francis et al., 2004; Ball and Shivakumar,
2005; Jenkins et al., 2006), absolute discretionary accruals and value relevance are used as measures of
earnings quality in our paper.
In this study, we focus on the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in 1998
because this was the most recent merger between top-tier auditors in recent decades. We believe that
the folding of ArthurAnderson intoDeloitte& Touche in 2002 is different fromanypreviousmerger, as it
is unlikely thatArthurAndersoncouldhave remainedas a stand-aloneﬁrmafter the Enron scandal. After
the dissolution of Arthur Anderson in 2002, themajority of its clients in theUKwere subsumed intoDel-
oitte & Touche, while the big-4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte and KPMG) have
remained as the dominant auditorsworldwide since then. Therefore, in this paper,we narrowour atten-
tion to the impact of themerger between PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand on the audit-service
market by comparing (1) the earnings quality of auditees in theUK and (2) audit fees paid by clients dur-
ing the three-year periods before and after the merger in 1998. The evidencemay have implications for
regulators facing the possibility of a future scenario inwhich the current ‘‘big-4’’merge into a ‘‘big-3,’’ as
the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger provides an event through which the consequences of auditor
mergers on audit pricing and audit quality can be scrutinized.
Our sample consists of publicly listed ﬁrms audited by big-X and non-big-X audit ﬁrms in the UK
between 1995 and 2001, except for the event year 1998. The primary reason to use UK data is that UK
public companies have long been required by the Companies Act 1967 to disclose audit-fee informa-
tion. We conduct two main tests to compare earnings quality, namely, absolute discretionary accruals
and the value relevance of earnings. We also examine audit-fee changes from the pre-merger to the
post-merger period. Furthermore, to show that the changes to audit quality and audit fees are not
the result of regulatory changes, we use the non-big-X auditors as a reference group. The ﬁnal sample
consists of 3677 observations for absolute discretionary accrual tests and value relevance tests and
5820 observations for audit fee tests.
Compared with previous studies that examine the effects of auditor mergers on audit pricing (e.g.,
McMeeking, 2007), our contribution is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the ﬁrst
empirical evidence on the association between auditor mergers and audit quality (measured by earn-
ings quality of clients): in the post-merger period, absolute discretionary accruals of big-X client ﬁrms
decreased compared with non-big-X client ﬁrms, indicating less earnings management; in the post-
merger period, earnings of big-X clients are more related to stock-market returns, indicating that earn-
ings quality has improved in this period. The results may reﬂect enhanced auditor independence and
auditors’ increasing ability to constrain the earnings management of their clients. Second, we use the
non-big-X auditors (second tier auditors) as a control group, which mitigates the concern that our
ﬁndings are driven by secular trends or changes to regulatory provisions during the period under con-
sideration. In particular, we show an increase in audit fees for the big-X clients after their auditors
merged, suggesting that the merger results in a net increase in the price paid by clients to purchase
audit services. This implies that the cost savings from a merger (which tends to lower costs of audit
services) is dominated by enhanced market power of auditors (which tends to increase fees). In con-
trast, the earnings quality of the clients of non-big-X auditors does not change from the pre-merger to
the post-merger period, and there is no evidence of increased audit fees charged by this group of audi-
tors in the post-merger period.
Our results are of interest to regulators and policy makers. Regulators may cautiously assess the
implication of future consolidation of the auditing industry in the UK. The potential consequence is
that, on the one hand, the audit fee is likely to increase if the number of major auditors decreases from
‘‘N’’ to ‘‘N  1’’; on the other hand, audit quality might improve as a result of enhanced auditor inde-
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pendence. Our ﬁndings have implications for auditors (especially the current ‘‘big-four’’) because if
any one of them is contemplating a merger, in addition to convincing regulators that the merged ﬁrm
can provide service of higher quality, it can choose to share some of the merger-induced cost savings
with clients in the form of lower audit fees to alleviate the regulatory concerns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background to the study. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the research methodology and sample selection while Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. The PricewaterhouseCoopers merger
In 1997, the potential mergers between Ernst & Young and KPMG and Price Waterhouse and
Coopers & Lybrand attracted the attention of competition authorities across the Atlantic: the European
Commission and the US Department of Justice. However, on February 13, 1998, Ernst &Young and
KPMG withdrew their intention to merge, partly because the combined ﬁrm would dominate the
auditing industry worldwide. This cleared the road for the proposed merger between Price Water-
house and Coopers & Lybrand: both the US Department of Justice and European Commission approved
the merger because there was ‘‘no conclusive proof that the merger would create or strengthen a
position of collective dominance’’ and ‘‘ﬁve vigorous competitors would remain in the marketplace’’
(Accountancy, June 1998). The PricewaterhouseCoopers merger created the largest accounting ﬁrm
in history, with more than 40,000 employees in 1100 ofﬁces worldwide. Its revenue in 1998 was over
USD 13 billion. Fig. 1 shows the inﬂuence of the merger on the distribution of their clients. The merged
ﬁrm retains approximately 56% of the clients of Coopers & Lybrand and approximately 59% of the cli-
ents of Price Waterhouse. According to McMeeking et al. (2007), after the merger, the audit concen-
tration ratio (CR4), measured by the number of clients in the UK, had risen from 0.69 in 1998 to
0.79 in 1999, and the Herﬁndahl index increased from 0.15 in 1998 to 0.21 in 1999. Measured by audit
fees, the concentration ratio (CR4) increased from 0.82 in 1998 to 0.88 in 1999, and the Herﬁndahl
Index rose from 0.21 in 1998 to 0.28 in 1999.2
Client firms of Coopers & Lybrand
56%
8%
7%
29%
PwC
Other big X
Non big X
Missing
Client firms of Price Waterhouse
59%
5%
3%
33%PwC
Other big X
Non big X
Missing
Fig. 1. The distribution of client ﬁrms of Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse after the 1998 merger.
2 The concentration ratio is deﬁned as CRn ¼
Pn
i¼1Xi and the Herﬁndahl index as HI ¼
Pn
1X
2
i where n is the number of ﬁrms and
Xi is the size of audit ﬁrm i as a percentage of the size of the market.
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We provide some descriptive statistics on audit fees and client size (measured by the logarithm of
assets) for PriceWaterhouseCoopers (hereafter PWC), non-PWC big-X auditors and non-big-X auditors.
Furthermore, we compare the mean of the audit fees and client sizes for these three groups of auditors
between the pre-merger and post-merger periods. The results are presented in Table 1.
First, for PWC clients, the mean of the audit fees increased from the pre-merger period to the post-
merger period, and the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (p < 0.0001). The mean client size also
increased from the pre-merger to the post-merger period, and the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level (p = 0.0082). Overall, the results indicate that after the merger, PWC gained increasing market
power over their clients, and thus, they retained large clients and charged a higher fee to these clients.
We also observe a similar change for non-PWC big-X clients. For example, they charged a higher fee
to their clients in the post-merger period, and the average client size increased in the post-merger
period (both differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level). Furthermore, the number of clients of non-
Table 1
The inﬂuence of the PWC merger on audit fees and client size for PWC, non-PWC big-X, and non-big-X clients. Logfee is the audit
fee in logarithmic terms; client_size is measured by the log of the total assets; logfee_diff is the logfee difference before and after the
merger; client_size_diff is the client_size difference before and after the merger. The P-values for the signiﬁcant difference (p-value <
10%) are highlighted in bold.
PWC client ﬁrms
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Before the merger
Logfee 2.000 1.046 0.647 0.699 0.314 1.093 860
client_size 0.097 1.572 2.158 2.060 2.711 4.710 956
Panel B: After the merger
logfee 1.824 0.896 0.459 0.523 0.097 1.104 777
client_size 0.467 1.665 2.262 2.138 2.802 4.346 799
Mean Std Dev Std Error t-Value p-Value
Panel C: t-Test on client-size and audit-fee differences
logfee_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.188 0.245 0.132 6.560 <.0001
client_size_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.104 0.182 0.027 2.650 0.0082
Non-PWC big-X client ﬁrms
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Before the merger
logfee 2.000 1.046 0.699 0.721 0.398 0.973 1453
client_size 0.268 1.504 2.037 1.931 2.514 4.710 1581
Panel B after the merger
logfee 1.886 0.939 0.536 0.598 0.215 1.107 2326
client_size 1.000 1.596 2.168 2.077 2.688 5.186 2405
Mean Std Dev Std Error t-Value p-Value
Panel C: t-Test on client-size and audit-fee differences
logfee_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.125 0.165 0.086 6.200 <.0001
client_size_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.084 0.1389 0.0298 3.03 0.0025
Non-big-X client ﬁrms
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Before the merger
logfee 2.000 1.398 1.075 1.097 0.824 0.591 619
client_size 0.252 1.127 1.540 1.520 1.904 3.916 660
Panel B: After the merger
logfee 2.000 1.347 1.048 1.086 0.796 0.799 562
client_size 0.721 1.142 1.565 1.553 1.967 4.249 592
Mean Std Dev Std Error t-Value p-Value
Panel C: t-Test on client-size and audit-fee differences
logfee_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.027 0.079 0.026 0.990 0.321
client_size_diff (before  after) Pooled 0.0256 0.0962 0.045 0.71 0.4771
72 R. Ding, Y. Jia / J. Account. Public Policy 31 (2012) 69–85
PWC big-X auditors increased in the post-merger period. Considering the fact that the collective mar-
ket share of big-X and non-big-X auditors remained stable over the period 1995–2001, it is likely that
some of the former clients of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand switched to non-PWC big-X
auditors after the merger. Finally, we compare the audit fees and client size of non-big-X auditors
between the pre-merger and post-merger periods. The differences in both audit fees and client size
are insigniﬁcant at the conventional level. The results suggest that the impact of the PWC merger ex-
tended beyond the merged auditor because after the merger, PWC as well as other big-X auditors
gained more market power, which enabled them to charge higher fees to their clients. However,
the impact of the PWC merger on non-big-X auditors seems to be insigniﬁcant.
2.2. Audit size and audit quality
As an important monitoring and insurance mechanism to mitigate the agency problem of public
corporations, external auditing is expected to reduce noise and bias in ﬁnancial statements (Kinney
and Martin, 1994). Therefore, auditing plays a central role in constraining opportunistic earnings man-
agement in publicly listed companies. Audit quality is deﬁned as the joint probability that an auditor
will (1) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system and (2) report the breach (DeAngelo, 1981).
The former refers to the auditor’s capability, and the latter refers to the auditor’s independence. While
the technical capability of the auditor is usually assumed to be constant across different auditors
regardless of their size, audit quality is a function of the auditor’s independence. We propose that
audit quality is expected to increase after an auditing ﬁrm merger, as larger auditors are more likely
to be independent. We elaborate our proposition according to the following dimensions.
2.2.1. Client-speciﬁc quasi-rents
Although audit technology is characterized by signiﬁcant client-speciﬁc start-up costs, DeAngelo
(1981) argues that larger auditors (measured by the number of clients) have reduced the incentive
to ‘‘cheat’’ to retain any individual client because auditors lose quasi-rents from all other clients when
lower-than-promised audit quality is detected and disclosed. Apparently, large auditors have more to
lose than their smaller competitors under such circumstances. It follows logically that the merged ﬁrm
(PWC) with an enlarged client base has more incentive to supply audit services of higher quality.
2.2.2. Auditor’s liability
Dye (1993) shows that the value of an audit consists of two components: an ‘‘informational’’ com-
ponent, which refers to the value of an audit to improving resource-allocation decisions, and a ‘‘liabil-
ity’’ component, which represents the option value of the claim ﬁnancial statement users have on the
auditor in the event of an ‘‘audit failure.’’ For auditors, their largest liability derives from clients who
subsequently experience ﬁnancial distress because investors of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms regard the
auditor as an associated party that has ‘‘deeper pockets’’ to compensate for their loss.3 For instance,
Jones and Raghunandan (1998) show that top-tier auditors were less likely to serve as independent audi-
tors for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and high-tech ﬁrms in 1994 relative to 1987 because these auditors
tried to reduce their exposure to litigation by avoiding more risky clients. Due to the fact that large audi-
tors have more exposure to litigation risk, merged (large) auditors are better motivated to deliver audit
services of higher quality to prevent potentially substantial losses arising from ‘‘audit failure.’’
2.2.3. The inﬂuence of important clients
Unlike their smaller rivals, who sometimes heavily depend on a dozen ‘‘important clients,’’4 large
auditors with a more diversiﬁed customer base are less likely to compromise when facing pressure from
3 Focusing on the ‘‘Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995’’ in the US, Geiger et al. (2006) conclude that the Reform Act largely
provided litigation relief to the Big-6 auditing ﬁrms in the US, which is consistent with the argument that the larger auditing ﬁrms
have more litigation exposure than their smaller competitors.
4 ‘‘When one or a few large clients supply a signiﬁcant portion of the total fees of a public accounting ﬁrm, the ﬁrm will have
great difﬁculty maintaining independence,’’ Improving the Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations and Their Auditors
(Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government Affairs: United States Senate, 1977).
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individual clients, partly because large auditors have enhanced negotiation power over their clients. Fur-
thermore, a merger, which substantially increases the size of an auditor, creates synergies by effectively
combining the resources of different ﬁrms, thus enabling the merged ﬁrm to supply even more compre-
hensive service to clients. Thus, resource reallocation is less likely to be a problem for large auditors in
the event of client switching. Overall, the inﬂuence of individual clients is perceived to be a decreasing
function of auditor size, indicating that large auditors are less likely to sacriﬁce audit quality when under
pressure from clients.
2.2.4. Auditor wealth
It is expected that an auditor’s wealth is positively associated with its reputation. This wealth will
lose value in the case of audit failure. Dye (1993) posits that wealthier auditors suffer more from
‘‘scandal’’ and litigation risk and thus have greater incentive to supply high-quality service to protect
their reputations and wealth. Furthermore, wealthy auditors are more capable of attracting the best
professionals in the industry and committing more resources to training and research, enabling them
to provide service at a higher level.
Using client earnings quality to reﬂect audit quality, empirical studies have provided supporting
evidence for DeAngelo’s theoretical premise that audit quality is positively correlated with auditor
size. Teoh and Wong (1993) report that earnings response coefﬁcients (ERC) of the big-6 auditors
are higher than those of non-big-6 auditors. Similarly, Becker et al. (1998) examine the discretionary
accruals and conﬁrm that earnings quality is negatively related to the presence of non-big-5 auditors.
Following the extant literature, we use the earnings quality of clients to reﬂect audit quality. It is
expected that the merger that created PWC led to increased audit quality because the merged ﬁrm
(with strengthened auditor independence) is more capable of constraining its clients from opportunis-
tic earnings management. Furthermore, the results in Table 1 indicate that the effects of the PWCmer-
ger spread to other big-X auditors: all of them are able to charge higher fees, and the average client
size for each ﬁrm increased in the post-merger period. This suggests that PWC and other big-X audi-
tors gained more market power, which enables them to become more independent and thus more
effective in constraining their clients from earnings management. We therefore hypothesize the
following:
H1. The audit quality (measured by earnings quality of clients) of PricewaterhouseCoopers as well as
other big-X auditors improved after the PWC merger.
To disentangle the effect of the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, we use non-big-X auditors as a
reference group to rule out the possibility that the change in audit quality is the result of an institu-
tional change during this period. Non-big-X auditors, also referred to as ‘‘second-tier auditors,’’ have
long been reported to focus on different market segments from the big-X: big-X audits all FTSE 100
companies in the UK, and 97% of FTSE 250 companies and most other listed companies employ a
big-X auditor (Beattie et al., 2003); by contrast, non-big-X auditors specialize in small and ﬂedgling
companies. The client distribution in Fig. 2 shows that the markets for big-X and non-big-X auditors
are quite segmented because the market shares of the two groups are largely stable over the sample
period (big-X auditors have 80% of the market share, and non-big-X auditors have 20%). Assuming
there were no ‘‘exogenous’’ shocks (e.g., the introduction of new ﬁnancial reporting standards) with
a positive impact on the average audit quality of publicly listed ﬁrms, the PWC merger would have
had little inﬂuence on the market segments controlled by non-big-X auditors.
2.3. Audit size and audit fees
Dopuch and Simunic (1980) contend that merged auditors might achieve economies of scale and
scope through increased labor productivity. A merged auditor with an enlarged client base can support
more areas of specialized knowledge (e.g., in-depth knowledge of the client’s industry and better
understanding of different tax laws and accounting standards) and redeploy strategic assets for more
productive uses, leading to decreased marginal costs. Furthermore, a merger of two auditors with
complementary geographic locations might also reduce the marginal cost of auditing, especially for
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geographically diverse clients, such as multinational companies (Sullivan, 2002). Marginal cost reduc-
tions are likely to be more signiﬁcant for large clients because specialists will be more efﬁciently uti-
lized if they can spend all of their time on a limited number of clients. Reasonably, increased
geographic coverage of an auditor would beneﬁt large clients more than small clients. A merger-
induced cost reduction is expected to result in lower audit fees if the auditors are willing to partially
pass along the beneﬁts of cost savings to their clients. However, because the market for audit services
has long been characterized as oligopolistic (Hermanson et al., 1987; Beattie and Fearnley, 1994),
merged top-tier auditors, together with their direct rivals, might boost their proﬁts by charging more
to their clients because they enjoy enhanced market power. If a merger between auditors generates
both cost savings and increased market power, the net change in audit fees paid by clients will indi-
cate which effect dominates. Prior literature has provided conﬂicting results: Ivancevich and
Zardkoohi (2000) investigate the effect of mergers among four US accounting ﬁrms in 1989/1990
on audit fees and conclude that both the market share and audit fees of the merged ﬁrms fell relative
to those auditors not involved in the merger. In contrast, Menon and Williams (2001) document a sig-
niﬁcant increase in audit fees paid to international audit ﬁrms in the US for the three-year period fol-
lowing the merger (1991–1993). To address the issue of audit fees, we compare the level of audit fees
charged by PWC and other big-X auditors in the pre-merger and post-merger periods. Consistently, we
use non-big-X auditors as a reference group.
3. Research design
3.1. Methodology
3.1.1. Measurement of earnings quality
Prior research (Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998; Jenkins et al., 2006) suggests that discre-
tionary accruals are often used as an effective proxy for earnings management because they reﬂect the
magnitude by which managers are allowed to manipulate earnings with accruals. Thus, we measure
companies’ earnings quality with discretionary accruals, which are computed using the cross-sec-
tional industry variation of a performance-adjusted modiﬁed Jones model (Reynolds and Francis,
2000; Kothari et al., 2005). It is expected that non-discretionary accruals are inﬂuenced by changes
in ﬁrms’ economic conditions: differences in revenues and trade receivables, the level of property,
plants and equipment, and ﬁrm performance. To control for industry and time effects, separate calcu-
lations were performed for each group of ﬁrms with the same two-digit SIC codes and ﬁscal years. Dis-
cretionary accruals are measured as the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary
accruals. In particular, discretionary accruals are residuals of the following regression model:
TAij;t=Aij;t1 ¼ a1jt 1Aij;t1
 
þ a2jt DSALESij;t  DTRij;tAij;t1
 
þ a3jt PPEij;tAij;t1 þ a4jtROAij;t þ eij;t ð1Þ
where TAijt is the total accruals (net income from continuing operations minus operating cash ﬂows)
for company i in industry j for year t; Aij,t1 is the total assets for company i in industry j for year t1;
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Fig. 2. The market share of big-X and non-big-X auditors in the UK.
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DSALESijt is the change in revenue from the prior year for company i in industry j for year t;DTRijt is the
change in trade receivables; PPEijt is the gross PP&E for company i in industry j for year t; and eijt is the
error term for company i in industry j for year t. a1, a2, a3, and a4 are ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters.
Consistent with prior literature (Balsam et al., 2003; Jenkins et al., 2006), we use the absolute value
of discretionary accruals to emphasize the magnitude of the accruals rather than the direction. Smaller
absolute values of discretionary accruals indicate less earnings management and suggest that earnings
will be more valuable to investors. Prior research identiﬁes several ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that may inﬂu-
ence the magnitude of discretionary accruals. These factors include ﬁrm size, operating cash ﬂows, to-
tal accruals, and leverage (Becker et al., 1998; Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Jenkins et al., 2006). We
include them as control variables in the following regression analysis to test our hypothesis:
DAit ¼ b0 þ b1big xit þ b2afterit þ b3bigx afterit þ b4sizeit þ b5OCFit þ b6TAit þ b7leverageit þ lit
ð2Þ
where DA is estimated discretionary accruals from Eq. (1); big_x equals one if the ﬁrm is audited by a
big-X ﬁrm; after equals one if the observation is from the post-merger period (1999, 2000, and 2001);
bigx_after is the interaction term of big_x and after, which accounts for the big-x ﬁrm effect after the
merger; size is the log of sales; OCF is cash ﬂows from operations scaled by lagged total assets; TA is
total accruals (net income from continuing operations minus operating cash ﬂows); and leverage is the
ratio of total long-term debt to total assets.
In this study, we narrow our attention to the impact of the merger between Price Waterhouse and
Coopers & Lybrand. As the merger was effectively completed on July 1, 1998, we deﬁne the three-year
period from 1995 to 1997 as the pre-merger period and 1999 to 2001 as the post-merger period.
Because fewer absolute discretionary accruals indicate less earnings management, a negative and sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcient of the interaction term between big_x and after (b3) in Eq. (2) would support our
hypothesis that earnings management has decreased in the post-merger period, which implies that
the audit quality of big-X auditors has improved.
Subsequently, we analyze whether investors also perceive earnings quality to be inﬂuenced by the
merger. We build on the value-relevance model of Easton and Harris (1991), which employs both the
current earnings level and the change in earnings to explain annualized stock returns. Following
Ghosh and Moon (2005), we also control for factors that inﬂuence the returns-earnings relationship.
The regression is speciﬁed as follows:
RETit ¼ dþ d1EARNit þ d2DEARN þ d3EARNit  big xit  afterit þ d4DEARNit  big xit  afterit
þ d5afterit þ d6big xit þ d7big xit  afterit þ
X6
j¼1
d8 þ 2ðj 1ÞEARNit  Controlsit
þ
X6
j¼1
d9 þ 2ðj 1ÞDEARNit  Controlsit þ
X6
j¼1
d10 þ 2ðj 1ÞControlsit þ tit ð3Þ
where RET is the stock return calculated over a 12-month period ending three months after the ﬁscal
year-end for ﬁrm i; EARN is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations per
share of the ﬁrm over the period t  1 to t; and DEARN is the change in EARN. Both EARN and DEARN
are deﬂated by the beginning-year price; after equals one if the observation is from the post-merger per-
iod (1999, 2000 and2001); the interaction term big_x  after accounts for the value relevance of earnings
for the big-X clients after the merger. We include the following control variables in the regression: age,
computedusing thebeginningand enddates, as reported in CRSP,measures thenumberof years that the
ﬁrm has been publicly traded as of the ﬁscal year-end; growth is the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm
(market value of the ﬁrmplus the book value of debt scaled by the book value of total assets); persistence
is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of income before extraordinary items per share; beta is systematic risk
computed using the past 60monthly stock returns; size ismeasured as a log of sales; leverage is the ratio
of total long-term debt to total assets. The coefﬁcients of d3 and/or d4 being positive and signiﬁcant
would support our expectation that investors perceive the earnings level (d3) and/or earnings change
(d4) of big-X clients to become more value-relevant after the merger.
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3.1.2. Audit fees
Following previous literature (Francis and Simon, 1987), we use the logarithmic model that has ro-
bust explanatory power to investigate the change in audit fees before and after the PWC merger, for
both big-X and non-big-X auditors.
Logfeei;t ¼ k0t þ k1afteri;t þ kicontroli;t þ 1i;t ð4Þ
The dependent variable is the natural log of the audit fees, and the time dummy ‘‘after’’ is assigned
one for observations in the post-merger period (1999, 2000 and 2001). We expect the cost of audit
services to decrease for the merged auditor due to economies of scale, but it is unclear whether the
auditor will retain the beneﬁts of cost savings within the ﬁrm, partially pass them along to their clients
by charging less, or increase audit fees to maximize proﬁt. Therefore, it is an empirical question to
examine the sign and magnitude of the coefﬁcient for after in the model.
Consistent with prior literature (Francis and Simon, 1987), control variables include the following:
Client size: natural log of total assets.
Leverage: ratio of debt to total assets.
Current ratio: total current assets divided by total current liabilities.
Risk: quick assets divided by total current liabilities.
Performance: net income divided by total assets.
3.2. Sample selection
We collected our data from COMPUSTAT Global. Consistent with previous studies, we exclude
ﬁnancial institutions (SICs between 6000 and 6999) and utility companies (SICs between 4000 and
4999). For discretionary accrual tests, to ensure the reliable estimation of parameters, we require a
minimum of 20 observations for each two-digit SIC codes and ﬁscal year. We delete the top and bot-
tom 1% of outliers based on all continuous variables used.5 We use the same sample base for value-rel-
evance tests. The ﬁnal sample consists of 2816 big-X client ﬁrms and 861 non-big-X client ﬁrms.
For audit-fee tests, we delete the top and bottom 1% of outliers based on the log audit fees, leverage,
current ratios and quick ratios. The ﬁnal sample consists of 4639 observations for big-X auditor client
ﬁrms and 1181 observations for non-big-X client ﬁrms.
4. Results
Table 2 illustrates the industry distribution of both big-X and non-big-X client ﬁrms in the sample.
The sample ﬁrms are from 21 industry categories. Within the sample, both primary metal industry and
auto dealer and gas stations industry have the smallest numbers of observations (20), whereas the
business-services industry has the largest number of observations (697). The number of big-X ﬁrms
(2816) is approximately three times larger than that of non-big-X ﬁrms (861), while the business-ser-
vices industry contributes the largest percentage of observations to both the big-X sample (17.2%) and
non-big-X sample (24.7%).
4.1. Earnings quality
4.1.1. Results of absolute discretionary accruals
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the ﬁrm characteristics of big-X and non-big-X clients be-
fore and after the merger. Panels A and B show that, on average, big-X client ﬁrms have a higher level
of absolute discretionary accruals (0.056 (after) vs. 0.048 (before)) in the post-merger period but less
operating cash ﬂows (71.365 (after) vs. 81.509 (before)). Another notable difference is that the perfor-
mance of big-X client ﬁrms became worse (ROA = 0.012 (after) vs. ROA = 0.046 (before)) and the oper-
5 The results remain consistent when we exclude the observations where the absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by
assets is greater than one or where the discretionary accruals scaled by assets exceed their means by three standard deviations.
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ating risk increased in the post-merger period (beta = 0.689 (after) vs. beta = 0.525 (before)). For non-
big-X client ﬁrms, the trend is very similar. Panels C and D show that after the merger, non-big-X
client ﬁrms had a higher level of absolute discretionary accruals (0.069 (after) vs. 0.053 (before))
but less operating cash ﬂows (6.826 (after) vs. 12.907 (before)). On average, the performance of
non-big-X client ﬁrms deteriorated after the merger (ROA = 0.036 (after) vs. ROA = 0.034 (before)),
but the risk decreased (beta = 0.533 (after) vs. beta = 0.568 (before)). On average, non-big-X client
ﬁrms are smaller compared to big-X client ﬁrms (log assets = 3.530 vs. log assets = 4.867 for the
pre-merger period; log assets = 3.346 vs. log assets = 4.967 for the post-merger period). Non-big-X cli-
ent ﬁrms are also younger (5.670 (before) and 6.509 (after) vs. 6.523 (before) and 8.437 (after)), which
implies that non-big-X auditors specialize in small and young ﬁrms.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the regression analysis. As discussed in Section 3.1, the level of dis-
cretionary accruals is inﬂuencedbyﬁrms’ economic conditions. After controlling forﬁrmcharacteristics,
a signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient on the interaction term of big_x and after indicates less earnings
management of big-X client ﬁrms in the post-merger period. Table 4.1, Panel A shows the regression
results without controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, while Panel B reports the regression results
after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Consistently, both results show that the coefﬁcients of
the interaction term on big_x and after are signiﬁcantly negative (0.021, p = 0.017 and
0.016, p = 0.025), which suggests that comparedwith the non-big-X auditors, big-X auditors constrain
their clients from earnings management to a lager extent in the post-merger period.
4.1.2. Results of value relevance
Table 4.2 provides the results of the value-relevance test. Following Ghosh and Moon (2005), the
explanatory variables include earnings and changes in earnings as well as the interaction between
earnings (change of earnings) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (age, growth, size, leverage and persistence).
Furthermore, we interact earnings (change of earnings) with BA(Bigx_after), the interaction term of
Big_x and after, which accounts for the big-X effect in the post-merger period. The coefﬁcient of inter-
action between earnings (change of earnings) and BA (EPS_BA/DEPS_BA) being positive and signiﬁcant
Table 2
Distribution of sample ﬁrms by industry. This table presents the distribution of big-X and non-big-X client ﬁrms by two-digit SIC
industry codes.
SIC Industry description Big-X Non-big X Total
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 37 6 43
15 Bldg Cnstr-Gen Contr, Op Bldr 206 35 241
20 Food and Kindred Products 192 73 265
22 Textile Mill Products 20 2 22
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied 144 35 179
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 317 53 370
30 Rubber and Misc Plastics Prods 43 4 47
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Pd 131 32 163
33 Primary metal 14 6 20
34 Fabr Metal, Ex Machy, Trans Eq 48 15 63
35 Indl, Comml Machy, Computer Eq 164 51 215
36 Electr, Oth Elec Eq, Ex Cmp 179 87 266
37 Transportation Equipment 138 18 156
38 Meas Instr, Photo Gds, Watches 126 24 150
50 Durable Goods-Wholesale 196 49 245
55 Auto Dealers, Gas Stations 15 5 20
58 Eating and Drinking Places 97 54 151
59 Miscellaneous Retail 13 9 22
73 Business Services 484 213 697
79 Amusement and Recreation Svcs 83 43 126
87 Engr, Acc, Resh, Mgmt, Rel Svcs 169 47 216
Total 2816 861 3677
Big-X ﬁrms are the clients of big-X auditors.
Non-big-X ﬁrms are the clients of non-big-X auditors.
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would support our conjecture that earnings (change of earnings) of big-X clients became more value-
relevant in the post-merger period. Consistent with our expectation, the coefﬁcient of EPS_BA is posi-
tive and signiﬁcant (0.086, p = 0.003). However, the coefﬁcient ofDEPS_BA is negative but insigniﬁcant
(0.05, p = 0.431). Furthermore, the coefﬁcient of EPS_growth is positive and signiﬁcant
(0.50, p < 0.001), suggesting that earnings of ﬁrms with higher growth are perceived to be more
value-relevant by investors. Finally, the coefﬁcients of EPS_age, EPS_leverage and DEPS_beta are signif-
icantly negative. Overall, we ﬁnd supportive evidence for H1.
Table 3
Summary statistics on the ﬁrm characters of big-X and non-big-X ﬁrms before and after the merger. This table presents the
distribution of ﬁrm characteristics for big-X client ﬁrms before the merger (Panel A), big-X ﬁrms after the merger (Panel B), non-
big-X ﬁrms before the merger (Panel C), and non-big-X ﬁrms after the merger (Panel D). Abs_DA is the absolute value of
discretionary accruals calculated from the performance-adjusted modiﬁed Jones model; client_size is measured by the log of the
total assets; OCF is cash ﬂows from the operations scaled by lagged total assets; TA is the total accruals (net income from
continuing operations minus operating cash ﬂows); leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets; age is the number of
years that the ﬁrm has been publicly traded as of the ﬁscal year-end; growth is the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (market value
of the ﬁrm plus the book value of debt scaled by the book value of the total assets); ROA is the return on assets; and beta is the
systematic risk computed using the past 60 monthly stock returns.
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Big-X client ﬁrms_before the merger
Abs_DA 0.000 0.016 0.048 0.034 0.063 0.619 1292
client_size 1.338 3.673 4.867 4.623 5.862 9.319 1292
OCF 22.300 3.238 81.509 11.612 38.412 2761.000 1292
TA 1.117 0.099 0.069 0.058 0.020 0.226 1292
leverage 0.000 0.012 0.102 0.082 0.161 0.529 1292
age 1.000 6.000 6.523 7.000 8.000 9.000 1292
growth 0.016 0.633 1.548 1.084 1.794 19.871 1292
ROA 0.729 0.033 0.046 0.064 0.095 0.266 1292
beta 7.794 0.152 0.525 0.557 0.976 5.539 1187
Panel B: Big-X client ﬁrms_after the merger
Abs_DA 0.000 0.018 0.056 0.039 0.071 0.845 1404
client_size 1.439 3.729 4.967 4.843 6.011 9.766 1404
OCF 22.658 2.356 71.365 11.393 44.399 2606.000 1404
TA 1.103 0.114 0.084 0.060 0.021 0.224 1404
leverage 0.000 0.008 0.126 0.096 0.205 0.560 1404
age 1.000 5.000 8.437 10.000 11.000 13.000 1404
growth 0.013 0.588 1.743 0.982 1.896 19.975 1404
ROA 0.826 0.001 0.012 0.046 0.084 0.261 1404
beta 4.693 0.212 0.689 0.638 1.131 6.197 1161
Panel C: Non-big-X client ﬁrms_before the merger
Abs_DA 0.000 0.019 0.053 0.037 0.071 0.909 378
client_size 0.070 2.585 3.530 3.504 4.408 7.424 378
OCF 5.132 1.030 12.907 3.804 10.533 264.700 378
TA 3.096 0.101 0.077 0.054 0.017 0.255 378
leverage 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.041 0.131 0.493 378
age 1.000 4.000 5.670 6.000 7.000 9.000 378
growth 0.050 0.524 1.335 1.026 1.615 13.933 378
ROA 1.673 0.036 0.034 0.062 0.097 0.206 378
beta 5.185 0.192 0.568 0.579 0.997 3.307 352
Panel D: Non-big-X client ﬁrms_after the merger
Abs_DA 0.000 0.020 0.069 0.044 0.083 1.257 447
client_size 0.039 2.312 3.346 3.258 4.322 6.640 447
OCF 8.046 0.020 6.826 1.849 6.924 127.700 447
TA 2.153 0.119 0.095 0.059 0.011 0.240 447
leverage 0.000 0.001 0.085 0.036 0.150 0.424 447
age 1.000 3.000 6.509 6.000 10.000 13.000 447
growth 0.026 0.504 1.374 0.888 1.684 14.136 447
ROA 1.853 0.041 0.036 0.037 0.070 0.230 447
beta 13.341 0.133 0.533 0.593 1.029 5.832 385
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4.2. Audit fees
Table 5.1, Panel A (B) presents the descriptive statistics for big-X clients in the pre-merger (post-
merger) period. In the pre-merger period, big-X client ﬁrms have a mean audit fee (in log term) of
0.680 (in millions), client size (in log asset) of 2.083 (in millions), current ratio of 1.664, risk (quick
ratio) of 0.964 and performance (net income divided by total assets) of 0.041. In the post-merger per-
iod, the mean of the audit fees (in log terms) is 0.536 (in millions), client size (in log assets) is 2.168
(in millions), the current ratio is 1.840, risk (quick ratio) is 1.140 and performance (net income divided
by total assets) is 0.005.
Table 5.1, Panel C provides the regression results for big-X client ﬁrms. The results show that all of
the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level: the coefﬁcient of client_size is positive, indicating that
large ﬁrms pay more for audit services; the coefﬁcients of current and performance are negative, sug-
gesting that ﬁrms with lower ﬁnancial risk and better performance are charged less by auditors; the
coefﬁcient of risk is positive, which suggests that ﬁrms with higher risk have to pay a higher audit fee.
Finally, the coefﬁcient of central interest, after, is positive (0.064, p < 0.0001), which indicates that big-
X client ﬁrms pay more audit fees in the post-merger period than in the pre-merger period. It can be
inferred that instead of sharing with the clients the cost savings from a merger, by lowering audit fees,
big-X auditors chose to charge more to their clients to raise proﬁts. Consistent with the theoretical
prediction implied by Chaney et al. (2003),6 when the audit market becomes less competitive, auditors
may charge the clients higher fees, possibly as a result of the growing market power of big-X auditors
after a merger.
Table 5.2 presents the results for non-big-X client ﬁrms. Compared with big-X client ﬁrms, non-big-
X auditors have a lower mean of audit fees and client size in both pre-merger and post-merger periods.
The regression results show that the coefﬁcient of after is insigniﬁcant at the conventional level
Table 4.1
Absolute discretionary accrual test. The table presents OLS regressions of absolute discretionary accruals on big-X ﬁrms and the
merger status with and without controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. The p-values for the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients (p-value < 10%) are
highlighted in bold. The sample consists of ﬁrms with data available on all variables needed to compute the discretionary accruals.
We delete the top and bottom 1% of observations to control for outliers. The dependent variable is DA, the discretionary accruals
calculated from the performance-adjusted modiﬁed Jones model; big_x equals one if the auditor is large X and is zero otherwise;
after equals one if the ﬁrm is in a post-merger period (1999, 2000, and 2001) and is zero otherwise; bigx_after is the interaction
term of big_x and after, which accounts for the big-ﬁrm effect after the merger; size is measured by the log of total assets; OCF is
cash ﬂows from operations scaled by lagged total assets; TA is the total accruals (net income from continuing operations minus
operating cash ﬂows); and leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets.
DAit ¼ b0 þ b1big xit þ b2afterit þ b3bigx afterit þ b4sizeit þ b5OCFit þ b6TAit þ b7leverageit þ lit
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Sig. (2-tailed) Adj_R2
Panel A: Regressions of absolute discretionary accruals on big-X ﬁrm status
intercept 0.061 0.006 10.480 <.0001 0.016
Big_x 0.008 0.007 1.280 0.201
after 0.039 0.008 4.940 <.0001
bigx_after 0.021 0.009 2.380 0.017
Panel B: Regressions of absolute discretionary accruals on big-X ﬁrm status and controls
intercept 0.067 0.006 11.300 <.0001 0.358
big_x 0.007 0.005 1.370 0.171
after 0.026 0.006 4.080 <.0001
bigx_after 0.016 0.007 2.250 0.025
size 0.008 0.001 7.450 <.0001
OCF 0.000 0.000 0.830 0.404
TA 0.307 0.007 42.920 <.0001
leverage 0.051 0.013 4.100 <.0001
6 The theoretical model in Chaney et al. (2003) suggests that the auditor fees would be lower when the audit market becomes
more competitive, which implies that when the level of competition decreases, the audit fees might increase.
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(0.013, p = 0.443), which suggests that the audit fees charged by ‘‘second-tier’’ auditors in the post-
merger period do not differ from those in the pre-merger period.
4.3. Sensitivity check
A series of sensitivity checks are conducted to test the robustness of our results. For discretionary
accrual tests, ﬁrst, we follow Kothari et al. (2005) and re-calculate the discretionary accruals from the
Jones model and modiﬁed Jones model with or without an intercept, and we ﬁnd that the results
remain consistent. Second, we run separate regressions for PWC clients and non-PWC big-X clients.
The results are similar for PWC clients and non-PWC big-X clients: both PWC and other big-X auditors
are more effective in constraining their clients from earnings management in the post-merger period
than non-big-X auditors. Third, we run regressions for positive discretionary accruals and negative
Table 4.2
Value relevance test. The table presents OLS regressions of returns on earnings and earnings change interacting with big-X ﬁrms
and the merger status. p-Values for signiﬁcant coefﬁcients (p-value < 10%) are highlighted in bold. We delete the top and bottom
1% of observations to control for outliers. The dependent variable is annualized stock returns, EPS is net income before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations per share of the ﬁrm over the period t  1 to t; DEPS is the change in EPS. Both
EPS andDEPS are deﬂated by the beginning-year price; BA (big_x_after) is the interaction term of big_x and after, which accounts for
the big-X auditor effect after the merger; age is the number of years that the ﬁrm has been publicly traded as of the ﬁscal year-end;
growth is the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (market value of the ﬁrm plus the book value of debt scaled by the book value of the
total assets); size is the log of sales; leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets; persistence is the ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation of income before extraordinary items per share; beta is the systematic risk computed using the past 60 monthly
stock returns; and big_x equals one if the auditor is big-X auditor and is zero otherwise.
RET ¼ dþ d1EARN þ d2DEARN þ d3EARN  after  big xþ d4DEARN  after  big xþ d5after
þ d6big xþ d7after  big xþ
X6
j¼1
d8 þ 2ðj 1ÞEARN  Controlsþ
X6
j¼1
d9 þ 2ðj
 1ÞDEARN  Controlsþ
X6
j¼1
d10 þ 2ðj 1ÞControlsþ t ð3Þ
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Sig. (2-tailed) Adj_R2
Intercept 0.136 0.037 3.720 0.000 0.207
EPS 0.136 0.060 2.260 0.024
DEPS 0.311 0.118 2.630 0.009
EPS_BA 0.086 0.029 2.940 0.003
DEPS_BA 0.050 0.064 0.790 0.431
EPS_age 0.008 0.005 1.780 0.076
DEPS_age 0.014 0.013 1.130 0.257
EPS_growth 0.500 0.050 10.000 <.0001
DEPS_growth 0.003 0.022 0.150 0.878
EPS_size 0.010 0.010 0.980 0.328
DEPS_size 0.032 0.021 1.550 0.121
EPS_leverage 0.775 0.150 5.160 <.0001
DEPS_leverage 1.042 0.258 4.030 <.0001
EPS_persistence 0.010 0.027 0.360 0.719
DEPS_persistence 0.018 0.030 0.610 0.540
EPS_beta 0.000 0.005 0.060 0.951
DEPS_beta 0.043 0.025 1.720 0.086
big_x 0.011 0.030 0.380 0.708
after 0.062 0.035 1.770 0.077
big_x_after 0.027 0.040 0.670 0.504
age 0.012 0.003 3.740 0.000
growth 0.129 0.005 26.210 <.0001
size 0.004 0.005 0.670 0.506
leverage 0.070 0.076 0.920 0.360
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discretionary accruals separately. The results show that constraints on earnings management by big-X
auditors are mainly reﬂected by positive discretionary accruals: big-X auditors signiﬁcantly reduced
the positive discretionary accruals of their clients, whereas there is no signiﬁcant difference between
big-X and non-big-X auditors regarding negative discretionary accruals. The results suggest that
income-increasing discretionary accruals (positive discretionary accruals) may be the main focus of
auditors.
For value-relevance tests, we run regressions separately for PWC clients and non-PWC big-X clients
to assess whether our choice of grouping all big-X client ﬁrms is justiﬁed. The results show that the
market perceives earnings in the post-merger period to be more value-relevant for both PWC clients
and non-PWC big-X clients, while there is no signiﬁcant difference for non-big-X client ﬁrms.
Furthermore, we follow Easton and Harris (1991) and run a value-relevance regression (in which
returns are regressed on earnings and change of earnings only) for big-X clients and non-big-X clients
separately and compare the adjusted R-squared of the regressions from pre-merger and post-merger
periods with a Cramer (1987) test. We ﬁnd that for big-X client ﬁrms, the adjusted R-squared in the
post-merger period is signiﬁcantly higher than that in the pre-merger period, which implies that earn-
ings and earnings changes do provide more explanatory power for returns for big-X clients after the
merger. In contrast, for non-big-X clients, the difference between adjusted R-squared for regressions
from pre-merger and post-merger periods is not statistically signiﬁcant from which we conclude that
the value relevance of earnings for non-big-X clients does not change from the pre-merger to the post-
merger period. The results are consistent with our ﬁndings reported in Section 4.1.2.
We test the robustness of ﬁndings regarding audit fees by running alternative regressions with
additional control variables (the ratio of debt to equity and the return on equity). With regard to
the direction and signiﬁcance level, unreported results show that the coefﬁcient of our main variable
of interest, the time dummy ‘‘after,’’ remains robust.
Table 5.1
PWC merger inﬂuence on audit fees: big-X client ﬁrms. The dependent variable is the Logfee (log of the audit fee), after is a time
dummy that takes the value of 1 for observations from the post-merger period (1999, 2000 and 2001) and is zero otherwise;
client_size is measured by the log of the total assets; current is the total current assets divided by the total current liabilities; risk is
the quick assets divided by the total current liabilities; and performance is the net income divided by the total assets. The p-values
for the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (p-value < 10%) are highlighted in bold.
Logfee ¼ k0 þ k1after þ k2client sizeþ k3current þ k4riskþ k5performanceþ f
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Big-X client ﬁrms_before the merger
Logfee 2.000 1.046 0.680 0.721 0.357 1.093 2313
client_size 0.268 1.521 2.083 1.965 2.582 4.710 2537
current 0.255 1.067 1.664 1.381 1.812 14.568 2537
risk 0.059 0.529 0.964 0.809 1.084 12.182 2524
performance 1.162 0.028 0.041 0.062 0.098 0.274 2537
Panel B: Big-X client ﬁrms_after the merger
Logfee 1.886 0.939 0.536 0.598 0.215 1.107 2326
client_size 1.000 1.596 2.168 2.077 2.688 5.186 2405
current 0.247 1.002 1.840 1.352 1.965 17.604 2405
risk 0.059 0.531 1.140 0.822 1.182 12.206 2387
performance 1.182 0.020 0.005 0.038 0.079 0.272 2404
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Sig. (2-tailed) Adj_R2
Panel C: Big-X client ﬁrms_regression results
intercept 1.860 0.017 110.770 <.0001 0.667
after 0.064 0.010 6.540 <.0001
client_size 0.596 0.007 91.730 <.0001
current 0.032 0.005 6.910 <.0001
risk 0.032 0.006 5.110 <.0001
performance 0.351 0.032 10.930 <.0001
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5. Conclusions
Using data from UK publicly listed companies audited by big-X auditors and non-big-X auditors be-
fore and after the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger in 1998, we conclude that the audit quality (mea-
sured by the earnings quality of auditees) improved in the post-merger period because, compared
with non-big-X client ﬁrms, absolute discretionary accruals of big-X clients decreased in the post-mer-
ger period, indicating less earnings management; in the post-merger period, earnings of big-X clients
are more related to stock-market returns, implying that investors perceive earnings to be more value-
relevant. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd such changes for non-big-X client ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd evidence
that there is a signiﬁcant increase in audit fees for big-X clients in the post-merger period. However,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between the audit fees charged by non-big-X auditors in pre-merger
and post-merger periods. The results suggest that cost savings from a merger (which tends to lower
audit fees) are dominated by collectively enhanced market power of ‘‘top-tier’’ auditors (which tends
to increase audit fees).
Our ﬁndings have implications for regulators and policy makers, as authorities are required to cau-
tiously assess the consequences of future consolidation in the auditing industry, which is character-
ized as a ‘‘tight oligopoly.’’ Further consolidation might reduce consumer welfare, as auditors may
use their increased market power to charge high audit fees, but larger auditors with strengthened
independence are able to provide higher-quality audit service. Further, a merger between ‘‘top-tier’’
auditors might also help the position of ‘‘second-tier’’ auditors, as they might use competitive pricing
to challenge their large rivals. Our results are of interest to accounting ﬁrms considering a merger in
the auditing industry. To mitigate regulatory scrutiny, they might choose to share with clients the cost
savings from the merger by reducing audit fees.
However, our study is subject to the following caveats: the ﬁndings are entirely based on UK data,
and thus, we are cautious in generalizing the results to other countries because of differences in mar-
ket structures and institutional environments. Additionally, our study only examines the auditing
function of accounting ﬁrms, which usually perform multiple functions. Furthermore, we might
Table 5.2
PwC merger inﬂuence on audit fees for non-big-X client ﬁrms. The p-values for the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (p-value < 10%) are
highlighted in bold.
Logfee ¼ k0 þ k1after þ k2client sizeþ k3current þ k4riskþ k5performanceþ m
Variable Minimum 25th Mean Median 75th Maximum Obs
Panel A: Non-big-X client ﬁrms_before the merger
Logfee 2.000 1.398 1.075 1.097 0.824 0.591 619
client_size 0.252 1.127 1.540 1.520 1.904 3.916 660
current 0.251 1.099 1.715 1.483 1.955 16.652 660
risk 0.061 0.575 1.059 0.863 1.207 12.303 659
performance 1.048 0.030 0.045 0.062 0.100 0.244 660
Panel B: Non-big-X client ﬁrms_after the merger
Logfee 2.000 1.347 1.048 1.086 0.796 0.799 562
client_size 0.721 1.142 1.565 1.553 1.967 4.249 592
current 0.249 1.018 1.990 1.451 2.228 15.125 591
risk 0.072 0.561 1.286 0.884 1.436 9.500 573
performance 1.228 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.071 0.274 592
Coefﬁcient Std. Error T-Statistic Sig. (2-tailed) Adj_R2
Panel C: Non-big-X client ﬁrms_regression results
intercept 1.956 0.028 69.830 <.0001 0.617
after 0.013 0.017 0.770 0.443
client_size 0.598 0.014 41.660 <.0001
current 0.029 0.008 3.580 0.000
risk 0.028 0.011 2.580 0.010
performance 0.365 0.052 6.950 <.0001
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underestimate the extent of audit-fee increases because of well-documented practices by auditors to
non-audit service contracts (such as consulting) from clients by lowering the price for audit services.
Finally, the results are speciﬁc to the PWC merger in 1998 and may not be generalized to previous and
later mergers.
Our study opens a rich avenue for future research in this domain: it can be extended to include the
previous merger in 1989/1990 and subsequent merger in 2002 to make comparisons along a time
horizon; it can also be broadened to make international comparisons between countries with dissim-
ilar accounting standards and different levels of investor protection. Leuz et al. (2003) report a nega-
tive association between earnings management and the level of investor protection based on evidence
across 31 countries. It would be interesting to examine whether external institutional factors can mit-
igate the association between auditor mergers and audit quality to different extents.
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Product market competition and corporate 
governance disclosure: Evidence from the UK
Basil Al-Najjar1 and Rong Ding
ABSTRACT
In this study we measure multiple dimensions of product market competition
and examine their impacts on corporate governance disclosure, based on a sam-
ple of UK public firms over the period 2001 to 2009. We use factor analysis to
explore the different dimensions of product market competition; and regression
models to analyse the association between multiple dimensions of product mar-
ket competition and corporate governance disclosure. We find that firms in less
competitive industries have significantly more corporate governance disclosure.
Furthermore, we detect a positive association between corporate governance
disclosure and board independence, as well as audit committee independence.
This suggests that firms with better corporate governance tend to disclose more
information to external investors. Overall the findings support the view that
managers use more corporate governance disclosure as a substitute for the
external disciplinary force of product market competition.
1. INTRODUCTION
WE INVESTIGATE the association between product market competition andcorporate governance disclosure.  Our research question is motivatedby the different predictions in the theoretical literature. On the one
hand, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) investigate competition in the context
of an entry game, and predict that firms in more competitive industries will
adopt better disclosure practice. This is because withholding information can
be interpreted by potential entrants as good news, thus encouraging competi-
tors to enter the market. On the other hand, Gertner et al (1988) detect that
firms in more competitive industries will have less disclosure. Here, the logic
is that information disclosed by one firm can be used opportunistically by
industry rivals, and hence it is optimal for firms to have less information dis-
closure. In a similar vein, Wagenhofer (1990) suggests that greater product
market competition inhibits disclosure in markets with mature competitors.
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Empirical studies in this area also present mixed results. For example,
Harris (1998) finds that a firm's decision to provide separate segment disclo-
sure is positively related to the level of competition. In contrast, Verrecchia
and Weber (2006) report that the probability of a firm providing proprietary
information is negatively related to product market competition, measured by
industry concentration. Based on a survey of UK private firms, Dedman and
Lennox (2009) suggest that when managers perceive more competition, they
are more likely to withhold information on sales and costs. Healy and Palepu
(2001) conclude that the empirical studies provide little evidence on how
product market competition is related to disclosure. To summarise, disagree-
ments over the association between product market competition and disclo-
sure remain unresolved and we aim to investigate this issue within corporate
governance disclosure in a sample of UK public firms.
In the current study, we suggest that product market competition can
potentially have two opposing effects on corporate governance disclosure. One
reason for this is that firms might have more disclosure as a result of intense
product market competition, since competition serves as a disciplinary and
monitoring mechanism, to pressure managers to commit to better disclosure
practice. Alternatively, corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a sub-
stitute for product market competition: managers use more disclosure in less
competitive markets to maintain investors' confidence in their firms.
Under the Companies Act 1967, UK public firms are mandated to dis-
close audited financial statements to shareholders. In 1993, the Accounting
Standard Board (ASB) introduced voluntary ‘Operating and Financial
Review'’(OFR) for public firms. OFR recommends public firms in the UK pro-
vide a formalised narrative explanation of their financial performance, con-
taining information on corporate social responsibility and internal governance,
as such information is useful for investors to interpret firms' financial per-
formance. Furthermore, UK public firms have low entry barriers for most
industries (except for those under tight government regulation). Therefore, we
exploit the UK setting to analyse the relationship between product market
competition and corporate governance disclosure.
In previous empirical studies, competition is constructed typically as an
industry level measure. For example, the level of concentration is used to meas-
ure competition (see for example, Marciukaityte and Park 2009; Balakrishnan
and Cohen 2009). However, other studies suggest that product market compe-
tition has different dimensions (see for example, Raith 2003). Following the
approach of Li (2010), we employ different measures, to reflect product market
competition at the industry level, and examine their impact on the corporate
governance disclosure. We report that firms in less competitive industries
(where entry cost is high and market size is large) have significantly more dis-
closure compared with their counterparts in more competitive industries.
Our results are robust after controlling for those firm-specific charac-
teristics and corporate governance factors that have been documented to
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affect disclosure, in previous studies. Furthermore, we find a positive associ-
ation between corporate governance disclosure and both board independence
and audit committee independence. This suggests that firms with better cor-
porate governance disclose more information to external investors. Overall, the
findings support the argument that managers use more corporate governance
disclosure as a substitute for the external disciplinary force of competition.
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature in a number of
ways. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to measure multiple
dimensions of product market competition, and to investigate the relationship
between corporate governance disclosure and competition in the UK context.
We add to the previous literature by identifying competition as an important
economic determinant of a firm's decision to disclose more information.
Second, we provide evidence on the positive association between corporate
governance factors and disclosure. Finally, we extend earlier studies (e.g.,
Marciukaityte and Park 2009), that use industry concentration to measure
competition, and find that different dimensions of competition can have dif-
ferent impacts on disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the lit-
erature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research
method. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. DISCLOSURE AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this Section we start with a discussion of corporate governance disclosure,
then we develop our hypotheses.
2.1 Corporate governance disclosure and product market competition in the UK
context
Historically, the Companies Act of 1900 (UK) required companies to disclose a
limited amount of audited balance sheet information to their shareholders. A
revised version in 1907 made it mandatory for public firms to file balance
sheets with a central registry at Companies House (Flower 2004). In 1918, the
Wrenbury Committee considered potential reforms of the Companies Act and
recommended that the policy of limited public disclosure should continue. In
1925, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales took a
similar stance. In 1967, private companies were required to start filing their
accounts with Companies House (Flower 2004).
In 1993, the Accounting Standard Board issued the statement of
'Operating and Financial Review' (OFR). The OFR enabled UK public firms to
provide a structured narrative explanation of their financial performance,
which has been voluntary (mandatory) for all listed firms before (after) April 1,
2005. However, on November 28, 2005 the UK government announced that
the OFR would no longer be mandatory. In 2006, the Accounting Standard
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Board recommended a revised version of the OFR, which can be seen as an
extended version. According to the Accounting Standard Board, the revised
OFR should be 'addressed to members, setting out their analysis of business
with a forward-looking orientation in order to assist members to assess the
strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for those strategies to suc-
ceed; the OFR should focus on matters that are relevant to the interest of
members' (the Accounting Standard Board, 2006: principle 6). The OFR,
which is qualitative in nature, contains information on corporate social
responsibility and internal governance, as such information is valuable for
investors to interpret the financial performance of public firms.
Furthermore, public firms in the UK, similar to their US counterparts,
have a diverse corporate ownership structure and high quality disclosure.
Apart from those tightly regulated industries (such as utilities), entry barriers
are generally low for other industries in the UK. This indicates that there is a
sufficient variation in the level of competition from industry to industry.
Consequently, we take advantage of this interesting institutional setting in the
UK to explore the relationship between product market competition and cor-
porate governance disclosure.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The classical agency problem arises from the information asymmetry and the
conflict of interests between principles (shareholders) and agents (managers).
The separation between ownership and control provides managers with the
opportunity to make decisions that maximise their benefits, at the expense of
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983).
Information asymmetry between managers and shareholders leads to ineffi-
cient resource allocation, which subsequently increases the cost of raising
capital because shareholders demand a risk premium for their investments.
Prior literature suggests that product market competition is an efficient mon-
itoring and disciplining mechanism to alleviate agency problems, as Shleifer
and Vishny (1997, p. 738) assert: ‘Product market competition is probably the
most powerful force towards economic efficiency in the world’.
Previous studies show that product market competition provides incen-
tives for managers to better align their interests with those of shareholders. It
is well established in the literature that firms with strong governance have on
average better performance (see for example, Gompers et al 2003; Anderson et
al 2004). However, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that firms with good cor-
porate governance have higher firm value and better operating performance,
in non-competitive industries, suggesting that firms in non-competitive indus-
tries will benefit more from strong governance practices. This implies that
competition serves as an effective mechanism to discipline managers and thus
partially substitutes internal governance tools.
Another theoretical perspective that is pertinent to the relationship
between competition and disclosure is a manager's career concern (Narayanan
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1985). Narayanan observes that top executives have an incentive to take
actions that boost short-term performance at the expense of long-run share-
holders’ interests, if they are concerned with their reputation on the labour
market, and that such concerns could become more serious when product
market competition is high. Other studies show that CEO turnover is higher
in more competitive industries (see for example, DeFond and Park 1999), and
poorly performing firms in competitive industries are more likely to become
takeover targets (Kruse and Rennie 2006). In contrast, managers in less com-
petitive industries tend to suffer less from such career concern problems.
However, information asymmetry still exists in the presence of intensive com-
petition (albeit to a less extent), and disclosure can be used partially to solve
the information asymmetry problem.
2.3 Hypotheses development
Product market competition plays an instrumental role in determining firms'
disclosure practice. On the one hand, firms can strengthen disclosure to
enhance corporate transparency and improve their reputation among
investors. On the other hand, if the information disclosed is opportunistically
exploited by current or potential competitors, such disclosure could put firms
at risk. This suggests that firms tend to adopt a low level of disclosure
(Verrecchia 1983). Thus, firms have to balance the benefits and costs of dis-
closure to decide the optimal level of such disclosure. We further elaborate two
potential channels through which product market competition can affect a
manager's incentives on corporate governance disclosure.
First, managers in less competitive industries are more likely to suffer
from agency conflicts, as they are operating in an environment where the dis-
ciplinary force of competition is largely absent. In order to substitute the weak
monitoring function of competition and signal to the market that their inter-
ests are aligned with those of shareholders, managers in less competitive
industries can volunteer to make more disclosure, to build a good reputation
and occupy advantageous positions in the labour market. This 'substitution
argument' is based on the assumption that firms in less competitive industries
have access to more free cash flows from operations, as a result of dominant
market power. Hence, managers are likely to benefit themselves with corpo-
rate resources in the absence of a strong monitoring environment. To alleviate
the concerns of shareholders and maintain investors' confidence in their
firms, managers in less competitive industries are motivated to disclose more
information on corporate governance. As such, managers can use disclosure
as a substitute for the disciplinary force of competition.
Although theoretical work (see for example, Clarke 1983) predicts that
it could be sub-optimal for firms in less competitive industries to increase dis-
closure on sales and investment strategies, we suggest that corporate gover-
nance disclosure can bring more benefits than costs, for the following reasons.
First, corporate governance disclosure does not involve specific information on
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a product or investment decision, so competitors are less likely to benefit from
such information. Second, a high level of disclosure on corporate governance
signals that firms are committed to high transparency, which is generally
appreciated by investors. Based on the above discussion we expect to find
support for the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms operating in less competitive industries disclose more information on
corporate governance.
However, Guadalupe and Peres-Gonzalez (2005) find evidence that the private
benefits of managerial control, as a measure of the magnitude of conflict
between managers and shareholders, decrease with the intensity of product
market competition. Relating product market competition to quality of finan-
cial reporting, Marciukaityte and Park (2009) detect that firms in more com-
petitive industries are less likely to engage in earnings management. In a sim-
ilar vein, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2009) find that competition disciplines
managers because the frequencies of earnings re-statement are significantly
lower in more competitive industries. Focusing on the relationship between
product market competition and a firm's social performance, Fernandez-Kranz
and Santalo (2010) report that firms in more competitive industries have bet-
ter social ratings. These results indicate that shareholders of firms in more
competitive industries are more likely to have fewer agency conflicts.
Previous literature also suggests that more disclosure is able to reduce
information asymmetry and alleviate agency problems (see for example, Easley
and O'Hara 2004; Lambert et al 2007). Furthermore, La Porta et al (2006) find
that an increase in mandatory disclosure is associated with a substantially
lower level of private benefits of control. Therefore, managers in more compet-
itive industries might voluntarily commit to better corporate governance dis-
closure. Here, competition can be seen as a powerful disciplinary mechanism
for managers, since competition effectively removes incapable managers and
managers who do not act in the best interest of shareholders. Furthermore,
firms operating in highly competitive industries are more likely to rely on
external financing for growth, ceteris paribus, because competition (in gener-
al) will lower the profit margin at the industry level. Previous literature sug-
gests that a major benefit of increased disclosure to reduce information asym-
metry and lower cost of capital (see for example, Easley and O'Hara 2004;
Lambert et al 2007). Consequently, as firms in competitive industries also
compete for funds in the financial market, they have strong incentives to dis-
close more information on corporate governance to raise capital at lower costs.
Hence we posit that:
H2: Firms operating in more competitive industries disclose more information on
corporate governance.
Prior studies suggest that internal corporate governance can be of great sig-
nificance in monitoring firms' performance and minimising managers' oppor-
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tunistic behaviours. For example, Bujaki and McConomy (2002) report that
firms with more ‘unrelated directors on the board’ voluntarily provide more
information related to corporate governance. Ben-Amar and Boujenoui (2010)
also find that ‘the percentage of unrelated directors on the board’ impacts gov-
ernance disclosure. Wang and Hussainey (2013) show that corporate gover-
nance features (board size and composition, CEO duality, directors' owner-
ship) influence companies' decision to disclose forward-looking statements
voluntarily in the narrative section of annual reports, from a sample of UK
public firms.
The findings of these studies suggest that board independence (meas-
ured by the percentage of independent directors on the board) plays an impor-
tant role in increasing board strength and monitoring of managers. This is
because insider directors are more likely to have a close relationship with the
management, which lowers their incentive and effectiveness in monitoring the
top executives (see for example, Pincus et al 1989). Accordingly, we hypothe-
sise that there is a positive relationship between independent directors and
corporate governance disclosure. In addition, audit committee independence
can enhance the quality of disclosure, as they are more able to question the
financial reports and to provide better links with external auditors.
Accordingly, we predict a positive association between audit committee inde-
pendence and the disclosure of information related to corporate governance.
Thus we hypothesise that:
H3: Firms with more independent board and audit committee disclose more
information on corporate governance.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
In this section we first discuss the data used in the current study. Then we
provide more details on the source of data and research method adopted in the
study.
3.1. Data on product market competition
Raith (2003) suggests that product market competition has multiple dimen-
sions, so drawing a conclusion based on one dimension of competition could
be misleading. Following the literature (such as, Karuna 2007; Li 2010), in
this study we construct variables to measure three dimensions of competition:
potential entry cost to an industry, industry profitability and industry con-
centration. Specifically, we use industry capital expenditure (the average cap-
ital expenditure for all firms in one industry) and industry market size (loga-
rithm of aggregate industry sales) to reflect entry cost. This is because indus-
try capital expenditure reflects the necessary investment for potential rivals to
compete with existing players in an industry, so it is positively correlated with
entry costs. As large sales is normally associated with high initial investment,
the correlation between industry market size and entry costs should also be
positive.
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Next, we use industry price-cost margin and industry return on assets
(ROA) to measure industry profitability, as large profits can motivate firms to
enter an industry. It is necessary to control for industry profitability in the
analysis. High industry profitability might imply more competition from poten-
tial entrants, or less competition from existing players in the industry
(because existing players can achieve high profit, so they have less incentives
to increase competition), and hence the interrelationship between industry
profitability and competition is ambiguous. Finally, we use the four firm con-
centration ratio and Herfindahl index to capture industry concentration, as
highly concentrated industries are assumed to have less competition.
We further employ principal component analysis with Oblimin rotation,
to generate three factors with eigenvalue larger than one: Entry cost is a fac-
tor obtained from the factor analysis on industry capital expenditure and
industry market size; industry profitability is a factor obtained from the factor
analysis on industry price-cost margin and industry ROA; whilst industry con-
centration is a factor obtained from the factor analysis on the four firm con-
centration ratio and Herfindahl index. All the data used to calculate competi-
tion measures are collected from DataStream for all the firms listed in each
industry. In the analysis we first use each individual measure for competition
and then use three factors simultaneously in the regression, to generate a
complete overview of the association between the dimensions of competition
and corporate governance disclosure. It is worth mentioning that for industry
classification, we employ the 4 digit SIC codes available in DataStream.
Finally, consistent with previous studies, we exclude financial firms.
3.2 Data on corporate governance disclosure and firm-specific characteristics
Our initial sample is based on FTSE 250 companies over the period 2001 to
2009. After excluding financial and utilities firms, the final sample consists of
162 firms.  We use the corporate governance rating score of the Corporate
Governance Quotient database developed by Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), that rates publicly traded companies in terms of the quality of
their corporate governance. The information is voluntarily disclosed by the
firm, which reflects their disclosure levels of internal governance information.
The information about corporate governance variables such as board inde-
pendence and audit independence, is hand-collected from firms' annual
reports. Firm level financial information is obtained from DataStream.
3.3 Research method
In order to investigate the effect of competition and internal corporate gover-
nance on governance disclosure, we employ panel data analysis. Our main
interest is to examine the relationship between competition and corporate gov-
ernance disclosure. Previous studies show that firm size is important in
explaining the level of disclosure (Zarzeski 1996; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng
and Courtenay 2006), so we control for firm size (natural logarithm of total
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assets) in our analysis. Both theoretical and empirical studies in industry
organisations suggest that leverage reduces the intensity of competition
(Fudenburg and Tirole 1986; Chevalier 1995), so we include leverage (long-
term debt to total assets) as another control variable. Firms with a high growth
rate and greater risk are less likely to disclose information (Rogers and
Stocken 2005; Waymire 1985), so we include market-to-book ratio, cash flow
(ratio of cash flow to total assets) and the firm's historical beta (a measure of
a firm's systematic risk, obtained from DataStream) in our models. We also
control for institutional ownership, since these investors can obtain more
information directly from their meetings with managers and hence there is
less need for disclosure (Schadewitz and Blevins 1998; Celik et al 2006). 
We first estimate the determinants of firms' corporate governance dis-
closure (INDEXCGQ) without controlling for the industry effect. Next, follow-
ing Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010), we re-estimate the model by adding
industry effects. It is worth noting that we have examined issues related to
endogeneity in our models. According to the Hausman Test there is no strong
significant evidence of an endogeneity problem among the industry variables
we are employing. We also used lagged variables to double check the robust-
ness of our results. Those findings are not significantly different from what is
reported in this paper. Our random effects model is as follows:
INDEXCGQit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Control + εit
Where INDEXCGQit is our corporate governance disclosure for firm i at year t,
with α as an intercept term; Xit is a vector of product market competition
measures and Control is a vector of control variables. εit is the error term.
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.
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(1)
AUDIND is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee
BETA is historical beta of firms
BOARDIND is board independence, which is measured as the ratio of inde-
pendent directors to total number of directors on board
CASHFLOW is defined as ratio of cash flow to total assets
ICAPEXP is measured as the weighted average of capital expenditures for
firms in each industry per year
INDCON4 is the four firm concentration ratio, which is measured as the sum
of the market share of four biggest firms in each industry each year
INDEXCGQ is corporate governance disclosure measure
INDHHI is defined as the Herfindahl index, which is measured as the sum
squared of market share of firms in each industry each year cont...
Table 1: Variable Definition
4. RESULTS
This section is divided into two sub-sections. Firstly, we discuss the descrip-
tive statistics and report findings from the correlation analysis of the investi-
gated variables. Secondly, we discuss the results of the regression analysis on
the relationship between competition and corporate governance on corporate
governance disclosure.
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean of the
corporate governance disclosure score is 86.79, indicating that the average
firms in the sample have a relatively good ranking of disclosure. The mean of
the four firm concentration ratio is 0.625 which suggests that, on average,
firms operate in a relatively concentrated industry (the largest four firms in the
industrial control 62.5 per cent of market share). The mean of firm size (loga-
rithm of total assets) is 13.36, as our sample is populated with large firms
included in the FTSE250 index. The mean of board independence (audit com-
mittee independence) is 0.48 (0.96), indicating that 48 per cent (96 per cent)
of board members (audit committee directors) are independent. Finally, on
average 17.49 per cent of shares are owned by institutions. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between variables. Corporate gover-
nance disclosure is positively correlated with firm size, board independence
and audit committee independence, suggesting that large firms, and firms
with independent boards and independent audit committees, are more likely
to disclose more information on corporate governance. The industry-average
of capital expenditure is positively related to price-cost margin at the industry
level and the industry return on assets, indicating that profitable industries
tend to have high entry costs in terms of capital investment. The industry-
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...cont
INDMGN is the price-cost margin measured as industry sales to industry
operating costs
INDMKTS is assessed as the product market size which is the natural loga-
rithm of industry sales in each industry yearly
INDROA is defined as industry Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and
Depreciation (EBITDA) to industry total assets
INSIDEROWN is the percentage of shares owned by insiders
INSTITUTIONOWN is the percentage of shares owned by institutions
LEV is leverage which is measured as the ratio of long term debt to total assets
MKBV is market to book ratio
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets
average of capital expenditure is also positively correlated with the four firm
concentration ratio, indicating that relatively concentrated industries have
high entry costs.
Industry market size is positively correlated with price-cost margin and
industry return on assets, which implies that industries with large market size
are more profitable. Price-cost margin at the industry level (industry return on
assets) is positively correlated with the four firm concentration ratio and
Herfindahl index, indicating that highly concentrated industries are more
profitable. This is consistent with findings in the economics literature (see for
example, Rivera-Batiz 1988), as powerful firms in less competitive industries
are price makers instead of price takers, so they can charge high prices to
increase their profits. The four firm concentration ratio is highly correlated
with the Herfindahl index, as they both measure the level of industry concen-
tration.
Industry return on assets is positively related to insider ownership,
suggesting that insiders are more likely to invest in firms operating in prof-
itable industries. The correlation between board independence (audit commit-
tee independence) and firm size is positive, as large firms are likely to have
more independent boards (audit committee). Leverage is negatively related to
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INDEXCGQ
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
BOARDIND
CASHFLOW
AUDIND
BETA
INSIDEROWN (%)
86.788
385155.5
18.253
0.015
0.963
0.625
0.178
13.364
2.847
0.171
0.480
0.188
0.959
1.058
17.485
0
46894
16.730
1.93e-06
-0.711
0.239
0.049
9.919
-99.6
0
0.1
-6.676
0.286
-0.54
0.01
100
986944.2
19.951
0.065
7.690
1
1
18.212
21.25
0.647
0.818
0.980
1
5.35
73.4
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum
cash flow, which indicates that firms with less cash flow use higher gearing to
finance their operations. Finally, board independence is negatively correlated
with institutional ownership, hence institutions invest less in firms with inde-
pendent boards, possibly due to concerns of the board that firms become less
transparent when institutions hold a significant percentage of shares.
According to Table 2, the correlations between variables are low to moderate,
which implies that multicollinearity is not of a concern in our specification.
4.2. Results on the association between competition and corporate governance
disclosure
Table 4 presents our main results on the association between product market
competition and corporate governance disclosure, without controlling for the
industry effects. In Models 1 to 6, the dependent variable is the corporate gov-
ernance disclosure index, while the independent variable of central interest is
each individual measure of competition. In Model 7 the dependent variable is
still the corporate governance disclosure index, while the independent vari-
ables are three factors resulting from the principal component analysis (entry
cost, industry profitability and industry concentration, respectively). In each
model we control for firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance
variables. The coefficients of industry average capital expenditure (ICAPEXP,
Model 1), industry market size (INDMKTS, Model 2) and industry price-cost
margin (INDMGN, Model 3) are positive and significant, which suggest that
firms operating in industries with higher entry costs (higher capital expendi-
ture and large market size) tend to disclose more information on corporate
governance. Furthermore, firms in more profitable industries tend to have
more corporate governance disclosure.
In Model 7 the coefficient of entry cost (which is the factor score
obtained from the principal component analysis on industry capital expendi-
ture and industry market size) is positive and significant, which confirms our
earlier result that firms disclose more governance information in less compet-
itive industries where there is higher entry cost. Our findings are consistent
with Li (2010), who shows that competition from potential rivals increases
management earnings forecasts and management investment forecasts.4
Overall, our findings support the argument that firms use more corporate gov-
ernance disclosure as a substitute for the external disciplinary force of prod-
uct market competition, as managers in these firms aim to gain a reputation
for the good treatment of their shareholders and the maintenance of investors'
confidence in their firms. H1 is thus supported.
Our results also suggest that the association between competition and
corporate governance disclosure is sensitive to the multi-dimensional charac-
terisation of competition, as we find a positive and significant association
between entry cost (industry profitability) and disclosure, but an insignifi-
cant association between industry concentration and disclosure. Therefore,
we caution against the use of a concentration ratio as the only measure of 
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Dependent variable:
Indexcgq
Independent
Variables:
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
Entry cost
Industry profitability
Ind’y concentration
BOARDIND
AUDIND
INSIDEROWN (%)
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
CASHFLOW
BETA
Constant
Observation
Wald Chi2
R2
(1)           (2)           (3)             (4)            (5)           (6)            (7)
Table 4: The association between product market competition and corporate governance disclosure
without controlling for industry effects (for the 162 firms (clusters))
0.001**
(0.033)
14.142**
(0.038)
11.341*
(0.072)
0.011
(0.796)
2.276**
(0.012)
0.827**
(0.003)
0.552
(0.909)
-5.938**
(0.045)
0.626
(0.486)
31.367**
(0.023)
353
38.06***
(0.000)
0.131
2.775**
(0.030)
11.985*
(0.077)
11.058*
(0.080)
0.012
(0.777)
2.679**
(0.003)
0.793**
(0.004)
1.117
(0.818)
-5.278*
(0.074)
0.549
(0.543)
-20.792
(0.464)
353
37.87***
(0.000)
0.129
109.972*
(0.094)
12.117*
(0.075)
10.884*
(0.085)
0.019
(0.668)
2.631**
(0.004)
0.766**
(0.006)
1.208
(0.804)
-5.349*
(0.071)
0.694
(0.442)
29.117**
(0.039)
353
35.78***
(0.000)
0.126
-0.005
(0.993)
11.819*
(0.088)
11.350*
(0.074)
0.0226
(0.601)
2.466**
(0.007)
0.734**
(0.008)
1.268
(0.795)
-5.264*
(0.077)
0.729
(0.436)
33.060**
(0.018)
353
32.66***
(0.000)
0.119
-0.751
(0.821)
11.593*
(0.093)
11.420*
(0.073)
0.0229
(0.597)
2.487**
(0.007)
0.736**
(0.008)
1.356
(0.782)
-5.136*
(0.090)
0.759
(0.408)
33.162**
(0.018)
353
32.66***
(0.000)
0.119
-0.736
(0.910)
11.745*
(0.087)
11.386*
(0.073)
0.0227
(0.600)
2.474**
(0.007)
0.735**
(0.008)
1.293
(0.791)
-5.213*
(0.083)
0.735
(0.419)
33.031**
(0.018)
353
32.65***
(0.000)
0.119
2.144**
(0.026)
-0.453
(0.691)
-0.283
(0.792)
13.103*
(0.056)
11.301*
(0.074)
0.006
(0.884)
2.438**
(0.008)
0.856**
(0.002)
0.549
(0.911)
-5.662*
(0.063)
0.636
(0.484)
32.163**
(0.023)
353
40.02***
(0.000)
0.136
***, **,* significant at 1 %, 5 %, 10 % levels respectively. 
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Table 5: The association between product market competition and corporate governance 
disclosure after controlling for industry effects (for the 162 firms (clusters))
Dependent Variable:
Indexcgq
Independent vari-
ables:
ICAPEXP
INDMKTS
INDMGN
INDROA
INDCON4
INDHHI
Entry cost
Industry profitability
Ind’y concentration
BOARDIND
AUDIND
INSTITUTIONOWN (%)
SIZE
MKBV
LEV
CASHFLOW
BETA
Constant
Wald Chi2
R2
(1)           (2)           (3)             (4)            (5)           (6)            (7)
0.001**
(0.038)1
1.864*
(0.102)
11.180*
(0.081)
0.013
(0.760)
2.481**
(0.009)
0.896**
(0.002)
0.431
(0.932)
-6.010*
(0.059)
0.981
(0.321)
23.240
(0.126)
40.01**
(0.001)
0.141
6.549
(0.857)
13.084*
(0.071)
12.321*
(0.056)
0.026
(0.550)
2.606**
(0.006)
0.714**
(0.012)
0.383
(0.939)
-5.050*
(0.107)
0.844
(0.393)
28.398*
(0.091)
36.35**
(0.003)
0.131
-35.288
(0.178)
13.526*
(0.064)
11.078*
(0.086)
0.021
(0.639)
2.586**
(0.007)
0.758**
(0.008)
0.439
(0.931)
-5.210*
(0.100)
0.901
(0.365)
62.357**
(0.029)
36.92**
(0.002)
0.134
-0.485
(0.582)
12.995*
(0.074)
11.860*
(0.066)
0.024
(0.584)
2.624**
(0.006)
0.720**
(0.011)
0.161
(0.975)
-5.091*
(0.107)
0.929
(0.355)
31.483**
(0.040)
35.66**
(0.003)
0.132
204.105
(0.132)
11.800*
(0.107)
11.156*
(0.083)
0.017
(0.701)
2.606**
(0.007)
0.828**
(0.005)
0.125
(0.980)
-5.734*
(0.073)
0.952
(0.339)
25.931*
(0.088)
37.34**
(0.002)
0.134
4.141*
(0.062)
11.751*
(0.108)
11.335*
(0.077)
0.010
(0.828)
2.576**
(0.007)
0.863**
(0.003)
0.231
(0.964)
-5.860*
(0.067)
0.764
(0.441)
-46.776
(0.283)
38.63**
(0.001)
0.134
3.018**
(0.033)
-0.845
(0.640)
1.707
(0.800)
11.629
(0.111)
11.482*
(0.074)
0.008
(0.849)
2.443**
(0.010)
0.921**
(0.002)
0.181
(0.971)
-6.237*
(0.049)
0.917
(0.354)
27.751*
(0.082)
41.43**
(0.001)
0.140
***, **,* significant at 1 %, 5 %, 10 % levels respectively. 
competition (see for example, Marciukaityte and Park 2009), because the sub-
sequent inference could be misleading.
The coefficients on board independence and audit committee independence
are positive and significant across all the regressions, which indicate that
firms with independent boards and independent audit committees have better
corporate governance disclosure. This is consistent with previous findings of a
positive relationship between governance and disclosure (see for example,
Anderson et al 2004). Accordingly, the empirical evidence supports H3.
Regarding the firm-specific variables, we show that there is a positive rela-
tionship between corporate governance disclosure and both firm size and mar-
ket to book ratio. In addition, cash flow is negatively associated with corporate
governance disclosure.
We re-estimate the regressions after controlling for industry effects, and
report the findings in Table 5. The results are qualitatively consistent, as the
coefficients of ICAPEXP (Model 1), INDMKTS (Model 2), INDMGN (Model 3) and
entry costs (Model 7) remain positive and significant, which suggests that our
results stay robust after controlling for the industry effects.
Finally, we estimate the models using the lagged corporate governance
factors to control for any possible endogeneity. The results (not reported) were
not substantially different from the results reported in this paper.5
Our results have important implications for regulators and policy mak-
ers, as government policies to regulate product market competition may have
unintended consequences on firms' disclosure practices. For example, the
multiple dimensions of competition imply that regulators need to consider
both current level of competition in terms of industry concentration and the
potential level of competition in terms of entry barriers, to assess appropriate-
ly the overall level of competition across different industries.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we test the association between product market competition and
corporate governance disclosure, using a sample of UK firms. What distin-
guishes the current study from previous studies on competition and corporate
disclosure is that we use multiple measures (entry cost, industry concentra-
tion and industry profitability), to reflect the different dimensions of competi-
tion, and analyse the association between each competition dimension and
corporate governance disclosure. We find that firms in less competitive indus-
tries (where entry cost is high and market size is large) have significantly more
disclosure. The results remain robust after controlling for the firm-specific fac-
tors and corporate governance variables that have been documented to affect
disclosure. Furthermore, we report a positive association between disclosure
and board independence, as well as audit committee independence, which
suggests that firms with better corporate governance tend to disclose more
information to external investors. Overall, the findings support the argument
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that managers use more disclosure as a substitute for the external discipli-
nary force of product market competition.
We contribute to the literature by identifying competition as an impor-
tant determinant of corporate governance disclosure. As far as we are aware
of, this is the first study to measure multiple dimensions of product market
competition, and investigate the relationship between corporate governance
disclosure and competition in the UK context. Second, we provide new evi-
dence on the positive association between corporate governance factors and
disclosure. Finally, our findings confirm that the association between compe-
tition and corporate governance disclosure is sensitive to the multi-dimen-
sional characterisation of competition. Therefore, we suggest that in future
studies, product market competition needs to be measured by more than
merely industry concentration to avoid reaching misleading inferences.
Our findings may have implications for both academics and policy mak-
ers, as we provide empirical evidence that different dimensions of competition
affect a firm's decision to disclose more information. In addition, firms with
strong internal governance (such as having more independent directors on the
board) are likely to disclose more information. Hence, our results suggest that
regulators might harmonise industry policies and accounting regulations to
increase social welfare of the general public. Furthermore, the multiple dimen-
sions of competition imply that policy makers may consider different aspects
of competition before they assess the impact of important merger and acqui-
sition deals that could re-shape the level of competition within an industry.
Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, we adopt an industry
level competition measure based on data from publicly listed firms in the UK.
As we do not have access to data on UK private firms, our measure is likely to
underestimate the actual level of competition. Second, our competition meas-
ure is compiled based on UK domestic firms. As the result of economic inte-
gration within the European Union (EU), companies from other EU countries
may compete directly with domestic UK firms, so our competition measure is
likely to be downward biased. Finally, by construction, our competition meas-
ure is at an industry level, however firms operating in the same industry may
confront different levels of competition. Unfortunately this is not captured by
our competition measure.
We suggest three directions for future research. First, researchers may
go beyond a single country to investigate the association between competition
and corporate governance disclosure from economically integrated regions,
such as the EU, in particular countries that use a common currency, such as
the euro. Within the EU, firms from different countries compete directly with
each other, which suggests that competition at the EU level may have an
impact on firms' disclosure practices.
Second, recent studies (e.g. Li et al 2013) develop a firm-level competi-
tion measure, based on how managers perceive the firm's competitive envi-
ronment in the management discussion and analysis section (MD&A) of 10-K
Economic Issues, Vol. 19, Part 1, 2014
- 89 -
filing for US public firms.6 Future research may use firm level competition
measures to provide in-depth insights on the association between competition
and corporate governance disclosure.
Finally, although competition at the industry level is considered stable
in the short to medium term, longitudinal studies may take the advantage of
studying external shocks to an industry, to explore how an increased or
decreased level of competition shapes firms' disclosure practice over time.
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ENDNOTES
1. Basil Al-Najjar; Department of Management; School of Business, Economics and
Informatics; Birkbeck, University of London Email: b.al-najjar@bbk.ac.uk; Rong Ding,
Accounting and Finance, Southampton University, Email: R.Ding@soton.ac.uk.
2. We employ a corporate governance rating score from the Corporate Governance
Quotient database developed by Institutional Shareholder Services, that rates publicly
traded companies in terms of the quality of their corporate governance. Each public
company is assigned a rating based on a number of factors including board structure
and composition, the executive and director compensation charter, and bylaw provi-
sions. The information is disclosed voluntarily by each firm, which reflects their level
of disclosure of internal governance information.
3. It is essential to note that firms from regulated industries (i.e., financial and utilities
firms) are excluded because they have different statutory requirements compared with
firms in other industries.
4.  Based on a large sample of US firms, Li (2010) uses principal component analysis
to construct competition from potential rivals with industry average of plant and
equipment, industry average R&D, industry average capital expenditure and industry
market size.
5. These results are available upon request.
6.Li et al (2013) use the number of occurrences of competition-related words (such as
competition, competitor, competitive and competing) per 1,000 total words in the 10-K
to capture competition at firm level, and find that firms' rates of diminishing marginal
return on new and existing investment vary significantly with this measure.
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